From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Jeff Liu Subject: [RESEND PATCH V3] binfmt_elf.c: use get_random_int() to fix entropy depleting Date: Wed, 07 Nov 2012 14:11:54 +0800 Message-ID: <5099FBAA.6000200@oracle.com> References: <5099F133.5030305@oracle.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Cc: Andrew Morton , Kees Cook , Andreas Dilger , John Sobecki , "viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk" , Alan Cox , "arnd@arndb.de" , James Morris , "Ted Ts'o" , "gregkh@linuxfoundation.org" , jakub@redhat.com, drepper@redhat.com, "linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org" To: LKML Return-path: In-Reply-To: <5099F133.5030305@oracle.com> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-Id: linux-fsdevel.vger.kernel.org Hello, This is the revised patch for fix entropy depleting. Changes: -------- v3->v2: - Tweak code comments of random_stack_user(). - Remove redundant bits mask and shift upon the random variable. v2->v1: Fix random copy to check up buffer length that are not 4-byte multiples. v2 can be found at: http://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-fsdevel/msg59418.html v1 can be found at: http://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-fsdevel/msg59128.html Many thanks to Andreas, Andrew as well as Kees for reviewing the patch of past! -Jeff Entropy is quickly depleted under normal operations like ls(1), cat(1), etc... between 2.6.30 to current mainline, for instance: $ cat /proc/sys/kernel/random/entropy_avail 3428 $ cat /proc/sys/kernel/random/entropy_avail 2911 $cat /proc/sys/kernel/random/entropy_avail 2620 We observed this problem has been occurring since 2.6.30 with fs/binfmt_elf.c: create_elf_tables()->get_random_bytes(), introduced by f06295b44c296c8f ("ELF: implement AT_RANDOM for glibc PRNG seeding"). /* * Generate 16 random bytes for userspace PRNG seeding. */ get_random_bytes(k_rand_bytes, sizeof(k_rand_bytes)); The patch introduces a wrapper around get_random_int() which has lower overhead than calling get_random_bytes() directly. With this patch applied: $ cat /proc/sys/kernel/random/entropy_avail 2731 $ cat /proc/sys/kernel/random/entropy_avail 2802 $ cat /proc/sys/kernel/random/entropy_avail 2878 Analyzed by John Sobecki. Signed-off-by: Jie Liu Cc: John Sobecki Cc: Al Viro Cc: Andreas Dilger Cc: Alan Cox Cc: Arnd Bergmann Cc: James Morris Cc: Ted Ts'o Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman Cc: Kees Cook Cc: Jakub Jelinek Cc: Ulrich Drepper Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton --- fs/binfmt_elf.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++++- 1 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/binfmt_elf.c b/fs/binfmt_elf.c index fbd9f60..b6c59f6 100644 --- a/fs/binfmt_elf.c +++ b/fs/binfmt_elf.c @@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct pt_regs *regs); static int load_elf_library(struct file *); static unsigned long elf_map(struct file *, unsigned long, struct elf_phdr *, int, int, unsigned long); +static void randomize_stack_user(unsigned char *buf, size_t nbytes); /* * If we don't support core dumping, then supply a NULL so we @@ -200,7 +201,7 @@ create_elf_tables(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct elfhdr *exec, /* * Generate 16 random bytes for userspace PRNG seeding. */ - get_random_bytes(k_rand_bytes, sizeof(k_rand_bytes)); + randomize_stack_user(k_rand_bytes, sizeof(k_rand_bytes)); u_rand_bytes = (elf_addr_t __user *) STACK_ALLOC(p, sizeof(k_rand_bytes)); if (__copy_to_user(u_rand_bytes, k_rand_bytes, sizeof(k_rand_bytes))) @@ -558,6 +559,25 @@ static unsigned long randomize_stack_top(unsigned long stack_top) #endif } +/* + * Use get_random_int() to implement AT_RANDOM while avoiding depletion + * of the entropy pool. + */ +static void randomize_stack_user(unsigned char *buf, size_t nbytes) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + + while (nbytes) { + unsigned int random_variable; + size_t chunk = min(nbytes, sizeof(unsigned int)); + + random_variable = get_random_int(); + memcpy(p, &random_variable, chunk); + p += chunk; + nbytes -= chunk; + } +} + static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct pt_regs *regs) { struct file *interpreter = NULL; /* to shut gcc up */ -- 1.7.4.1