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From: Amerigo Wang <amwang@redhat.com>
To: OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, esandeen@redhat.com,
	eteo@redhat.com, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [Patch v3] vfs: allow file truncations when both suid and write permissions set
Date: Wed, 12 Aug 2009 17:03:12 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <4A828550.5030008@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87my6724rz.fsf@devron.myhome.or.jp>

OGAWA Hirofumi wrote:
> Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> writes:
>
>   
>>>> SELinux shouldn't apply a permission check for the clearing of the suid
>>>> bit on write or truncate.  It should only apply a permission check for
>>>> the actual truncate or write operation, and then the clearing of the
>>>> suid bit should always be forced if that check passed.
>>>>         
>>> Ok. Yes. So, to do it efficiently without problem, I'm suggesting the
>>> following or something (I don't know whether LSM should do this or not).
>>>
>>> selinux_inode_setattr(),
>>>
>>> 	ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
>>> 	if (!(ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) && (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE_MASK)) {
>>> 		err = dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
>>> 		if (err)
>>>                 	return err;
>>> 		ia_valid &= ~ATTR_FORCE_MASK;
>>> 	}
>>> 	if (ia_valid & ATTR_NOT_FORCE_MASK)
>>> 	 	err = dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
>>> 	return err;
>>>
>>> I guess ATTR_FORCE_MASK would be (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
>>> 			ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET) or something,
>>> and ATTR_NOT_FORCE_MASK would be ATTR_SIZE or something.
>>>
>>> I'm not sure this is the right code what selinux want to do though, but,
>>> I hope it is clear what I want to say. (I'm assuming FILE__WRITE is for
>>> check of ATTR_SIZE)
>>>       
>> The logic is supposed to map certain attribute changes (mode, owner,
>> group, explicit setting of atime or mtime to a specific value rather
>> than the current time) to the SELinux setattr permission, while mapping
>> other attribute changes that occur naturally on a write (size, setting
>> of mtime to current time) to the SELinux write permission.  That doesn't
>> seem clear from using ATTR_FORCE_MASK vs ATTR_NOT_FORCE_MASK above - I'd
>> use different naming conventions for clarity.
>>     
>
> I see. Yes, the naming of this code doesn't matter at all. The code was
> just intended to explain what I'm suggesting.
>
>   
>>> With this change, the caller can pass "(ATTR_SIZE | ATTR_MODE)" or
>>> "(ATTR_SIZE | ATTR_MODE | ATTR_FORCE)" etc. for truncate().
>>>
>>> [btw, "(ATTR_SIZE | ATTR_MODE)" is what do_truncate() does currently].
>>>       
>> That was a change in do_truncate(), commit
>> 7b82dc0e64e93f430182f36b46b79fcee87d3532.
>>
>> It makes sense, but no one ever updated selinux_inode_setattr() to match
>> that change.
>>     
>
> I see. Yes, exactly. And for the user of non file owner case, I'm
> thinking we would like to pass ATTR_FORCE too.
>
>   
Ok, I know what you are talking about now...

Maybe I should make another patch to fix this... :-/ I need some time to 
understand SELinux, before I finish it, keeping this patch is fine.

Thanks!

      reply	other threads:[~2009-08-12  9:03 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2009-08-07 10:05 [Patch v3] vfs: allow file truncations when both suid and write permissions set Amerigo Wang
2009-08-07 19:57 ` Eric Paris
2009-08-07 20:23   ` OGAWA Hirofumi
2009-08-07 20:38     ` Eric Paris
2009-08-07 20:53       ` OGAWA Hirofumi
2009-08-10  2:30         ` Amerigo Wang
2009-08-10  4:59           ` OGAWA Hirofumi
2009-08-10 11:49       ` Stephen Smalley
2009-08-10 12:43         ` OGAWA Hirofumi
2009-08-10 12:57           ` Stephen Smalley
2009-08-10 13:10             ` OGAWA Hirofumi
2009-08-12  9:03               ` Amerigo Wang [this message]

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