From: Anastasios Papagiannis <tasos.papagiannnis@gmail.com>
To: bpf@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, david@kernel.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
andrii@kernel.org, ast@kernel.org, brauner@kernel.org,
daniel@iogearbox.net, eddyz87@gmail.com, kpsingh@kernel.org,
ljs@kernel.org, matt@bobrowski.net, memxor@gmail.com,
song@kernel.org, sun.jian.kdev@gmail.com,
utilityemal77@gmail.com, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk,
tasos.papagiannnis@gmail.com
Subject: [PATCH bpf-next v6 0/5] bpf: Add user memory access kfuncs for mm_struct
Date: Tue, 8 Sep 2026 16:52:57 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260908135302.74963-1-tasos.papagiannnis@gmail.com> (raw)
On MMU systems, during exec, argument and environment strings are copied
into the new address space held by struct linux_binprm before that address
space is installed on the task_struct. Existing BPF user memory helpers
operate on the current address space or one associated with a task_struct.
Because no task_struct refers to the new address space at this point,
programs cannot access these strings from the bprm_check_security LSM
hook.
This series adds two sleepable BPF kfuncs for copying bytes or
NUL-terminated strings from a trusted struct mm_struct. It also marks
linux_binprm->mm as trusted-or-null, allowing BPF LSM programs to pass it
to the kfuncs after a NULL check and inspect exec arguments before
allowing the exec to continue.
To make the trusted-or-null annotation safe, the exec paths are hardened
to clear bprm->mm before dropping the reference it owns.
On NOMMU systems, exec argument and environment strings remain in
bprm->page[] until they are transferred to the new process stack. They
cannot be accessed through bprm->mm at the bprm_check_security hook.
The new kfuncs remain available on NOMMU for address ranges represented
by a supplied struct mm_struct.
The series adds selftests covering both kfuncs while reading argument and
environment strings from linux_binprm during exec.
Changes in v6:
- Drop redundant extern keywords and CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL guards from the
remote memory copy declarations.
- Drop the explicit bpf_copy_from_user_mm() prototype and share copy
logic through inlineable static internal helpers instead of calling
between kfunc/helper entry points.
- Validate flags and zero-length requests before acquiring the task's
mm, preserving existing behavior and ensuring internal helpers are
called only with a live mm.
- Drop the verifier relaxation for unchecked reads through trusted-or-null
pointers and its tests.
- Fix the existing LSM selftest to explicitly NULL-check bprm->mm after
marking the field trusted-or-null.
Changes in v5:
- Move the shared wrappers to mm/util.c and handle zero-length requests
at the entry points.
Changes in v4:
- Add negative verifier tests for atomic RMW and load-acquire accesses
through trusted-or-null BTF pointers.
- Preserve explicit nullability-marking coverage for tracepoint
arguments, dentry->d_inode, and sched_ext .dispatch.
- Use the already-nullable mmap_file argument for the negative store
test, avoiding dependency on the later linux_binprm->mm marking.
- Clarify the bprm->mm lifetime invariant and move its lifetime fix
before the mm_struct kfunc patch.
- Reword the trusted-or-null read change in imperative mood and remove
its redundant before-and-after summary.
- Document that the existing task-based user-memory interfaces delegate
to the new mm-based implementations, reorder the string-copy kfuncs to
remove an unnecessary declaration, and annotate the remaining
declaration with __bpf_kfunc.
Changes in v3:
- Replace the linux_binprm-specific kfuncs with generic struct mm_struct
kfuncs, as suggested by Andrii Nakryiko.
- Move the kfuncs next to the existing user memory helpers and make the
task-based variants delegate to the new mm-based implementations, as
suggested by Andrii Nakryiko.
- Clear bprm->mm before dropping its reference on exec error paths.
- Mark linux_binprm->mm as trusted-or-null.
- Allow fault-protected reads through trusted-or-null BTF pointers to
preserve compatibility with existing BPF programs, as suggested by
Andrii Nakryiko.
- Add verifier and runtime selftests for trusted-or-null BTF pointer
reads.
