From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
To: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Cc: linux-bcache@vger.kernel.org,
Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
dm-devel@redhat.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
linux-raid@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 5/7] selinux: Add support for unprivileged mounts from user namespaces
Date: Tue, 13 Oct 2015 16:27:09 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <561D691D.9080209@tycho.nsa.gov> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1444755861-54997-6-git-send-email-seth.forshee@canonical.com>
On 10/13/2015 01:04 PM, Seth Forshee wrote:
> Security labels from unprivileged mounts in user namespaces must
> be ignored. Force superblocks from user namespaces whose labeling
> behavior is to use xattrs to use mountpoint labeling instead.
> For the mountpoint label, default to converting the current task
> context into a form suitable for file objects, but also allow the
> policy writer to specify a different label through policy
> transition rules.
>
> Pieced together from code snippets provided by Stephen Smalley.
>
> Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
> ---
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index de05207eb665..09be1dc21e58 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -756,6 +756,28 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
> goto out;
> }
> }
> +
> + /*
> + * If this is a user namespace mount, no contexts are allowed
> + * on the command line and security labels must be ignored.
> + */
> + if (sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns) {
> + if (context_sid || fscontext_sid || rootcontext_sid ||
> + defcontext_sid) {
> + rc = -EACCES;
> + goto out;
> + }
> + if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
> + sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
> + rc = security_transition_sid(current_sid(), current_sid(),
> + SECCLASS_FILE, NULL,
> + &sbsec->mntpoint_sid);
> + if (rc)
> + goto out;
> + }
> + goto out_set_opts;
> + }
> +
> /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
> if (fscontext_sid) {
> rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
> @@ -824,6 +846,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
> sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
> }
>
> +out_set_opts:
> rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
> out:
> mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-10-13 20:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-10-13 17:04 [PATCH v2 0/7] User namespace mount updates Seth Forshee
2015-10-13 17:04 ` [PATCH v2 1/7] block_dev: Support checking inode permissions in lookup_bdev() Seth Forshee
2015-10-13 17:04 ` [PATCH v2 2/7] block_dev: Check permissions towards block device inode when mounting Seth Forshee
2015-10-13 17:04 ` [PATCH v2 3/7] mtd: Check permissions towards mtd " Seth Forshee
2015-10-13 17:04 ` [PATCH v2 4/7] fs: Treat foreign mounts as nosuid Seth Forshee
2015-10-13 17:04 ` [PATCH v2 5/7] selinux: Add support for unprivileged mounts from user namespaces Seth Forshee
2015-10-13 20:27 ` Stephen Smalley [this message]
2015-10-13 17:04 ` [PATCH v2 6/7] userns: Replace in_userns with current_in_userns Seth Forshee
2015-10-13 17:04 ` [PATCH v2 7/7] Smack: Handle labels consistently in untrusted mounts Seth Forshee
2015-10-15 5:46 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-10-15 19:24 ` Seth Forshee
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