[RFC PATCH v1 10/11] samples/landlock: Add capability and namespace restriction support

Mickaël Salaün
2026-03-12T10:05:23Z

Extend the sandboxer sample to demonstrate the new Landlock capability
and namespace restriction features. The LL_CAPS environment variable
takes a colon-delimited list of allowed capability numbers (e.g. "18"
for CAP_SYS_CHROOT). The LL_NS variable takes a colon-delimited list of
allowed namespace types by short name (e.g. "user:uts:net"). Update
LANDLOCK_ABI_LAST to 9 and add best-effort degradation for older
kernels.

Allow creating user and UTS namespaces but deny network namespaces
(works as an unprivileged user). All capabilities are available
(LL_CAPS is not set), but namespace creation is still restricted to the
types listed in LL_NS. The first command succeeds because user and UTS
types are in the allowed set, and sets the hostname inside the new UTS
namespace. The second command fails because the network namespace type
is not allowed by the LANDLOCK_PERM_NAMESPACE_ENTER rule:

LL_FS_RO=/ LL_FS_RW=/proc LL_NS="user:uts" \
./sandboxer /bin/sh -c \
"unshare --user --uts --map-root-user hostname sandbox \
&& ! unshare --user --net true"

Allow only user namespace creation and CAP_SYS_CHROOT (18), denying all
other capabilities and namespace types (works as an unprivileged user).
An unprivileged process creates a user namespace (no capability
required) and calls chroot inside it using the CAP_SYS_CHROOT granted
within the new namespace:

LL_FS_RO=/ LL_FS_RW="" LL_NS="user" LL_CAPS="18" \
./sandboxer /bin/sh -c \
"unshare --user --keep-caps chroot / true"

Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
---
samples/landlock/sandboxer.c | 164 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 155 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c b/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c
index 9f21088c0855..09c499703835 100644
--- a/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c
+++ b/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c
@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <linux/landlock.h>
#include <linux/socket.h>
+#include <sched.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
@@ -22,12 +24,16 @@
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <unistd.h>
-#include <stdbool.h>

#if defined(__GLIBC__)
#include <linux/prctl.h>
#endif

+/* From include/linux/bits.h, not available in userspace. */
+#ifndef BITS_PER_TYPE
+#define BITS_PER_TYPE(type) (sizeof(type) * 8)
+#endif
+
#ifndef landlock_create_ruleset
static inline int
landlock_create_ruleset(const struct landlock_ruleset_attr *const attr,
@@ -60,6 +66,8 @@ static inline int landlock_restrict_self(const int ruleset_fd,
#define ENV_FS_RW_NAME "LL_FS_RW"
#define ENV_TCP_BIND_NAME "LL_TCP_BIND"
#define ENV_TCP_CONNECT_NAME "LL_TCP_CONNECT"
+#define ENV_CAPS_NAME "LL_CAPS"
+#define ENV_NS_NAME "LL_NS"
#define ENV_SCOPED_NAME "LL_SCOPED"
#define ENV_FORCE_LOG_NAME "LL_FORCE_LOG"
#define ENV_DELIMITER ":"
@@ -226,11 +234,125 @@ static int populate_ruleset_net(const char *const env_var, const int ruleset_fd,
return ret;
}

