From: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
To: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
netdev@vger.kernel.org,
"Christian Brauner (Amutable)" <brauner@kernel.org>,
stable@kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 4/8] landlock: pass the namespace id to log to check_ns_type()
Date: Mon, 26 Oct 2026 10:57:12 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261026-work-security-namespace_free-v1-4-ffa3ebbf71bd@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261026-work-security-namespace_free-v1-0-ffa3ebbf71bd@kernel.org>
Landlock logs the namespace id when it denies the use of a namespace.
check_ns_type() takes it from the namespace itself. When it is called
from the namespace_init hook the id is always zero as it is only
allocated after the hook has run.
A follow-up patch will allocate the id before the namespace_init hook is
called. But a namespace whose creation is denied never becomes visible
and the Landlock documentation says that namespace_id is zero for
namespace creation (cf. Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/landlock.rst and
Documentation/trace/events-landlock.rst). So pass the id to log to
check_ns_type() and keep passing zero from hook_namespace_init().
No functional changes.
Fixes: f675d2e95569 ("lsm: add LSM blob and hooks for namespaces")
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> # mainline only
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
---
security/landlock/ns.c | 11 ++++++-----
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/landlock/ns.c b/security/landlock/ns.c
index cd44c927f83a..39795c4e1404 100644
--- a/security/landlock/ns.c
+++ b/security/landlock/ns.c
@@ -90,15 +90,16 @@ static const struct access_masks ns_permission = {
* check_ns_type - Check namespace use permission
*
* @ns: The namespace being allocated or installed.
+ * @ns_id: The namespace id to log.
*
* Shared check for namespace_init (creation via clone(2), unshare(2),
* open_tree(2), or fsmount(2)) and namespace_install (use via setns(2)): denies
* when the namespace type is not in the domain's allowed set. At allocation
- * time @ns->ns_id is still zero and is logged as such.
+ * time the namespace isn't visible yet so @ns_id is zero.
*
* Return: 0 if allowed, -EPERM if denied.
*/
-static int check_ns_type(struct ns_common *const ns)
+static int check_ns_type(struct ns_common *const ns, const u64 ns_id)
{
const struct landlock_cred_security *subject;
size_t denied_layer;
@@ -121,7 +122,7 @@ static int check_ns_type(struct ns_common *const ns)
.permission =
LANDLOCK_PERMISSION_NAMESPACE_USE,
.audit.u.ns.ns_type = ns->ns_type,
- .audit.u.ns.ns_id = ns->ns_id,
+ .audit.u.ns.ns_id = ns_id,
.layer_plus_one = denied_layer,
});
return -EPERM;
@@ -129,13 +130,13 @@ static int check_ns_type(struct ns_common *const ns)
static int hook_namespace_init(struct ns_common *const ns)
{
- return check_ns_type(ns);
+ return check_ns_type(ns, 0);
}
static int hook_namespace_install(const struct nsset *const nsset,
struct ns_common *const ns)
{
- return check_ns_type(ns);
+ return check_ns_type(ns, ns->ns_id);
}
static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
--
2.53.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-10-26 9:57 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-26 9:57 [PATCH 0/8] ns: fixes for the namespace LSM hooks Christian Brauner
2026-10-26 9:57 ` [PATCH 1/8] lsm: always call the namespace_free hook Christian Brauner
2026-10-26 9:57 ` [PATCH 2/8] bpf: don't mark namespace_init and namespace_free arguments as trusted Christian Brauner
2026-10-26 9:57 ` [PATCH 3/8] selftests/bpf: add verifier tests for the namespace LSM hooks Christian Brauner
2026-10-26 9:57 ` Christian Brauner [this message]
2026-10-26 9:57 ` [PATCH 5/8] ns: allocate the namespace id before the namespace_init hook Christian Brauner
2026-10-26 9:57 ` [PATCH 6/8] nstree: drop ns_tree_add_raw() Christian Brauner
2026-10-26 9:57 ` [PATCH 7/8] lsm: fix the security_namespace_init() kernel-doc Christian Brauner
2026-10-26 9:57 ` [PATCH 8/8] selftests/bpf: add a lifecycle test for the namespace LSM hooks Christian Brauner
2026-10-26 20:31 ` [PATCH 0/8] ns: fixes " Paul Moore
2026-10-27 9:24 ` Christian Brauner
2026-10-27 14:36 ` Daniel Borkmann
2026-10-27 22:37 ` Paul Moore
2026-10-28 10:42 ` Christian Brauner
2026-10-28 15:59 ` Paul Moore
2026-10-26 23:31 ` Alexei Starovoitov
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