From: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
To: Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik@gmail.com>, Yu Ma <yu.ma@intel.com>
Cc: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, brauner@kernel.org, jack@suse.cz,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
tim.c.chen@intel.com, pan.deng@intel.com, tianyou.li@intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/3] fs/file.c: move sanity_check from alloc_fd() to put_unused_fd()
Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2024 11:04:41 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <8fa3f49b50515f8490acfe5b52aaf3aba0a36606.camel@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <fd4eb382a87baed4b49e3cf2cd25e7047f9aede2.camel@linux.intel.com>
On Mon, 2024-06-17 at 10:55 -0700, Tim Chen wrote:
> On Sat, 2024-06-15 at 07:07 +0200, Mateusz Guzik wrote:
> > On Sat, Jun 15, 2024 at 06:41:45AM +0200, Mateusz Guzik wrote:
> > > On Fri, Jun 14, 2024 at 12:34:16PM -0400, Yu Ma wrote:
> > > > alloc_fd() has a sanity check inside to make sure the FILE object mapping to the
> > >
> > >
> >
> > Now that I wrote it I noticed the fd < end check has to be performed
> > regardless of max_fds -- someone could have changed rlimit to a lower
> > value after using a higher fd. But the main point stands: the call to
> > expand_files and associated error handling don't have to be there.
>
> To really prevent someone from mucking with rlimit, we should probably
> take the task_lock to prevent do_prlimit() racing with this function.
>
> task_lock(current->group_leader);
>
> Tim
And also move the task_lock in do_prlimit() before the RLIMIT_NOFILE check.
diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
index 3a2df1bd9f64..b4e523728c3e 100644
--- a/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/kernel/sys.c
@@ -1471,6 +1471,7 @@ static int do_prlimit(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned int resource,
return -EINVAL;
resource = array_index_nospec(resource, RLIM_NLIMITS);
+ task_lock(tsk->group_leader);
if (new_rlim) {
if (new_rlim->rlim_cur > new_rlim->rlim_max)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -1481,7 +1482,6 @@ static int do_prlimit(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned int resource,
/* Holding a refcount on tsk protects tsk->signal from disappearing. */
rlim = tsk->signal->rlim + resource;
- task_lock(tsk->group_leader);
if (new_rlim) {
/*
* Keep the capable check against init_user_ns until cgroups can
Tim
> >
> > > This elides 2 branches and a func call in the common case. Completely
> > > untested, maybe has some brainfarts, feel free to take without credit
> > > and further massage the routine.
> > >
> > > Moreover my disasm shows that even looking for a bit results in
> > > a func call(!) to _find_next_zero_bit -- someone(tm) should probably
> > > massage it into another inline.
> > >
> > > After the above massaging is done and if it turns out the check has to
> > > stay, you can plausibly damage-control it with prefetch -- issue it
> > > immediately after finding the fd number, before any other work.
> > >
> > > All that said, by the above I'm confident there is still *some*
> > > performance left on the table despite the lock.
> > >
> > > > out:
> > > > spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
> > > > @@ -572,7 +565,7 @@ int get_unused_fd_flags(unsigned flags)
> > > > }
> > > > EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_unused_fd_flags);
> > > >
> > > > -static void __put_unused_fd(struct files_struct *files, unsigned int fd)
> > > > +static inline void __put_unused_fd(struct files_struct *files, unsigned int fd)
> > > > {
> > > > struct fdtable *fdt = files_fdtable(files);
> > > > __clear_open_fd(fd, fdt);
> > > > @@ -583,7 +576,12 @@ static void __put_unused_fd(struct files_struct *files, unsigned int fd)
> > > > void put_unused_fd(unsigned int fd)
> > > > {
> > > > struct files_struct *files = current->files;
> > > > + struct fdtable *fdt = files_fdtable(files);
> > > > spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
> > > > + if (unlikely(rcu_access_pointer(fdt->fd[fd]))) {
> > > > + printk(KERN_WARNING "put_unused_fd: slot %d not NULL!\n", fd);
> > > > + rcu_assign_pointer(fdt->fd[fd], NULL);
> > > > + }
> > > > __put_unused_fd(files, fd);
> > > > spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
> > > > }
> >
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-06-17 18:04 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 103+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-06-14 16:34 [PATCH 0/3] fs/file.c: optimize the critical section of Yu Ma
2024-06-14 16:34 ` [PATCH 1/3] fs/file.c: add fast path in alloc_fd() Yu Ma
2024-06-15 6:31 ` Mateusz Guzik
2024-06-16 4:01 ` Ma, Yu
2024-06-17 17:49 ` Tim Chen
2024-06-19 10:36 ` David Laight
2024-06-19 17:09 ` Ma, Yu
2024-06-14 16:34 ` [PATCH 2/3] fs/file.c: conditionally clear full_fds Yu Ma
2024-06-14 16:34 ` [PATCH 3/3] fs/file.c: move sanity_check from alloc_fd() to put_unused_fd() Yu Ma
2024-06-15 4:41 ` Mateusz Guzik
2024-06-15 5:07 ` Mateusz Guzik
2024-06-17 17:55 ` Tim Chen
2024-06-17 17:59 ` Mateusz Guzik
2024-06-17 18:04 ` Tim Chen [this message]
2024-06-18 8:35 ` Michal Hocko
2024-06-18 9:06 ` Mateusz Guzik
2024-06-18 20:40 ` Tim Chen
2024-06-16 3:47 ` Ma, Yu
2024-06-17 11:23 ` Mateusz Guzik
2024-06-17 17:22 ` Ma, Yu
2024-06-17 8:36 ` Christian Brauner
2024-06-22 15:49 ` [PATCH v2 0/3] fs/file.c: optimize the critical section of file_lock in Yu Ma
2024-06-22 15:49 ` [PATCH v2 1/3] fs/file.c: add fast path in alloc_fd() Yu Ma
2024-06-25 11:52 ` Jan Kara
2024-06-25 12:53 ` Jan Kara
2024-06-25 15:33 ` Ma, Yu
2024-06-26 11:54 ` Jan Kara
2024-06-26 16:43 ` Tim Chen
2024-06-26 16:52 ` Tim Chen
2024-06-27 12:09 ` Jan Kara
2024-06-27 12:20 ` Mateusz Guzik
2024-06-27 16:21 ` Tim Chen
2024-06-26 19:13 ` Mateusz Guzik
2024-06-27 14:03 ` Jan Kara
2024-06-27 15:33 ` Christian Brauner
2024-06-27 18:27 ` Ma, Yu
2024-06-27 19:59 ` Mateusz Guzik
2024-06-28 9:12 ` Jan Kara
2024-06-29 15:41 ` Ma, Yu
2024-06-29 15:46 ` Mateusz Guzik
2024-06-29 14:23 ` Ma, Yu
2024-06-22 15:49 ` [PATCH v2 2/3] fs/file.c: conditionally clear full_fds Yu Ma
2024-06-25 11:54 ` Jan Kara
2024-06-25 15:41 ` Ma, Yu
2024-06-22 15:49 ` [PATCH v2 3/3] fs/file.c: remove sanity_check from alloc_fd() Yu Ma
2024-06-25 12:08 ` Jan Kara
2024-06-25 13:09 ` Mateusz Guzik
2024-06-25 13:11 ` Mateusz Guzik
2024-06-25 13:30 ` Jan Kara
2024-06-26 13:10 ` Christian Brauner
2024-07-03 14:33 ` [PATCH v3 0/3] fs/file.c: optimize the critical section of file_lock in Yu Ma
2024-07-03 14:33 ` [PATCH v3 1/3] fs/file.c: remove sanity_check and add likely/unlikely in alloc_fd() Yu Ma
2024-07-03 14:34 ` Christian Brauner
2024-07-03 14:46 ` Ma, Yu
2024-07-04 10:11 ` Jan Kara
2024-07-04 14:45 ` Ma, Yu
2024-07-04 15:41 ` Jan Kara
2024-07-03 14:33 ` [PATCH v3 2/3] fs/file.c: conditionally clear full_fds Yu Ma
2024-07-03 14:33 ` [PATCH v3 3/3] fs/file.c: add fast path in find_next_fd() Yu Ma
2024-07-03 14:17 ` Mateusz Guzik
2024-07-03 14:28 ` Ma, Yu
2024-07-04 10:07 ` Jan Kara
2024-07-04 10:03 ` Jan Kara
2024-07-04 14:50 ` Ma, Yu
2024-07-04 17:44 ` Mateusz Guzik
2024-07-04 21:55 ` Jan Kara
2024-07-05 7:56 ` Ma, Yu
2024-07-09 8:32 ` Ma, Yu
2024-07-09 10:17 ` Mateusz Guzik
2024-07-10 23:40 ` Tim Chen
2024-07-11 9:27 ` Ma, Yu
2024-07-13 2:39 ` [PATCH v4 0/3] fs/file.c: optimize the critical section of file_lock in Yu Ma
2024-07-13 2:39 ` [PATCH v4 1/3] fs/file.c: remove sanity_check and add likely/unlikely in alloc_fd() Yu Ma
2024-07-16 11:11 ` Jan Kara
2024-07-13 2:39 ` [PATCH v4 2/3] fs/file.c: conditionally clear full_fds Yu Ma
2024-07-13 2:39 ` [PATCH v4 3/3] fs/file.c: add fast path in find_next_fd() Yu Ma
2024-07-16 11:19 ` Jan Kara
2024-07-16 12:37 ` Ma, Yu
2024-07-17 14:50 ` [PATCH v5 0/3] fs/file.c: optimize the critical section of file_lock in Yu Ma
2024-07-17 14:50 ` [PATCH v5 1/3] fs/file.c: remove sanity_check and add likely/unlikely in alloc_fd() Yu Ma
2024-08-06 13:44 ` kernel test robot
2024-08-14 21:38 ` Al Viro
2024-08-15 2:49 ` Ma, Yu
2024-08-15 3:45 ` Al Viro
2024-08-15 8:34 ` Ma, Yu
2024-10-31 7:42 ` Mateusz Guzik
2024-10-31 10:14 ` Christian Brauner
2024-07-17 14:50 ` [PATCH v5 2/3] fs/file.c: conditionally clear full_fds Yu Ma
2024-07-17 14:50 ` [PATCH v5 3/3] fs/file.c: add fast path in find_next_fd() Yu Ma
2024-07-19 17:53 ` Mateusz Guzik
2024-07-20 12:57 ` Ma, Yu
2024-07-20 14:22 ` Mateusz Guzik
2024-08-06 13:48 ` kernel test robot
2024-07-22 15:02 ` [PATCH v5 0/3] fs/file.c: optimize the critical section of file_lock in Christian Brauner
2024-08-01 19:13 ` Al Viro
2024-08-02 11:04 ` Christian Brauner
2024-08-02 14:22 ` Al Viro
2024-08-05 6:56 ` Christian Brauner
2024-08-12 1:31 ` Ma, Yu
2024-08-12 2:40 ` Al Viro
2024-08-12 15:09 ` Ma, Yu
2024-11-06 17:44 ` Jan Kara
2024-11-06 17:59 ` Al Viro
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