From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Jeremy Maitin-Shepard Subject: Re: [AppArmor 01/41] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_create LSM hook Date: Fri, 25 May 2007 01:17:36 -0400 Message-ID: <87lkfdpjm7.fsf@jbms.ath.cx> References: <309300.41401.qm@web36615.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Cc: Andreas Gruenbacher , James Morris To: Casey Schaufler Return-path: Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org In-Reply-To: <309300.41401.qm@web36615.mail.mud.yahoo.com> (Casey Schaufler's message of "Thu\, 24 May 2007 11\:58\:41 -0700 \(PDT\)") Sender: linux-security-module-owner@vger.kernel.org List-Id: linux-fsdevel.vger.kernel.org Casey Schaufler writes: > On Fedora zcat, gzip and gunzip are all links to the same file. > I can imagine (although it is a bit of a stretch) allowing a set > of users access to gunzip but not gzip (or the other way around). > There are probably more sophisticated programs that have different > behavior based on the name they're invoked by that would provide > a more compelling arguement, assuming of course that you buy into > the behavior-based-on-name scheme. What I think I'm suggesting is > that AppArmor might be useful in addressing the fact that a file > with multiple hard links is necessarily constrained to have the > same access control on each of those names. That assumes one > believes that such behavior is flawwed, and I'm not going to try > to argue that. The question was about an example, and there is one. This doesn't work. The behavior depends on argv[0], which is not necessarily the same as the name of the file. -- Jeremy Maitin-Shepard