From: Usama Arif <usama.arif@linux.dev>
To: Lorenzo Stoakes <ljs@kernel.org>
Cc: "Denis M. Karpov" <komlomal@gmail.com>,
rppt@kernel.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
Liam.Howlett@oracle.com, vbabka@kernel.org, jannh@google.com,
peterx@redhat.com, pfalcato@suse.de, brauner@kernel.org,
viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, jack@suse.cz, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] userfaultfd: allow registration of ranges below mmap_min_addr
Date: Thu, 9 Apr 2026 11:52:12 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <408fc657-94a2-4832-b5cd-7013c002403d@linux.dev> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <addcUpxfuR2llaiW@lucifer>
On 09/04/2026 09:01, Lorenzo Stoakes wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 08, 2026 at 05:36:59AM -0700, Usama Arif wrote:
>> On Tue, 7 Apr 2026 11:14:42 +0300 "Denis M. Karpov" <komlomal@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> The current implementation of validate_range() in fs/userfaultfd.c
>>> performs a hard check against mmap_min_addr without considering
>>> capabilities, but the mmap() syscall uses security_mmap_addr()
>>> which allows privileged processes (with CAP_SYS_RAWIO) to map below
>>> mmap_min_addr. Furthermore, security_mmap_addr()->cap_mmap_addr() uses
>>> dac_mmap_min_addr variable which can be changed with
>>> /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr.
>>>
>>> Because userfaultfd uses a different check, UFFDIO_REGISTER may fail
>>> with -EINVAL for valid memory areas that were successfully mapped
>>> below mmap_min_addr even with appropriate capabilities.
>>>
>>> This prevents apps like binary compilers from using UFFD for valid memory
>>> regions mapped by application.
>>>
>>> Replace the rigid mmap_min_addr check with security_mmap_addr() to align
>>> userfaultfd with the standard kernel memory mapping security policy.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Denis M. Karpov <komlomal@gmail.com>
>>>
>>> ---
>>> Initial RFC following the discussion on the [BUG] thread.
>>> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CADtiZd0tWysx5HMCUnOXfSHB7PXAuXg1Mh4eY_hUmH29S=sejg@mail.gmail.com/
>>> ---
>>> fs/userfaultfd.c | 4 +---
>>> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/fs/userfaultfd.c b/fs/userfaultfd.c
>>> index bdc84e521..dbfe5b2a0 100644
>>> --- a/fs/userfaultfd.c
>>> +++ b/fs/userfaultfd.c
>>> @@ -1238,15 +1238,13 @@ static __always_inline int validate_unaligned_range(
>>> return -EINVAL;
>>> if (!len)
>>> return -EINVAL;
>>> - if (start < mmap_min_addr)
>>> - return -EINVAL;
>>> if (start >= task_size)
>>> return -EINVAL;
>>> if (len > task_size - start)
>>> return -EINVAL;
>>> if (start + len <= start)
>>> return -EINVAL;
>>> - return 0;
>>> + return security_mmap_addr(start);
>>
>> Is this introducing an ABI change?
>>
>> The old code returned -EINVAL when start was below mmap_min_addr.
>> The new code calls security_mmap_addr() which returns -EPERM when
>> the caller lacks CAP_SYS_RAWIO. Existing userspace callers checking
>> specifically for -EINVAL would see different behavior start is
>> below mmap_min_addr.
>
> You mean API change? :) we don't guarantee ABI for kernel stuff anyway.
>
Ah no, I meant ABI, I hope :)
The return value of validate_unaligned_range() flows directly back to the
ioctl() return value, which is visible to userspace. The error code a program
sees from ioctl(fd, UFFDIO_REGISTER, ...) changes from -EINVAL to -EPERM for
the same input, right? Its probably not an issue, but we would need to update
https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/ioctl_userfaultfd.2.html
right?
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-04-09 10:52 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-04-07 8:14 [RFC PATCH] userfaultfd: allow registration of ranges below mmap_min_addr Denis M. Karpov
2026-04-08 3:21 ` Harry Yoo (Oracle)
2026-04-08 8:09 ` Denis M. Karpov
2026-04-09 2:51 ` Harry Yoo (Oracle)
2026-04-09 7:58 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2026-04-08 12:36 ` Usama Arif
2026-04-09 8:01 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2026-04-09 9:05 ` Denis M. Karpov
2026-04-09 10:52 ` Usama Arif [this message]
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=408fc657-94a2-4832-b5cd-7013c002403d@linux.dev \
--to=usama.arif@linux.dev \
--cc=Liam.Howlett@oracle.com \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=brauner@kernel.org \
--cc=jack@suse.cz \
--cc=jannh@google.com \
--cc=komlomal@gmail.com \
--cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
--cc=ljs@kernel.org \
--cc=peterx@redhat.com \
--cc=pfalcato@suse.de \
--cc=rppt@kernel.org \
--cc=vbabka@kernel.org \
--cc=viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox