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From: Peter Staubach <staubach@redhat.com>
To: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, akpm@osdl.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/3] VFS: Fix access("file", X_OK) in the presence of ACLs
Date: Thu, 13 Jul 2006 09:59:54 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <44B651DA.2020308@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20060712175006.7413.91738.stgit@lade.trondhjem.org>

Trond Myklebust wrote:

>From: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
>
>Currently, the access() call will return incorrect information on NFS if
>there exists an ACL that grants execute access to the user on a regular
>file. The reason the information is incorrect is that the VFS overrides
>this execute access in open_exec() by checking (inode->i_mode & 0111).
>
>This patch propagates the VFS execute bit check back into the generic
>permission() call.
>
>Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
>---
>
> fs/namei.c |    9 ++++++++-
> 1 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
>
>diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
>index 664b4a5..08cc418 100644
>--- a/fs/namei.c
>+++ b/fs/namei.c
>@@ -227,10 +227,10 @@ int generic_permission(struct inode *ino
> 
> int permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, struct nameidata *nd)
> {
>+	umode_t mode = inode->i_mode;
> 	int retval, submask;
> 
> 	if (mask & MAY_WRITE) {
>-		umode_t mode = inode->i_mode;
> 
> 		/*
> 		 * Nobody gets write access to a read-only fs.
>@@ -247,6 +247,13 @@ int permission(struct inode *inode, int 
> 	}
> 
> 
>+	/*
>+	 * MAY_EXEC on regular files requires special handling: We override
>+	 * filesystem execute permissions if the mode bits aren't set.
>+	 */
>+	if ((mask & MAY_EXEC) && S_ISREG(mode) && !(mode & S_IXUGO))
>+		return -EACCES;
>+
> 	/* Ordinary permission routines do not understand MAY_APPEND. */
> 	submask = mask & ~MAY_APPEND;
> 	if (inode->i_op && inode->i_op->permission)
>-
>  
>

Does this imply that some of the code in places like generic_permission(),
fuse_permission(), and xfs_iaccess() can be cleaned up too?  They contain
code which appears to check to ensure that an exec bit is on before allowing
an override.

    Thanx...

       ps

  parent reply	other threads:[~2006-07-13 14:00 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2006-07-12 17:50 [PATCH 1/3] VFS: Fix access("file", X_OK) in the presence of ACLs Trond Myklebust
2006-07-12 17:50 ` [PATCH 2/3] VFS: Remove redundant open-coded mode bit check in prepare_binfmt() Trond Myklebust
2006-07-12 17:50 ` [PATCH 3/3] VFS: Remove redundant open-coded mode bit checks in open_exec() Trond Myklebust
2006-07-13 13:59 ` Peter Staubach [this message]
2006-07-13 14:13   ` [PATCH 1/3] VFS: Fix access("file", X_OK) in the presence of ACLs Trond Myklebust

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