From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: "Toshiharu Harada" Subject: Re: [AppArmor 01/41] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_create LSM hook Date: Sun, 27 May 2007 08:08:56 +0900 Message-ID: <9d732d950705261608j4bc72cd4s4378df9848101c84@mail.gmail.com> References: <309300.41401.qm@web36615.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Cc: "Kyle Moffett" , casey@schaufler-ca.com, "Andreas Gruenbacher" , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org To: "James Morris" Return-path: In-Reply-To: Content-Disposition: inline Sender: linux-security-module-owner@vger.kernel.org List-Id: linux-fsdevel.vger.kernel.org 2007/5/27, James Morris : > On Sat, 26 May 2007, Kyle Moffett wrote: > > AppArmor). On the other hand, if you actually want to protect the _data_, > > then tagging the _name_ is flawed; tag the *DATA* instead. > > Bingo. > > (This is how traditional Unix DAC has always functioned, and is what > SELinux does: object labeling). Object labeling (or labeled security) looks simple and straight forward way, but it's not. (1) Object labeling has a assumption that labels are always properly defined and maintained. This can not be easily achieved. (2) Also, assigning a label is something like inventing and assigning a *new* name (label name) to objects which can cause flaws. I'm not saying labeled security or SELinux is wrong. I just wanted to remind that the important part is the "process" not the "result". :-) -- Toshiharu Harada haradats@gmail.com