security_path hooks for xattr

security_path hooks for xattr

[Miklos Szeredi]

Forwarding from an internal bug report:

   "AppArmor does not mediate the xattr system calls for confined processes.

   As a consequence, a confined process can cross the confinement privilege
   boundary by reading or writing to extended attributes that the confined
   task should not have access to. The restrictions for security and user
   attributes read and write still apply according to DAC; however, this
   does not comply with the claim of AppArmor to mediate fipe
   operations. The use of extended attributes is very flexible, so that the
   effect of a missing mediation can lead to false assumptions in
   subsequent policy decisions (eCryptfs)."

AFAIU this boils down to missing security hooks in *xattr().

Would it be possible to add these hooks?

Thanks,
Miklos

Re: security_path hooks for xattr

[Casey Schaufler]

On 1/26/2012 4:45 AM, Miklos Szeredi wrote:
> Forwarding from an internal bug report:
>
>     "AppArmor does not mediate the xattr system calls for confined processes.
>
>     As a consequence, a confined process can cross the confinement privilege
>     boundary by reading or writing to extended attributes that the confined
>     task should not have access to. The restrictions for security and user
>     attributes read and write still apply according to DAC; however, this
>     does not comply with the claim of AppArmor to mediate fipe
>     operations. The use of extended attributes is very flexible, so that the
>     effect of a missing mediation can lead to false assumptions in
>     subsequent policy decisions (eCryptfs)."
>
> AFAIU this boils down to missing security hooks in *xattr().
>
> Would it be possible to add these hooks?

Please post proposed patches to linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org


>
> Thanks,
> Miklos
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Re: security_path hooks for xattr

[John Johansen]

On 01/26/2012 04:45 AM, Miklos Szeredi wrote:
> Forwarding from an internal bug report:
> 
>    "AppArmor does not mediate the xattr system calls for confined processes.
> 
>    As a consequence, a confined process can cross the confinement privilege
>    boundary by reading or writing to extended attributes that the confined
>    task should not have access to. The restrictions for security and user
>    attributes read and write still apply according to DAC; however, this
>    does not comply with the claim of AppArmor to mediate fipe
>    operations. The use of extended attributes is very flexible, so that the
>    effect of a missing mediation can lead to false assumptions in
>    subsequent policy decisions (eCryptfs)."
> 
> AFAIU this boils down to missing security hooks in *xattr().
> 
> Would it be possible to add these hooks?
> 
right, this is something we lost when we moved to the security_path hooks and
while we have spent some time looking at the problem, we haven't addressed it
yet.  

New hooks would certainly be the easiest solution. I looked at it back when
I initially did the port, and considered proposing new hooks at the time, but
for various reasons it was decided to separate that from the main apparmor
submission, and I haven't had a chance to revisit this since.


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