+static __u64 str2ns(const char *const name)
+{
+ static const struct {
+ const char *name;
+ __u64 value;
+ } ns_map[] = {
+ /* clang-format off */
+ { "cgroup", CLONE_NEWCGROUP },
+ { "ipc", CLONE_NEWIPC },
+ { "mnt", CLONE_NEWNS },
+ { "net", CLONE_NEWNET },
+ { "pid", CLONE_NEWPID },
+ { "time", CLONE_NEWTIME },
+ { "user", CLONE_NEWUSER },
+ { "uts", CLONE_NEWUTS },
+ /* clang-format on */
+ };
+ size_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sizeof(ns_map) / sizeof(ns_map[0]); i++) {
+ if (strcmp(name, ns_map[i].name) == 0)
+ return ns_map[i].value;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int populate_ruleset_caps(const char *const env_var,
+ const int ruleset_fd)
+{
+ int ret = 1;
+ char *env_cap_name, *env_cap_name_next, *strcap;
+ struct landlock_capability_attr cap_attr = {
+ .allowed_perm = LANDLOCK_PERM_CAPABILITY_USE,
+ };
+
+ env_cap_name = getenv(env_var);
+ if (!env_cap_name)
+ return 0;
+ env_cap_name = strdup(env_cap_name);
+ unsetenv(env_var);
+
+ env_cap_name_next = env_cap_name;
+ while ((strcap = strsep(&env_cap_name_next, ENV_DELIMITER))) {
+ __u64 cap;
+
+ if (strcmp(strcap, "") == 0)
+ continue;
+
+ if (str2num(strcap, &cap) ||
+ cap >= BITS_PER_TYPE(cap_attr.capabilities)) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Failed to parse capability at \"%s\"\n",
+ strcap);
+ goto out_free_name;
+ }
+ cap_attr.capabilities = 1ULL << cap;
+ if (landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_CAPABILITY,
+ &cap_attr, 0)) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Failed to update the ruleset with capability \"%llu\": %s\n",
+ (unsigned long long)cap, strerror(errno));
+ goto out_free_name;
+ }
+ }
+ ret = 0;
+
+out_free_name:
+ free(env_cap_name);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int populate_ruleset_ns(const char *const env_var, const int ruleset_fd)
+{
+ int ret = 1;
+ char *env_ns_name, *env_ns_name_next, *strns;
+ struct landlock_namespace_attr ns_attr = {
+ .allowed_perm = LANDLOCK_PERM_NAMESPACE_ENTER,
+ };
+
+ env_ns_name = getenv(env_var);
+ if (!env_ns_name)
+ return 0;
+ env_ns_name = strdup(env_ns_name);
+ unsetenv(env_var);
+
+ env_ns_name_next = env_ns_name;
+ while ((strns = strsep(&env_ns_name_next, ENV_DELIMITER))) {
+ __u64 ns_type;
+
+ if (strcmp(strns, "") == 0)
+ continue;
+
+ ns_type = str2ns(strns);
+ if (!ns_type) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Unknown namespace type \"%s\"\n",
+ strns);
+ goto out_free_name;
+ }
+ ns_attr.namespace_types = ns_type;
+ if (landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_NAMESPACE,
+ &ns_attr, 0)) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Failed to update the ruleset with namespace \"%s\": %s\n",
+ strns, strerror(errno));
+ goto out_free_name;
+ }
+ }
+ ret = 0;
+
+out_free_name:
+ free(env_ns_name);
+ return ret;
+}
+
/* Returns true on error, false otherwise. */
static bool check_ruleset_scope(const char *const env_var,
struct landlock_ruleset_attr *ruleset_attr)
{
- char *env_type_scope, *env_type_scope_next, *ipc_scoping_name;
+ char *env_type_scope, *env_type_scope_next, *scope_name;
bool error = false;
bool abstract_scoping = false;
bool signal_scoping = false;
@@ -247,16 +369,14 @@ static bool check_ruleset_scope(const char *const env_var,

env_type_scope = strdup(env_type_scope);
env_type_scope_next = env_type_scope;
- while ((ipc_scoping_name =
- strsep(&env_type_scope_next, ENV_DELIMITER))) {
- if (strcmp("a", ipc_scoping_name) == 0 && !abstract_scoping) {
+ while ((scope_name = strsep(&env_type_scope_next, ENV_DELIMITER))) {
+ if (strcmp("a", scope_name) == 0 && !abstract_scoping) {
abstract_scoping = true;
- } else if (strcmp("s", ipc_scoping_name) == 0 &&
- !signal_scoping) {
+ } else if (strcmp("s", scope_name) == 0 && !signal_scoping) {
signal_scoping = true;
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Unknown or duplicate scope \"%s\"\n",
- ipc_scoping_name);
+ scope_name);
error = true;
goto out_free_name;
}
@@ -299,7 +419,7 @@ static bool check_ruleset_scope(const char *const env_var,