- Rename __copy_remote_vm_str() to __copy_remote_mm_str(), as suggested
by Andrii Nakryiko.
- Clarify that reading exec strings through bprm->mm is limited to MMU
systems, while the generic mm-based kfuncs remain available on NOMMU.
Changes in v2:
- Register the kfuncs on NOMMU systems and return -EOPNOTSUPP when called,
as suggested by Justin Suess.
- Add selftest coverage for reading environment strings, as suggested by
Justin Suess.
- Clarify that copy_remote_mm_str() leaves the destination untouched when
called with a zero-length buffer.
- Use sizeof() instead of hardcoded argument lengths in the selftests.
- Use ~0ULL for invalid-flags checks in the selftests.
v5:
https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260907165220.52431-1-tasos.papagiannnis@gmail.com/
v4:
https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260904145340.40212-1-tasos.papagiannnis@gmail.com/
v3:
https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260831092305.42062-1-tasos.papagiannnis@gmail.com/
v2:
https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260820131801.68759-1-tasos.papagiannnis@gmail.com/
v1:
https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260812111140.7762-1-tasos.papagiannnis@gmail.com/
Anastasios Papagiannis (5):
mm: Add copy_remote_mm_str()
exec: Clear bprm->mm before dropping its reference
bpf: Add user memory access kfuncs for mm_struct
bpf: Mark linux_binprm->mm as trusted-or-null
selftests/bpf: Test mm_struct user memory kfuncs with linux_binprm
fs/exec.c | 7 +-
include/linux/mm.h | 8 +-
kernel/bpf/helpers.c | 130 ++++++++++++++++--
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 5 +
mm/internal.h | 3 +
mm/memory.c | 41 +-----
mm/nommu.c | 41 +-----
mm/util.c | 62 +++++++++
.../bpf/prog_tests/copy_from_user_bprm.c | 72 ++++++++++
.../selftests/bpf/progs/copy_from_user_bprm.c | 123 +++++++++++++++++
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm.c | 5 +-
11 files changed, 400 insertions(+), 97 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/copy_from_user_bprm.c
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/copy_from_user_bprm.c
base-commit: 1b7415bf70be95b9a1e7e87d544867881065613f
--
2.55.0
next reply other threads:[~2026-09-08 13:53 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-09-08 13:52 Anastasios Papagiannis [this message]
2026-09-08 13:52 ` [PATCH bpf-next v6 1/5] mm: Add copy_remote_mm_str() Anastasios Papagiannis
2026-09-08 14:07 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-09-08 13:52 ` [PATCH bpf-next v6 2/5] exec: Clear bprm->mm before dropping its reference Anastasios Papagiannis
2026-09-08 13:53 ` [PATCH bpf-next v6 3/5] bpf: Add user memory access kfuncs for mm_struct Anastasios Papagiannis
2026-09-08 16:18 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-09-09 7:24 ` Anastasios Papagiannis
2026-09-08 13:53 ` [PATCH bpf-next v6 4/5] bpf: Mark linux_binprm->mm as trusted-or-null Anastasios Papagiannis
2026-09-08 13:53 ` [PATCH bpf-next v6 5/5] selftests/bpf: Test mm_struct user memory kfuncs with linux_binprm Anastasios Papagiannis
2026-09-08 16:18 ` bot+bpf-ci
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20260908135302.74963-1-tasos.papagiannnis@gmail.com \
--to=tasos.papagiannnis@gmail.com \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=andrii@kernel.org \
--cc=ast@kernel.org \
--cc=bpf@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=brauner@kernel.org \
--cc=daniel@iogearbox.net \
--cc=david@kernel.org \
--cc=eddyz87@gmail.com \
--cc=kpsingh@kernel.org \
--cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
--cc=ljs@kernel.org \
--cc=matt@bobrowski.net \
--cc=memxor@gmail.com \
--cc=song@kernel.org \
--cc=sun.jian.kdev@gmail.com \
--cc=utilityemal77@gmail.com \
--cc=viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox