From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; t=1794995204; b=U91er+ucZBcAOwtvuGxk3foI1ZqeN02N2xWOlpOplV1mWEFbRoFaAfXB5YIBymgUUX6W CV8/Lkuc0uxdhWsYzQXIFZL7G6ayD2V4CXz0NX+A4JR7t3iVKbdwHAWh38HHwiaNKCJo7 iHO5L70p7tyBRuTHMyoQiV7XA53aQgkxRaBebxYZOlLN+G1vf2HTCN3Jqqt9Ff92DDhfx b3G092TkBx5U+NNsngK7GMBm/Csd/gk5PAkWqSBtNIJCyvqi/LO0HwlG4bzVqg7Y5pf4I hyOGtfEUgQUTlNsFsjw5tDIQ6CCkvX8Tenww4o1pZx6bFUqKnlLo+jt6+2LyQ3F/EXw== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1794995204; h=Received:DKIM-Signature:Message-ID:Date:MIME-Version:User-Agent: Subject:To:Cc:References:From:Content-Language:Autocrypt:In-Reply-To: Content-Type:Content-Transfer-Encoding; bh=CtaieybfS6BQtpEqYoffKr95cQJaQPqI7rmHn30lmpg=; b=mg0J7lnPNL6Z51SCOPTACweg0G4aQLWH1RXRU/PRrOFQIBDL85auSM5ENa6rLIGNT8aT lKclzH7qoNz+4Lm6B8Si32HlLj2R++a2tExzBbByVvSZZHlQNFaZFPR4wpXwZSz4czbSJ aMfCNSvcKLIm97jz3z5x/6FNoxqGvmCeWScHH0nOBEmv00mbCtpfQvwboiHA9rbX3k2h3 ZjZfC6/eU1+5wKTFsIHByNFmNP/6d1sHn4+Y4fkxVM6oD8JOa94V9vagyEgQHgwxQkKId 7KHmcQ6KFEJ67/Ee0pWgWGNMVzte1FCqQLGc4llT9Cc39v/1IVKCSXNkuZzrTs1hWGw== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=RQYGohhW; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (quasi.space.kernel.org [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2E79A606A32F; Wed, 18 Nov 2026 09:46:43 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=RQYGohhW Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id CA1101F000C4; Wed, 18 Nov 2026 09:46:27 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1794995203; bh=CtaieybfS6BQtpEqYoffKr95cQJaQPqI7rmHn30lmpg=; h=Date:Subject:To:Cc:References:From:In-Reply-To; b=RQYGohhWWhAMmEGxIAzOYr6Fx+D3c8etuGKHMFcbyKBYk19gb0PmTU3vg4xr2/6an SJ/qop6o7easXoypEONyiMJCk8cgR+yJjAnGlWhqyYJ/ziD1aNlj2ESpXtYiDNRwlj e5B2ZdNugULbszT5sBs7bvHePzJ8bmuqz1BjALmVdtQaVhFWk40mYXG3RtN1ZfLaG8 CO7RPHtrPQW3mS0ouvPJuJjTBrscheUKbE+yzjJIA5+EdbTjFPpS41EOhTYuSfpYXk m2o215lUT4PGALLB0rFVQlxsiCFea6eOd2CBZHCy/6uKXDd0NHCR7gWa9XW+UGFy9f mZGW3Ic1lhhTw== Message-ID: <332f315d-ea27-488a-9a3c-28cdfdcd5f27@kernel.org> Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 10:46:24 +0100 X-Mailing-List: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 0/7] mm: kasan: skip KASAN for GFP_HIGHUSER To: Jeff Xu , Tomasz Figa Cc: Andrew Morton , Vlastimil Babka , Johannes Weiner , Andrey Ryabinin , Lorenzo Stoakes , "Liam R . Howlett" , Mike Rapoport , Suren Baghdasaryan , Michal Hocko , Brendan Jackman , Zi Yan , Alexander Potapenko , Andrey Konovalov , Dmitry Vyukov , Vincenzo Frascino , Marco Elver , Boris Brezillon , Catalin Marinas , Chia-I Wu , Dev Jain , Evgenii Stepanov , Ian Rickards , Jann Horn , Jeff Vander Stoep , Jeff Xu , Kees Cook , Mark Rutland , Peter Collingbourne , =?UTF-8?Q?Pierre-Cl=C3=A9ment_Tosi?= , Ryan Roberts , Will Deacon , Alexander Viro , Christian Brauner , Jan Kara , Miklos Szeredi , Baoquan He , Pasha Tatashin , Pratyush Yadav , Allison Henderson , "David S . Miller" , Eric Dumazet , Jakub Kicinski , Paolo Abeni , Simon Horman , linux-mm@kvack.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, fuse-devel@lists.linux.dev, kexec@lists.infradead.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org, rds-devel@oss.oracle.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Ryan Roberts References: <20261116230627.3537051-1-jeffxu@chromium.org> <2066d131-f999-4747-beb8-520d5e0ce1db@kernel.org> <20261118012858.289236-1-jeffxu@chromium.org> From: "David Hildenbrand (Arm)" Content-Language: en-US Autocrypt: addr=david@kernel.org; keydata= xsFNBFXLn5EBEAC+zYvAFJxCBY9Tr1xZgcESmxVNI/0ffzE/ZQOiHJl6mGkmA1R7/uUpiCjJ dBrn+lhhOYjjNefFQou6478faXE6o2AhmebqT4KiQoUQFV4R7y1KMEKoSyy8hQaK1umALTdL QZLQMzNE74ap+GDK0wnacPQFpcG1AE9RMq3aeErY5tujekBS32jfC/7AnH7I0v1v1TbbK3Gp XNeiN4QroO+5qaSr0ID2sz5jtBLRb15RMre27E1ImpaIv2Jw8NJgW0k/D1RyKCwaTsgRdwuK Kx/Y91XuSBdz0uOyU/S8kM1+ag0wvsGlpBVxRR/xw/E8M7TEwuCZQArqqTCmkG6HGcXFT0V9 PXFNNgV5jXMQRwU0O/ztJIQqsE5LsUomE//bLwzj9IVsaQpKDqW6TAPjcdBDPLHvriq7kGjt WhVhdl0qEYB8lkBEU7V2Yb+SYhmhpDrti9Fq1EsmhiHSkxJcGREoMK/63r9WLZYI3+4W2rAc UucZa4OT27U5ZISjNg3Ev0rxU5UH2/pT4wJCfxwocmqaRr6UYmrtZmND89X0KigoFD/XSeVv jwBRNjPAubK9/k5NoRrYqztM9W6sJqrH8+UWZ1Idd/DdmogJh0gNC0+N42Za9yBRURfIdKSb B3JfpUqcWwE7vUaYrHG1nw54pLUoPG6sAA7Mehl3nd4pZUALHwARAQABzS5EYXZpZCBIaWxk ZW5icmFuZCAoQ3VycmVudCkgPGRhdmlkQGtlcm5lbC5vcmc+wsGQBBMBCAA6AhsDBQkmWAik AgsJBBUKCQgCFgICHgUCF4AWIQQb2cqtc1xMOkYN/MpN3hD3AP+DWgUCaYJt/AIZAQAKCRBN 3hD3AP+DWriiD/9BLGEKG+N8L2AXhikJg6YmXom9ytRwPqDgpHpVg2xdhopoWdMRXjzOrIKD g4LSnFaKneQD0hZhoArEeamG5tyo32xoRsPwkbpIzL0OKSZ8G6mVbFGpjmyDLQCAxteXCLXz ZI0VbsuJKelYnKcXWOIndOrNRvE5eoOfTt2XfBnAapxMYY2IsV+qaUXlO63GgfIOg8RBaj7x 3NxkI3rV0SHhI4GU9K6jCvGghxeS1QX6L/XI9mfAYaIwGy5B68kF26piAVYv/QZDEVIpo3t7 /fjSpxKT8plJH6rhhR0epy8dWRHk3qT5tk2P85twasdloWtkMZ7FsCJRKWscm1BLpsDn6EQ4 jeMHECiY9kGKKi8dQpv3FRyo2QApZ49NNDbwcR0ZndK0XFo15iH708H5Qja/8TuXCwnPWAcJ DQoNIDFyaxe26Rx3ZwUkRALa3iPcVjE0//TrQ4KnFf+lMBSrS33xDDBfevW9+Dk6IISmDH1R HFq2jpkN+FX/PE8eVhV68B2DsAPZ5rUwyCKUXPTJ/irrCCmAAb5Jpv11S7hUSpqtM/6oVESC 3z/7CzrVtRODzLtNgV4r5EI+wAv/3PgJLlMwgJM90Fb3CB2IgbxhjvmB1WNdvXACVydx55V7 LPPKodSTF29rlnQAf9HLgCphuuSrrPn5VQDaYZl4N/7zc2wcWM7BTQRVy5+RARAA59fefSDR 9nMGCb9LbMX+TFAoIQo/wgP5XPyzLYakO+94GrgfZjfhdaxPXMsl2+o8jhp/hlIzG56taNdt VZtPp3ih1AgbR8rHgXw1xwOpuAd5lE1qNd54ndHuADO9a9A0vPimIes78Hi1/yy+ZEEvRkHk /kDa6F3AtTc1m4rbbOk2fiKzzsE9YXweFjQvl9p+AMw6qd/iC4lUk9g0+FQXNdRs+o4o6Qvy iOQJfGQ4UcBuOy1IrkJrd8qq5jet1fcM2j4QvsW8CLDWZS1L7kZ5gT5EycMKxUWb8LuRjxzZ 3QY1aQH2kkzn6acigU3HLtgFyV1gBNV44ehjgvJpRY2cC8VhanTx0dZ9mj1YKIky5N+C0f21 zvntBqcxV0+3p8MrxRRcgEtDZNav+xAoT3G0W4SahAaUTWXpsZoOecwtxi74CyneQNPTDjNg azHmvpdBVEfj7k3p4dmJp5i0U66Onmf6mMFpArvBRSMOKU9DlAzMi4IvhiNWjKVaIE2Se9BY FdKVAJaZq85P2y20ZBd08ILnKcj7XKZkLU5FkoA0udEBvQ0f9QLNyyy3DZMCQWcwRuj1m73D sq8DEFBdZ5eEkj1dCyx+t/ga6x2rHyc8Sl86oK1tvAkwBNsfKou3v+jP/l14a7DGBvrmlYjO 59o3t6inu6H7pt7OL6u6BQj7DoMAEQEAAcLBfAQYAQgAJgIbDBYhBBvZyq1zXEw6Rg38yk3e EPcA/4NaBQJonNqrBQkmWAihAAoJEE3eEPcA/4NaKtMQALAJ8PzprBEXbXcEXwDKQu+P/vts IfUb1UNMfMV76BicGa5NCZnJNQASDP/+bFg6O3gx5NbhHHPeaWz/VxlOmYHokHodOvtL0WCC 8A5PEP8tOk6029Z+J+xUcMrJClNVFpzVvOpb1lCbhjwAV465Hy+NUSbbUiRxdzNQtLtgZzOV Zw7jxUCs4UUZLQTCuBpFgb15bBxYZ/BL9MbzxPxvfUQIPbnzQMcqtpUs21CMK2PdfCh5c4gS sDci6D5/ZIBw94UQWmGpM/O1ilGXde2ZzzGYl64glmccD8e87OnEgKnH3FbnJnT4iJchtSvx yJNi1+t0+qDti4m88+/9IuPqCKb6Stl+s2dnLtJNrjXBGJtsQG/sRpqsJz5x1/2nPJSRMsx9 5YfqbdrJSOFXDzZ8/r82HgQEtUvlSXNaXCa95ez0UkOG7+bDm2b3s0XahBQeLVCH0mw3RAQg r7xDAYKIrAwfHHmMTnBQDPJwVqxJjVNr7yBic4yfzVWGCGNE4DnOW0vcIeoyhy9vnIa3w1uZ 3iyY2Nsd7JxfKu1PRhCGwXzRw5TlfEsoRI7V9A8isUCoqE2Dzh3FvYHVeX4Us+bRL/oqareJ CIFqgYMyvHj7Q06kTKmauOe4Nf0l0qEkIuIzfoLJ3qr5UyXc2hLtWyT9Ir+lYlX9efqh7mOY qIws/H2t In-Reply-To: <20261118012858.289236-1-jeffxu@chromium.org> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit On 11/18/26 02:28, Jeff Xu wrote: > On Tue, Nov 17, 2026 at 11:11 PM Tomasz Figa wrote: >> >> On Tue, Nov 17, 2026 at 7:10 PM David Hildenbrand (Arm) >> wrote: >>> >>> I really don't want us to spread KASAN-related GFP flags in the kernel. >>> >>> There must be a proper way to abstract this. >>> >>> Why is GFP_HIGHUSER not sufficient? We were already told that this is memory to >>> be mapped into user space. Placing data structure on it and handing out pointers >>> to that would already be a bit questionable. >>> >>> So what are the ways to avoid GFP_HIGHUSER_KASAN? >> >> I think the