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From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
	Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>,
	Anna Schumaker <anna@kernel.org>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>,
	Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>,
	Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	selinux@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6] vfs, security: Fix automount superblock LSM init problem, preventing NFS sb sharing
Date: Fri, 04 Aug 2023 16:16:18 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <2678222.1691162178@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <bac543537058619345b363bbfc745927.paul@paul-moore.com>

Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> wrote:

> 
> I generally dislike core kernel code which makes LSM calls conditional
> on some kernel state maintained outside the LSM.  Sometimes it has to
> be done as there is no other good options, but I would like us to try
> and avoid it if possible.  The commit description mentioned that this
> was put here to avoid a SELinux complaint, can you provide an example
> of the complain?  Does it complain about a double/invalid mount, e.g.
> "SELinux: mount invalid.  Same superblock, different security ..."?
> 
> I'd like to understand why the sb_set_mnt_opts() call fails when it
> comes after the fs_context_init() call.  I'm particulary curious to
> know if the failure is due to conflicting SELinux state in the
> fs_context, or if it is simply an issue of sb_set_mnt_opts() not
> properly handling existing values.  Perhaps I'm being overly naive,
> but I'm hopeful that we can address both of these within the SELinux
> code itself.
> 
> In a worst case situation, we could always implement a flag *inside*
> the SELinux code, similar to what has been done with 'lsm_set' here.

IIRC, the issue is when you make a mount with an explicit context= setting and
make another mount from some way down the export tree that doesn't have an
explicit setting, e.g.:

	mount carina:/ /mnt -o context=system_u:object_r:root_t:s0
	mount carina:/nfs/scratch /mnt2

and then cause an automount to walk from one to the other:

	stat /mnt/nfs/scratch/foo

For reference, my server has:

	/nfs/scratch 192.168.6.0/255.255.255.0,90.155.74.16/255.255.255.248
	/nfs         192.168.6.0/255.255.255.0,90.155.74.16/255.255.255.248
	/            192.168.6.0/255.255.255.0,90.155.74.16/255.255.255.248

and if I look in /proc/fs/nfsfs/volumes, I can see the individual superblocks:

	NV SERVER   PORT DEV          FSID                              FSC
	v4 c0a80601  801 0:51         0:0                               no 
	v4 c0a80601  801 0:56         3:0                               no 
	v4 c0a80601  801 0:52         1:0                               no 
	v4 c0a80601  801 0:55         3:0                               no 

As you can see, there are two referring to the same 'volume'.

Without the "fc->lsm_set=true" bit, you get an error something like:

	SELinux: mount invalid.  Same superblock, different security settings for (dev 0:56, type nfs4)

One important question is how should sharing of a mount with unspecified
context be handled when we try to unify it with a mount that has an explicit
context?

David


  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-08-04 15:17 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-08-02 16:49 [PATCH v6] vfs, security: Fix automount superblock LSM init problem, preventing NFS sb sharing Jeff Layton
2023-08-02 18:16 ` Paul Moore
2023-08-02 19:34   ` Jeff Layton
2023-08-03  2:46     ` Paul Moore
2023-08-03 16:27       ` Jeff Layton
2023-08-04  2:48         ` Paul Moore
2023-08-04 12:58           ` Jeff Layton
2023-08-03 13:27     ` Christian Brauner
2023-08-03 16:09       ` Jeff Layton
2023-08-03 17:36         ` Christian Brauner
2023-08-03 18:58           ` Jeff Layton
2023-08-04  8:25             ` Christian Brauner
2023-08-04 13:25               ` Jeff Layton
2023-08-04 13:38                 ` Christian Brauner
2023-08-04 15:16 ` David Howells [this message]
2023-08-04 15:22 ` David Howells
2023-08-04 16:00   ` Jeff Layton

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