From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: "Ware, Ryan R" Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 00/16] EVM Date: Thu, 30 Jun 2011 19:02:28 -0700 Message-ID: References: <1309473473.2857.5.camel@localhost.localdomain> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: QUOTED-PRINTABLE Cc: "linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org" , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, James Morris , David Safford , Andrew Morton , Greg KH , Dmitry Kasatkin To: Mimi Zohar Return-path: In-Reply-To: <1309473473.2857.5.camel@localhost.localdomain> Sender: linux-security-module-owner@vger.kernel.org List-Id: linux-fsdevel.vger.kernel.org On Thu, Jun 30, 2011 at 3:37 PM, Mimi Zohar = wrote: > > On Thu, 2011-06-30 at 14:06 -0700, Ryan Ware wrote: > > Glad to see this going in Mimi! =A0Looking forward to enabling this= in our > > MeeGo kernels. > > > > Ryan > > I wish. =A0As far as I'm aware, EVM hasn't been upstreamed. =A0The go= od news > is that the ecryptfs encrypted-key patches are now in the > security-testing tree. True. My wording should have been clearer. It's definitely good to have the ecryptfs patches in. > > > On 6/29/11 12:50 PM, "Mimi Zohar" wrote: > > > > >Discretionary Access Control(DAC) and Mandatory Access Control(MAC= ) can > > >protect the integrity of a running system from unauthorized change= s. When > > >these protections are not running, such as when booting a maliciou= s OS, > > >mounting the disk under a different operating system, or physicall= y moving > > >the disk to another system, an "offline" attack is free to read an= d write > > >file data/metadata. > > > > > >...snip... > > > > > > > -- > To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kerne= l" in > the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org > More majordomo info at =A0http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html > Please read the FAQ at =A0http://www.tux.org/lkml/ -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-securit= y-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html