From: "Toshiharu Harada" <haradats@gmail.com>
To: "Evgeniy Polyakov" <johnpol@2ka.mipt.ru>
Cc: "Miklos Szeredi" <miklos@szeredi.hu>,
hch@infradead.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org,
sds@tycho.nsa.gov, eparis@redhat.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com,
agruen@suse.de, jjohansen@suse.de,
penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [patch 01/15] security: pass path to inode_create
Date: Tue, 3 Jun 2008 00:31:14 +0900 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <9d732d950806020831h1b8aeabag9cb6db8e16bac971@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20080602150517.GB22400@2ka.mipt.ru>
2008/6/3 Evgeniy Polyakov <johnpol@2ka.mipt.ru>:
> On Mon, Jun 02, 2008 at 12:55:33PM +0200, Miklos Szeredi (miklos@szeredi.hu) wrote:
>> Oh, I've been told. But valid technical reason given? No.
>
> This is a really interesting flame, can you proceed,
> we will run for cola and peanuts :)
Let me quote a message by Chris Wright from LSM ml:
"You cannot discover the path used to access an inode without knowing
both the dentry and the vfsmount objects. "
Another one by Stephen Smalley:
"Pathname-based security considered harmful. You want to control access
to an object, not a name, and the name-to-object mapping is neither
one-to-one nor immutable."
Can you guess when they were posted?
The answer is December 2003. :)
Do we need more time? I don't think so.
I'm viewing Miklos' patches as *enhancements* not only for AppArmor (and
other pathname-based LSM modules). Everyone can make use of
information and lose nothing. Am I too simple minded?
> For the technical reason: in case of stackable/bind, which path should
> be checked? Whatever answer is, there will always be another party,
> which wants different behaviour.
--
Toshiharu Harada
haradats@gmail.com
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2008-06-02 15:31 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 51+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2008-05-29 13:49 [patch 00/15] security: pass path instead of inode to security ops Miklos Szeredi
2008-05-29 13:49 ` [patch 01/15] security: pass path to inode_create Miklos Szeredi
2008-05-31 8:30 ` Christoph Hellwig
2008-05-31 10:48 ` Tetsuo Handa
2008-06-01 20:52 ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-06-02 6:01 ` Christoph Hellwig
2008-06-02 7:02 ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-06-02 9:13 ` Christoph Hellwig
2008-06-02 9:32 ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-06-02 9:36 ` Christoph Hellwig
2008-06-02 9:52 ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-06-02 10:42 ` Christoph Hellwig
2008-06-02 10:55 ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-06-02 11:04 ` Pekka Enberg
2008-06-02 11:13 ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-06-02 15:05 ` Evgeniy Polyakov
2008-06-02 15:31 ` Toshiharu Harada [this message]
2008-06-02 15:51 ` Evgeniy Polyakov
2008-06-02 16:29 ` Toshiharu Harada
2008-06-02 16:52 ` Evgeniy Polyakov
2008-06-02 23:37 ` Toshiharu Harada
2008-06-03 6:08 ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-06-02 18:59 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-06-02 10:04 ` Andreas Gruenbacher
2008-06-02 11:23 ` Matthew Wilcox
2008-06-02 11:34 ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-06-02 11:52 ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-06-02 12:32 ` Matthew Wilcox
2008-06-02 12:45 ` Andreas Gruenbacher
2008-06-02 12:49 ` Matthew Wilcox
2008-06-02 13:24 ` Andreas Gruenbacher
2008-06-14 8:27 ` Tetsuo Handa
2008-06-03 13:43 ` Stephen Smalley
2008-06-04 5:09 ` Tetsuo Handa
2008-05-29 13:49 ` [patch 02/15] security: pass path to inode_mknod Miklos Szeredi
2008-05-29 13:49 ` [patch 03/15] security: pass path to inode_mkdir Miklos Szeredi
2008-05-29 13:49 ` [patch 04/15] security: pass path to inode_rmdir Miklos Szeredi
2008-05-29 13:49 ` [patch 05/15] security: pass path to inode_unlink Miklos Szeredi
2008-05-29 13:49 ` [patch 06/15] security: pass path to inode_symlink Miklos Szeredi
2008-05-29 13:49 ` [patch 07/15] security: pass path to inode_link Miklos Szeredi
2008-05-29 13:49 ` [patch 08/15] security: pass path to inode_rename Miklos Szeredi
2008-05-29 13:49 ` [patch 09/15] security: pass path to inode_setattr Miklos Szeredi
2008-05-29 13:49 ` [patch 10/15] security: pass path to inode_getxattr Miklos Szeredi
2008-05-29 13:49 ` [patch 11/15] security: pass path to inode_listxattr Miklos Szeredi
2008-05-29 13:49 ` [patch 12/15] security: pass path to inode_setxattr Miklos Szeredi
2008-05-29 13:49 ` [patch 13/15] security: pass path to inode_removexattr Miklos Szeredi
2008-05-29 13:49 ` [patch 14/15] vfs: more path_permission() conversions Miklos Szeredi
2008-05-29 13:49 ` [patch 15/15] security: pass path to inode_permission Miklos Szeredi
2008-05-30 13:37 ` [patch 00/15] security: pass path instead of inode to security ops Tetsuo Handa
2008-05-30 17:17 ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-05-31 0:33 ` Tetsuo Handa
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