idea behind GFP_HIGHUSER_KASAN is to make it possible to >> skip KASAN for GFP_HIGHUSER by default (for most of its users), but >> keep it for some of the users which today use GFP_HIGHUSER for their >> memory allocations, but could benefit from the added security. As per >> the other patches in the series: >> >> pipe, fuse: use GFP_HIGHUSER_KASAN for pipe buffer pages >> kexec: use GFP_HIGHUSER_KASAN for segment pages >> net/rds: use GFP_HIGHUSER_KASAN for message pages >> >> That said, I'm not familiar with any of the code mentioned by those >> patches, so I can't really tell how much they would benefit from KASAN >> or if their choice of GFP_HIGHUSER to begin with is correct. > > Thanks David and Tomasz for the feedback. > > Tomasz is right about why I added GFP_HIGHUSER_KASAN in v1: out of > caution, I audited existing GFP_HIGHUSER callers to find any that never > map the pages to userspace and instead fill/drain them in the kernel via > kmap_local_page() (pipe, FUSE, kexec, rds). Since this series intends to > improve KASAN performance while preserving its security aspects, and the > performance impact on pipe/FUSE/kexec/rds was negligible in my testing, > v1 was optimized for minimum behavioral change. > > Looking closer at both of your questions, I agree that the security > benefit of keeping those 4 under KASAN is minimal -- e.g., only linear > overflows out of the pipe/FUSE/kexec/rds page, since none of them store > kernel structures or pointers. That is the exact same trade-off we > already make for GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE. Yes, that's my understanding as well. > > To avoid introducing GFP_HIGHUSER_KASAN, I see two options: > > 1) Simply keep those 4 cases under GFP_HIGHUSER (drop patches 1-4 and > 7), reducing the series to just the GFP_HIGHUSER change and its KUnit > test. That's what I would look into first. > > 2) Switch those 4 callers to GFP_USER. Since CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS is > 64-bit arm64 only (!CONFIG_HIGHMEM), GFP_USER is identical to today's > GFP_HIGHUSER on arm64 and all other 64-bit builds (and if 32-bit > CONFIG_HIGHMEM=y builds still need ZONE_HIGHMEM, that could be gated > on CONFIG_HIGHMEM, though that feels ugly at call sites). > > (1) seems much cleaner to me. David, would (1) work for you? Agreed, (2) looks more hacky and I don't see the value of doing it like that just yet. -- Cheers, David