From: Marcelo Mendes Spessoto Junior <marcelomspessoto@gmail.com>
To: syzbot+608f7f2a86361e18ba0b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: a.hindborg@kernel.org, leitao@debian.org,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com,
Marcelo Mendes Spessoto Junior <marcelomspessoto@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH] configfs: fix UAF race between rmdir and symlink
Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 15:35:56 -0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260805183556.18283-1-marcelomspessoto@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <6a6d3f0e.f794c993.27aeb.000a.GAE@google.com>
To avoid touching a target that is concurrently being removed,
configfs_get_config_item() and create_link() both rely on a hashed
dentry as proof that the config_item/configfs_dirent behind it is
still alive (using locks could lead to deadlocks, as described on
configfs_symlink).
However, configfs_remove_dir drops the last reference without
enforcing proper unhash over the dentry. This enables a possible
race condition where a symlink leads to UAF over a dentry that
has no reference but is still stale on the hash. Therefore, the
dentry removal must also enforce proper unhash, avoiding this
specific UAF scenario.
Verified against syzbot's C reproducer: no longer triggers the
WARN_ON/KASAN panics after this change.
Reported-by: syzbot+608f7f2a86361e18ba0b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=608f7f2a86361e18ba0b
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Mendes Spessoto Junior <marcelomspessoto@gmail.com>
---
fs/configfs/dir.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
fs/configfs/symlink.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
2 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/configfs/dir.c b/fs/configfs/dir.c
index 3c88f13f1ca2..ec6f3550178a 100644
--- a/fs/configfs/dir.c
+++ b/fs/configfs/dir.c
@@ -411,6 +411,21 @@ static void configfs_remove_dir(struct dentry *d)
{
struct dentry * parent = dget(d->d_parent);
+ /*
+ * Unhash before dropping any reference to the dirent/item this
+ * dentry pins: a concurrent configfs_get_config_item() (e.g. from
+ * configfs_symlink()'s target resolution, which runs unlocked
+ * against directories it doesn't otherwise own) only checks
+ * d_unhashed() under d_lock before pinning the item. Unhashing
+ * first ensures that check reliably fails once we're past this
+ * point, instead of racing the dirent/item's refcount reaching
+ * zero while the dentry is still (briefly) hashed.
+ */
+ spin_lock(&d->d_lock);
+ if (simple_positive(d))
+ __d_drop(d);
+ spin_unlock(&d->d_lock);
+
configfs_remove_dirent(d);
if (d_really_is_positive(d)) {
diff --git a/fs/configfs/symlink.c b/fs/configfs/symlink.c
index 31eb28b27309..b8043a6b0b42 100644
--- a/fs/configfs/symlink.c
+++ b/fs/configfs/symlink.c
@@ -78,18 +78,40 @@ static int create_link(struct config_item *parent_item,
struct config_item *item,
struct dentry *dentry)
{
- struct configfs_dirent *target_sd = item->ci_dentry->d_fsdata;
+ struct dentry *target_dentry = item->ci_dentry;
+ struct configfs_dirent *target_sd;
char *body;
int ret;
- if (!configfs_dirent_is_ready(target_sd))
+ /*
+ * item is pinned by the caller, but that only keeps the config_item
+ * itself alive. item->ci_dentry's configfs_dirent (and thus its
+ * s_count) is a separate refcount that a concurrent rmdir of this
+ * same directory can drop to zero and free independently -- see the
+ * matching d_lock/d_unhashed() dance in configfs_get_config_item()
+ * and the unhash-before-free ordering configfs_remove_dir() now
+ * guarantees. Do the same check here instead of trusting
+ * target_dentry->d_fsdata unconditionally.
+ */
+ spin_lock(&target_dentry->d_lock);
+ if (d_unhashed(target_dentry)) {
+ spin_unlock(&target_dentry->d_lock);
return -ENOENT;
+ }
+ target_sd = configfs_get(target_dentry->d_fsdata);
+ spin_unlock(&target_dentry->d_lock);
+
+ if (!configfs_dirent_is_ready(target_sd)) {
+ configfs_put(target_sd);
+ return -ENOENT;
+ }
body = kzalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!body)
+ if (!body) {
+ configfs_put(target_sd);
return -ENOMEM;
+ }
- configfs_get(target_sd);
spin_lock(&configfs_dirent_lock);
if (target_sd->s_type & CONFIGFS_USET_DROPPING) {
spin_unlock(&configfs_dirent_lock);
--
2.55.0
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-05 18:36 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-01 0:34 [syzbot] [fs?] WARNING in configfs_symlink syzbot
2026-08-05 18:35 ` Marcelo Mendes Spessoto Junior [this message]
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