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From: Marko Rauhamaa <marko.rauhamaa@f-secure.com>
To: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
	linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>, <mhocko@suse.cz>,
	Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Subject: Re: fanotify permission events on virtual filesystem
Date: Thu, 21 Mar 2019 10:36:40 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <87imwcfwtj.fsf@drapion.f-secure.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAOQ4uxjDq2ZZFwdirjrU9JG32MzQukeFr9-Ht_oQvYFo7SKQ-A@mail.gmail.com> (Amir Goldstein's message of "Wed, 20 Mar 2019 17:02:54 +0200")

Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>:

> On Wed, Mar 20, 2019 at 4:30 PM Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> wrote:
>> Well, I didn't mean all marks, just the permission ones. I'm not sure
>> there are apps that place permission events on /proc...
>
> Maybe not intentionally.
> I once tested a few fanotify based AntiVirus solutions.
> In some of them, setting an "Exclude path" on some mount point
> would cause mark to not be set on that path, but for one in particular,
> the mark was still being set on the mount so path pattern filtering was
> done after receiving the events.
> I did not check whether /proc was blacklisted out of the box or if it
> could be marked/excluded from scan.
> IMO, assuming that all AntiVirus vendors blacklist all virtual filesystems
> is an assumption that we need to validate.
> [CC Marko from F-Secure for commenting on the above.]

Yeah, we have learned by experimentation to not mark some file systems.

(Also, inspecting some /proc files *during* OPEN_PERM processing of a
regular file can lead to deadlocks.)


Marko

  reply	other threads:[~2019-03-21  8:36 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-03-20 13:16 fanotify permission events on virtual filesystem Jan Kara
2019-03-20 13:46 ` Amir Goldstein
2019-03-20 14:30   ` Jan Kara
2019-03-20 15:02     ` Amir Goldstein
2019-03-21  8:36       ` Marko Rauhamaa [this message]
2019-04-01 17:26       ` Jan Kara

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