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From: Anastasios Papagiannis <tasos.papagiannnis@gmail.com>
To: memxor@gmail.com
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org, andrii@kernel.org, ast@kernel.org,
	bpf@vger.kernel.org, brauner@kernel.org, daniel@iogearbox.net,
	david@kernel.org, eddyz87@gmail.com, kpsingh@kernel.org,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, ljs@kernel.org, matt@bobrowski.net,
	song@kernel.org, sun.jian.kdev@gmail.com,
	tasos.papagiannnis@gmail.com, utilityemal77@gmail.com,
	viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next v5 4/7] bpf: Allow reads through trusted-or-null BTF pointers
Date: Tue,  8 Sep 2026 14:47:36 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260908114736.5342-1-tasos.papagiannnis@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <DL9V0Y6BPZSY.3J1EXVDXSHRFO@gmail.com>

Thanks for the review!

> We tried doing this before in
> https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20241104171959.2938862-2-memxor@gmail.com and it
> got reverted, it broke all sorts of things and made everything more complex.

Out of curiosity, what were the main issues caused by that change?

> I would drop this hack and just fix the program. Given your earlier change to
> annotate the field correctly, I am puzzled why you added this, and there isn't
> any description anywhere explaining why.

Initially, in v1, I only marked linux_binprm->mm as trusted-or-null in [1] where 
I also needed to update a test. But I got an AI review comment in [2] that this
change breaks the BPF load-compatibility guarantee documented in 
Documentation/bpf/bpf_design_QA.rst.

For this reason, I took a simpler approach in [3] where Andrii commented in [4]
that we might want to look into having verifier still allow to dereference
trusted ptr-or-null into untrusted ptr_to_btf_id to help with smooth transitions
like this or just marked linux_binprm->mm as trusted-or-null (ignoring the issue
about breaking the BPF load-compatibility guarantee).

So I tried the more "risky" approach first. This was the full story behind this 
change.

To summarise: are you ok with removing this patch (and the next one with the tests)
and fall back to something like [1]?

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260811112154.94053-1-tasos.papagiannnis@gmail.com/T/#m295ed4ae8a717ac4cdf536585f150590faa2c40c
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260811112154.94053-1-tasos.papagiannnis@gmail.com/T/#mc0865ac61ab3ffb1acb720e42b35ea65469442b5
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260820131801.68759-1-tasos.papagiannnis@gmail.com/
[4] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260820131801.68759-1-tasos.papagiannnis@gmail.com/T/#mf5cd6a81c2e8231999ed2e4b991e060cfc4ca7d9

Thanks,
Anastasios

  reply	other threads:[~2026-09-08 11:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-09-07 16:52 [PATCH bpf-next v5 0/7] bpf: Add user memory access kfuncs for mm_struct Anastasios Papagiannis
2026-09-07 16:52 ` [PATCH bpf-next v5 1/7] mm: Add copy_remote_mm_str() Anastasios Papagiannis
2026-09-07 20:06   ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-09-08 13:16   ` Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)
2026-09-07 16:52 ` [PATCH bpf-next v5 2/7] exec: Clear bprm->mm before dropping its reference Anastasios Papagiannis
2026-09-07 16:52 ` [PATCH bpf-next v5 3/7] bpf: Add user memory access kfuncs for mm_struct Anastasios Papagiannis
2026-09-08 11:56   ` Matt Bobrowski
2026-09-07 16:52 ` [PATCH bpf-next v5 4/7] bpf: Allow reads through trusted-or-null BTF pointers Anastasios Papagiannis
2026-09-08 10:24   ` Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
2026-09-08 11:47     ` Anastasios Papagiannis [this message]
2026-09-08 13:19       ` Anastasios Papagiannis
2026-09-07 16:52 ` [PATCH bpf-next v5 5/7] selftests/bpf: Cover trusted-or-null BTF pointer reads Anastasios Papagiannis
2026-09-07 16:52 ` [PATCH bpf-next v5 6/7] bpf: Mark linux_binprm->mm as trusted-or-null Anastasios Papagiannis
2026-09-08 10:12   ` Matt Bobrowski
2026-09-07 16:52 ` [PATCH bpf-next v5 7/7] selftests/bpf: Test mm_struct user memory kfuncs with linux_binprm Anastasios Papagiannis

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