From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; t=1795219756; b=Vcl0s/TxsW02pAMm4bskhetYN8IkrgzSwzvWoheuqzNH6cTlgFtrpeIMr8mY+0JHuIO4 QYuGsrov4QkDlDfePkOJsmgA7lAdOpr4RhHNcuht+ayWOvS3HtyvhZdFLLVK1rtBiW+FE 1FKYtTDk046ofMlEnNZHsnRhTOp0RNhs3V76zucNhU2yVEeA2otCjH37l53ExHrRuHk5C xIuuTVPOsYe/FWnBzHKVSkWXc3nZej3Ki9F0/naZpvoCJU+bynORuxGl/Z69JYZ8GOkWd GLTFXBFecJMWQcxu5pxoP+iOjldUfZ2Jktl+e7uj6buViOfQT2rZ2rbSiMRpuziN0Ww== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1795219756; h=Received:DKIM-Signature:From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:X-Mailer: In-Reply-To:References:MIME-Version:Content-Transfer-Encoding; bh=ltCLnFz06IQQ3SZ4JmjrUpmJ3OSN/eK/CX4oIn1dBP0=; b=OWLDCHnokASgnYDYROSOvaJTicRasXJxFR+dTadEKqZkzFJMmXNFbbibFxhDCn9KWDhh l0EfHPiE0dpQqCzKYy3b+4IXW/1GSOhY9kgFDiCFDcbZb/FfiwBrNYxZyIRgc2bg0F1iE dfJn/TLyCukJzq8pdw/YV3R8rOMC7sOY3HVUh/IFQqmyYJUmAKPS44sBURzT13oRzML3I N4GaDGc1fP5LbGIEYekyYquQwbCFh6C4kGsWNXUH6kD1QN0KOx59TTeY3LumLMFX6iQUT lmpmtcplqnBHyGypkPFk87EZjFn/SOOtQvsXERaOebbv9D7lFHmuCsc8ZKtaQHLpKfg== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=E6eFWkLN; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (quasi.space.kernel.org [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with UTF8SMTPS id 9491F606A688; Sat, 21 Nov 2026 00:09:16 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=E6eFWkLN Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with UTF8SMTPSA id 8CF171F00A3D; Sat, 21 Nov 2026 00:09:15 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1795219756; bh=ltCLnFz06IQQ3SZ4JmjrUpmJ3OSN/eK/CX4oIn1dBP0=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=E6eFWkLNbxYCdzsPwOHpyhJa3fnhM106kVy1noUevOAjD4VRTNpQprlWqpZx0fk9F fPF3K1sj4lenh8sHolhHTqIM36IyPEf7cGQaODb5Y53NPblxs29R7VON//kvE2qbEM wuHini2ovvVt2ou18JLHSOqfANgPURVWLcJYlVH4INaiuK/4LLRT5vgtkoxte5VySt uv6RrE3r94o1hWJa+cPjqvsAuL9r+veLWGak6PzpxNj1rZ/bjsM88K8eeetMSJh9YM vLhBUKAbIqBW4k2jHWIO76idMrVIlAHOeHbBjv3v6XSHe54WGSo4QcA1pSR9LfCA3/ sPQCkmMFn0LvQ== From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen , linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Alexander Mikhalitsyn , Alexander Viro , Andy Lutomirski , Christian Brauner , David Howells , Jan Kara , Jonathan Corbet , Josef Bacik , Kees Cook , Neal Gompa , Paul Moore , Serge Hallyn , Zygmunt Krynicki Subject: [RFC PATCH v5 05/25] mount: Enforce mount_too_revealing() for foreign mntns Date: Sat, 21 Nov 2026 02:08:24 +0200 Message-ID: <20261121000844.1863324-6-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.47.3 In-Reply-To: <20261121000844.1863324-1-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20261121000844.1863324-1-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailing-List: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit mount_too_revealing() skips visibility checks whenever current->nsproxy->mnt_ns belongs to init_user_ns, assuming the caller holds CAP_SYS_ADMIN in its current mount namespace. That assumption does not hold when an unprivileged caller creates mounts for a child user namespace while running in init_mnt_ns or another foreign mount namespace. Require CAP_SYS_ADMIN in init_user_ns before bypassing mount_too_revealing() for init_mnt_ns, reject chrooted callers lacking CAP_SYS_ADMIN in their current mount namespace, and treat existing mounts and child overmounts in a foreign mount namespace as locked during mnt_already_visible() checks. Co-developed-by: David Howells Signed-off-by: David Howells Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- fs/namespace.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c index 781380945d78..b2dc84c0d0d6 100644 --- a/fs/namespace.c +++ b/fs/namespace.c @@ -6582,6 +6582,7 @@ static bool mnt_already_visible(struct mnt_namespace *ns, const struct super_block *sb, int *new_mnt_flags) { + bool foreign_ns = !ns_capable_noaudit(ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN); int new_flags = *new_mnt_flags; struct mount *mnt; @@ -6606,11 +6607,16 @@ static bool mnt_already_visible(struct mnt_namespace *ns, continue; /* A local view of the mount flags */ - mnt_flags = mnt->mnt.mnt_flags; + mnt_flags = READ_ONCE(mnt->mnt.mnt_flags); /* Don't miss readonly hidden in the superblock flags */ if (sb_rdonly(mnt->mnt.mnt_sb)) mnt_flags |= MNT_LOCK_READONLY; + if (foreign_ns) { + if (mnt_flags & MNT_READONLY) + mnt_flags |= MNT_LOCK_READONLY; + mnt_flags |= MNT_LOCK_ATIME; + } /* Verify the mount flags are equal to or more permissive * than the proposed new mount. @@ -6629,7 +6635,7 @@ static bool mnt_already_visible(struct mnt_namespace *ns, list_for_each_entry(child, &mnt->mnt_mounts, mnt_child) { struct inode *inode = child->mnt_mountpoint->d_inode; /* Only worry about locked mounts */ - if (!(child->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCKED)) + if (!foreign_ns && !(READ_ONCE(child->mnt.mnt_flags) & MNT_LOCKED)) continue; /* Is the directory permanently empty? */ if (!is_empty_dir_inode(inode)) @@ -6650,13 +6656,18 @@ static bool mount_too_revealing(const struct super_block *sb, int *new_mnt_flags struct mnt_namespace *ns = current->nsproxy->mnt_ns; unsigned long s_iflags; - if (ns->user_ns == &init_user_ns) - return false; - /* Can this filesystem be too revealing? */ if (!(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_USERNS_MOUNT_RESTRICTED)) return false; + if (ns->user_ns == &init_user_ns && + ns_capable_noaudit(&init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + return false; + + if (!ns_capable_noaudit(ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && + current_chrooted()) + return true; + s_iflags = sb->s_iflags; if ((s_iflags & required_iflags) != required_iflags) { WARN_ONCE(1, "Expected s_iflags to contain 0x%lx\n", -- 2.47.3