From: cem@kernel.org
To: cem@kernel.org
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>, "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org>,
Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>,
Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>,
linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Subject: [PATCH v3 2/5] capability: Add new capable_noaudit
Date: Thu, 2 Jul 2026 11:33:19 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260702093324.127450-5-cem@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260702093324.127450-1-cem@kernel.org>
From: Carlos Maiolino <cem@kernel.org>
In some situations (quota enforcement bypass in this case) we'd like to
check for a specific capability without triggering spurious audit
messages from security modules like selinux.
Add a new helper so we don't need to use ns_capable_noaudit() directly.
V3: remove the extern declaration
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Cc: Dr. Thomas Orgis" <thomas.orgis@uni-hamburg.de>
Cc: linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
---
include/linux/capability.h | 5 +++++
kernel/capability.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 22 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index 37db92b3d6f8..f8532d92fcad 100644
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -145,6 +145,7 @@ extern bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
extern bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t,
struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
extern bool capable(int cap);
+bool capable_noaudit(int cap);
extern bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
extern bool ns_capable_noaudit(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
extern bool ns_capable_setid(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
@@ -167,6 +168,10 @@ static inline bool capable(int cap)
{
return true;
}
+static inline bool capable_noaudit(int cap)
+{
+ return true;
+}
static inline bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
{
return true;
diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
index 829f49ae07b9..2c2d1e8300bd 100644
--- a/kernel/capability.c
+++ b/kernel/capability.c
@@ -416,6 +416,23 @@ bool capable(int cap)
return ns_capable(&init_user_ns, cap);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable);
+
+/**
+ * capable_noaudit - Determine if the current task has a superior
+ * capability in effect (unaudited).
+ * @cap: The capability to be tested for
+ *
+ * This is the same as capable(), except it uses CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT as to prevent
+ * issuing spurious audit messages.
+ *
+ * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the
+ * assumption that it's about to be used.
+ */
+bool capable_noaudit(int cap)
+{
+ return ns_capable_noaudit(&init_user_ns, cap);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable_noaudit);
#endif /* CONFIG_MULTIUSER */
/**
--
2.54.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-07-02 9:36 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-07-02 9:33 [PATCH v3 0/5] Fix quota evasion on xfs and add capable_noaudit cem
2026-07-02 9:33 ` [PATCH v3 1/5] xfs: fix capability check in xfs cem
2026-07-02 10:30 ` Christoph Hellwig
2026-07-02 11:17 ` Carlos Maiolino
2026-07-02 11:24 ` Christoph Hellwig
2026-07-02 12:11 ` Carlos Maiolino
2026-07-02 12:24 ` Carlos Maiolino
2026-07-02 9:33 ` cem [this message]
2026-07-02 15:56 ` [PATCH v3 2/5] capability: Add new capable_noaudit Darrick J. Wong
2026-07-02 9:33 ` [PATCH v3 3/5] quota: Don't issue audit messages on quota enforcing cem
2026-07-02 10:56 ` Jan Kara
2026-07-02 9:33 ` [PATCH v3 4/5] xfs: replace ns_capable_noaudit cem
2026-07-02 15:58 ` Darrick J. Wong
2026-07-02 9:33 ` [PATCH v3 5/5] capability: unexport has_capability_noaudit cem
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