From: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com
Cc: paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com,
viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, brauner@kernel.org, jack@suse.cz,
john.johansen@canonical.com, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com,
omosnace@redhat.com, mic@digikod.net, gnoack@google.com,
takedakn@nttdata.co.jp, penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp,
herton@canonical.com, kernel-team@meta.com,
Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v5 7/8] vfs: Replace security_sb_mount/security_move_mount with granular hooks
Date: Thu, 28 May 2026 11:26:06 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260528182607.3150386-8-song@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260528182607.3150386-1-song@kernel.org>
Replace the monolithic security_sb_mount() call in path_mount() and
security_move_mount() in vfs_move_mount() with the new granular mount
hooks:
- do_loopback(): call security_mount_bind()
- do_new_mount(): call security_mount_new()
- do_remount(): call security_mount_remount()
- do_reconfigure_mnt(): call security_mount_reconfigure()
- do_move_mount_old(): call security_mount_move()
- do_change_type(): call security_mount_change_type()
- vfs_move_mount(): replace security_move_mount() with
security_mount_move()
The new hooks are called at the individual operation level with
appropriate context (resolved paths, fs_context), rather than at
the top of path_mount() with raw string arguments.
Code generated with the assistance of Claude, reviewed by human.
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> # for selinux only
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
---
fs/namespace.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
index fe919abd2f01..43f22c5e2bf4 100644
--- a/fs/namespace.c
+++ b/fs/namespace.c
@@ -2888,6 +2888,10 @@ static int do_change_type(const struct path *path, int ms_flags)
if (!type)
return -EINVAL;
+ err = security_mount_change_type(path, ms_flags);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
guard(namespace_excl)();
err = may_change_propagation(mnt);
@@ -3006,6 +3010,10 @@ static int do_loopback(const struct path *path, const char *old_name,
if (err)
return err;
+ err = security_mount_bind(&old_path, path, recurse);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
if (mnt_ns_loop(old_path.dentry))
return -EINVAL;
@@ -3328,7 +3336,8 @@ static void mnt_warn_timestamp_expiry(const struct path *mountpoint,
* superblock it refers to. This is triggered by specifying MS_REMOUNT|MS_BIND
* to mount(2).
*/
-static int do_reconfigure_mnt(const struct path *path, unsigned int mnt_flags)
+static int do_reconfigure_mnt(const struct path *path, unsigned int mnt_flags,
+ unsigned long flags)
{
struct super_block *sb = path->mnt->mnt_sb;
struct mount *mnt = real_mount(path->mnt);
@@ -3343,6 +3352,10 @@ static int do_reconfigure_mnt(const struct path *path, unsigned int mnt_flags)
if (!can_change_locked_flags(mnt, mnt_flags))
return -EPERM;
+ ret = security_mount_reconfigure(path, mnt_flags, flags);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
/*
* We're only checking whether the superblock is read-only not
* changing it, so only take down_read(&sb->s_umount).
@@ -3366,7 +3379,7 @@ static int do_reconfigure_mnt(const struct path *path, unsigned int mnt_flags)
* on it - tough luck.
*/
static int do_remount(const struct path *path, int sb_flags,
- int mnt_flags, void *data)
+ int mnt_flags, void *data, unsigned long flags)
{
int err;
struct super_block *sb = path->mnt->mnt_sb;
@@ -3393,6 +3406,9 @@ static int do_remount(const struct path *path, int sb_flags,
fc->oldapi = true;
err = parse_monolithic_mount_data(fc, data);
+ if (!err)
+ err = security_mount_remount(fc, path, mnt_flags, flags,
+ data);
if (!err) {
down_write(&sb->s_umount);
err = -EPERM;
@@ -3708,6 +3724,10 @@ static int do_move_mount_old(const struct path *path, const char *old_name)
if (err)
return err;
+ err = security_mount_move(&old_path, path);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
return do_move_mount(&old_path, path, 0);
}
@@ -3786,7 +3806,7 @@ static int do_new_mount_fc(struct fs_context *fc, const struct path *mountpoint,
*/
static int do_new_mount(const struct path *path, const char *fstype,
int sb_flags, int mnt_flags,
- const char *name, void *data)
+ const char *name, void *data, unsigned long flags)
{
struct file_system_type *type;
struct fs_context *fc;
@@ -3830,6 +3850,9 @@ static int do_new_mount(const struct path *path, const char *fstype,
err = parse_monolithic_mount_data(fc, data);
if (!err && !mount_capable(fc))
err = -EPERM;
+
+ if (!err)
+ err = security_mount_new(fc, path, mnt_flags, flags, data);
if (!err)
err = do_new_mount_fc(fc, path, mnt_flags);
@@ -4080,7 +4103,6 @@ int path_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path,
const char *type_page, unsigned long flags, void *data_page)
{
unsigned int mnt_flags = 0, sb_flags;
- int ret;
/* Discard magic */
if ((flags & MS_MGC_MSK) == MS_MGC_VAL)
@@ -4093,9 +4115,6 @@ int path_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path,
if (flags & MS_NOUSER)
return -EINVAL;
- ret = security_sb_mount(dev_name, path, type_page, flags, data_page);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
if (!may_mount())
return -EPERM;
if (flags & SB_MANDLOCK)
@@ -4141,9 +4160,9 @@ int path_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path,
SB_I_VERSION);
if ((flags & (MS_REMOUNT | MS_BIND)) == (MS_REMOUNT | MS_BIND))
- return do_reconfigure_mnt(path, mnt_flags);
+ return do_reconfigure_mnt(path, mnt_flags, flags);
if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
- return do_remount(path, sb_flags, mnt_flags, data_page);
+ return do_remount(path, sb_flags, mnt_flags, data_page, flags);
if (flags & MS_BIND)
return do_loopback(path, dev_name, flags & MS_REC);
if (flags & (MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE | MS_UNBINDABLE))
@@ -4152,7 +4171,7 @@ int path_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path,
return do_move_mount_old(path, dev_name);
return do_new_mount(path, type_page, sb_flags, mnt_flags, dev_name,
- data_page);
+ data_page, flags);
}
int do_mount(const char *dev_name, const char __user *dir_name,
@@ -4545,7 +4564,7 @@ static inline int vfs_move_mount(const struct path *from_path,
{
int ret;
- ret = security_move_mount(from_path, to_path);
+ ret = security_mount_move(from_path, to_path);
if (ret)
return ret;
--
2.53.0-Meta
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-05-28 18:26 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-05-28 18:25 [PATCH v5 0/8] lsm: Replace security_sb_mount with granular mount hooks Song Liu
2026-05-28 18:26 ` [PATCH v5 1/8] lsm: Add " Song Liu
2026-05-28 18:26 ` [PATCH v5 2/8] apparmor: Remove redundant MS_MGC_MSK stripping in apparmor_sb_mount Song Liu
2026-05-28 18:26 ` [PATCH v5 3/8] apparmor: Convert from sb_mount to granular mount hooks Song Liu
2026-05-28 18:26 ` [PATCH v5 4/8] selinux: " Song Liu
2026-05-28 18:26 ` [PATCH v5 5/8] landlock: " Song Liu
2026-05-28 18:26 ` [PATCH v5 6/8] tomoyo: " Song Liu
2026-05-28 18:26 ` Song Liu [this message]
2026-06-03 15:42 ` [PATCH v5 7/8] vfs: Replace security_sb_mount/security_move_mount with granular hooks Song Liu
2026-06-17 13:53 ` Christian Brauner
2026-06-18 10:56 ` Song Liu
2026-06-18 14:02 ` Christian Brauner
2026-06-19 6:14 ` Song Liu
2026-06-19 10:17 ` Christian Brauner
2026-05-28 18:26 ` [PATCH v5 8/8] lsm: Remove security_sb_mount and security_move_mount Song Liu
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2026-06-18 19:33 [PATCH v5 7/8] vfs: Replace security_sb_mount/security_move_mount with granular hooks Bryam Vargas
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