/* clang-format on */

-#define LANDLOCK_ABI_LAST 8
+#define LANDLOCK_ABI_LAST 9

#define XSTR(s) #s
#define STR(s) XSTR(s)
@@ -322,6 +442,10 @@ static const char help[] =
"means an empty list):\n"
"* " ENV_TCP_BIND_NAME ": ports allowed to bind (server)\n"
"* " ENV_TCP_CONNECT_NAME ": ports allowed to connect (client)\n"
+ "* " ENV_CAPS_NAME ": capability numbers allowed to use "
+ "(e.g. 10 for CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE, 21 for CAP_SYS_ADMIN)\n"
+ "* " ENV_NS_NAME ": namespace types allowed to enter "
+ "(cgroup, ipc, mnt, net, pid, time, user, uts)\n"
"* " ENV_SCOPED_NAME ": actions denied on the outside of the landlock domain\n"
" - \"a\" to restrict opening abstract unix sockets\n"
" - \"s\" to restrict sending signals\n"
@@ -334,6 +458,8 @@ static const char help[] =
ENV_FS_RW_NAME "=\"/dev/null:/dev/full:/dev/zero:/dev/pts:/tmp\" "
ENV_TCP_BIND_NAME "=\"9418\" "
ENV_TCP_CONNECT_NAME "=\"80:443\" "
+ ENV_CAPS_NAME "=\"21\" "
+ ENV_NS_NAME "=\"user:uts:net\" "
ENV_SCOPED_NAME "=\"a:s\" "
"%1$s bash -i\n"
"\n"
@@ -357,6 +483,8 @@ int main(const int argc, char *const argv[], char *const *const envp)
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
.scoped = LANDLOCK_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET |
LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL,
+ .handled_perm = LANDLOCK_PERM_CAPABILITY_USE |
+ LANDLOCK_PERM_NAMESPACE_ENTER,
};
int supported_restrict_flags = LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_NEW_EXEC_ON;
int set_restrict_flags = 0;
@@ -438,6 +566,10 @@ int main(const int argc, char *const argv[], char *const *const envp)
~LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_NEW_EXEC_ON;
__attribute__((fallthrough));
case 7:
+ __attribute__((fallthrough));
+ case 8:
+ /* Removes permission support for ABI < 9 */
+ ruleset_attr.handled_perm = 0;
/* Must be printed for any ABI < LANDLOCK_ABI_LAST. */
fprintf(stderr,
"Hint: You should update the running kernel "
@@ -470,6 +602,14 @@ int main(const int argc, char *const argv[], char *const *const envp)
~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP;
}

+ /* Removes capability handling if not set by a user. */
+ if (!getenv(ENV_CAPS_NAME))
+ ruleset_attr.handled_perm &= ~LANDLOCK_PERM_CAPABILITY_USE;
+
+ /* Removes namespace handling if not set by a user. */
+ if (!getenv(ENV_NS_NAME))
+ ruleset_attr.handled_perm &= ~LANDLOCK_PERM_NAMESPACE_ENTER;
+
if (check_ruleset_scope(ENV_SCOPED_NAME, &ruleset_attr))
return 1;

@@ -514,6 +654,12 @@ int main(const int argc, char *const argv[], char *const *const envp)
goto err_close_ruleset;
}

+ if (populate_ruleset_caps(ENV_CAPS_NAME, ruleset_fd))
+ goto err_close_ruleset;
+
+ if (populate_ruleset_ns(ENV_NS_NAME, ruleset_fd))
+ goto err_close_ruleset;
+
if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)) {
perror("Failed to restrict privileges");
goto err_close_ruleset;
--
2.53.0