From: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
To: Oren Laadan <orenl@cs.columbia.edu>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
Linux Containers <containers@lists.osdl.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [patch 1/2] [RFC] Simple tamper-proof device filesystem.
Date: Wed, 19 Dec 2007 12:43:14 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <4768E7B2.40203@openvz.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <476738A0.9010601@cs.columbia.edu>
Oren Laadan wrote:
> Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
>> Quoting Oren Laadan (orenl@cs.columbia.edu):
>>> I hate to bring this again, but what if the admin in the container
>>> mounts an external file system (eg. nfs, usb, loop mount from a file,
>>> or via fuse), and that file system already has a device that we would
>>> like to ban inside that container ?
>> Miklos' user mount patches enforced that if !capable(CAP_MKNOD),
>> then mnt->mnt_flags |= MNT_NODEV. So that's no problem.
>
> Yes, that works to disallow all device files from a mounted file system.
>
> But it's a black and white thing: either they are all banned or allowed;
> you can't have some devices allowed and others not, depending on type
> A scenario where this may be useful is, for instance, if we some apps in
> the container to execute withing a pre-made chroot (sub)tree within that
> container.
>
>> But that's been pulled out of -mm! ? Crap.
>>
>>> Since anyway we will have to keep a white- (or black-) list of devices
>>> that are permitted in a container, and that list may change even change
>>> per container -- why not enforce the access control at the VFS layer ?
>>> It's safer in the long run.
>> By that you mean more along the lines of Pavel's patch than my whitelist
>> LSM, or you actually mean Tetsuo's filesystem (i assume you don't mean that
>> by 'vfs layer' :), or something different entirely?
>
> :)
>
> By 'vfs' I mean at open() time, and not at mount(), or mknod() time.
> Either yours or Pavel's; I tend to prefer not to use LSM as it may
> collide with future security modules.
Oren, AFAIS you've seen my patches for device access controller, right?
Maybe we can revisit the issue then and try to come to agreement on what
kind of model and implementation we all want?
> Oren.
>
>> thanks,
>> -serge
> --
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2007-12-19 9:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 46+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20071216080441.435456586@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
[not found] ` <20071216080628.061470932@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
2007-12-16 10:44 ` [patch 0/2] [RFC] Simple tamper-proof device filesystem Tetsuo Handa
2007-12-16 10:56 ` [patch 1/2] " Tetsuo Handa
2007-12-06 15:29 ` Pavel Machek
2007-12-18 15:55 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2007-12-18 16:43 ` Casey Schaufler
2007-12-16 11:21 ` David Newall
2007-12-16 11:26 ` Tetsuo Handa
2007-12-16 11:31 ` David Newall
2007-12-16 11:36 ` Tetsuo Handa
2007-12-16 11:58 ` David Newall
2007-12-16 12:03 ` Tetsuo Handa
2007-12-16 12:14 ` Tetsuo Handa
2007-12-17 6:00 ` David Newall
2007-12-18 15:33 ` Radoslaw Szkodzinski
2007-12-16 16:52 ` Indan Zupancic
2007-12-16 19:48 ` Al Viro
2007-12-17 0:40 ` Tetsuo Handa
2007-12-17 11:44 ` Indan Zupancic
2007-12-17 12:59 ` Tetsuo Handa
2007-12-17 13:05 ` Al Boldi
2007-12-17 13:16 ` Tetsuo Handa
2007-12-18 15:22 ` Radoslaw Szkodzinski
2007-12-19 12:11 ` Tetsuo Handa
2007-12-19 19:14 ` Radoslaw Szkodzinski
2007-12-17 13:32 ` Tetsuo Handa
2007-12-17 6:42 ` penguin-kernel
2007-12-17 19:48 ` Serge E. Hallyn
[not found] ` <20071217194802.GA14156-6s5zFf/epYLPQpwDFJZrxKsjOiXwFzmk@public.gmane.org>
2007-12-18 0:03 ` Tetsuo Handa
2007-12-18 0:39 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2007-12-18 1:39 ` Oren Laadan
2007-12-18 2:09 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2007-12-18 3:04 ` Oren Laadan
2007-12-19 9:43 ` Pavel Emelyanov [this message]
2007-12-19 14:10 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2007-12-20 0:07 ` Oren Laadan
2007-12-20 7:42 ` Pavel Emelyanov
2007-12-20 14:09 ` Serge E. Hallyn
[not found] ` <476A1CE0.30505-GEFAQzZX7r8dnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>
2007-12-21 1:47 ` Oren Laadan
2007-12-19 14:13 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2007-12-18 1:55 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2007-12-18 2:26 ` Tetsuo Handa
2007-12-18 2:53 ` serge
2007-12-18 3:40 ` Tetsuo Handa
2007-12-19 23:43 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2007-12-24 13:09 ` Tetsuo Handa
2007-12-16 11:03 ` [patch 2/2] " Tetsuo Handa
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