From: 程洋 <d17103513@gmail.com>
To: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
"Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>,
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>,
Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: > [PATCH] Security: Handle hidepid option correctly
Date: Mon, 17 Dec 2018 12:21:40 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CADd0cq21TfsncsoViQD+1Q=GKyjG5fKuWEnZr8JxevLh3mSeag@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181214154436.GA16772@avx2>
Actually I'm pretty sure kernel calls proc_mount()
Here is the call stack
[ 0.003450] [<ffffff8bef2a0190>] proc_mount+0x2c/0x98
[ 0.003459] [<ffffff8bef22e560>] mount_fs+0x164/0x190
[ 0.003465] [<ffffff8bef24c138>] vfs_kern_mount+0x74/0x168
[ 0.003469] [<ffffff8bef24c244>] kern_mount_data+0x18/0x30
[ 0.003474] [<ffffff8bef2a0258>] pid_ns_prepare_proc+0x24/0x40
[ 0.003484] [<ffffff8bef0cd5ec>] alloc_pid+0x498/0x4b4
[ 0.003492] [<ffffff8bef0a9b94>] copy_process.isra.73.part.74+0xed0/0x1708
[ 0.003496] [<ffffff8bef0aa560>] _do_fork+0xdc/0x3f8
[ 0.003501] [<ffffff8bef0aa8c8>] kernel_thread+0x34/0x3c
[ 0.003511] [<ffffff8bf00cd498>] rest_init+0x20/0x80
[ 0.003522] [<ffffff8bf0c00c7c>] start_kernel+0x3e4/0x43c
[ 0.003527] [<ffffff8bf0c001e8>] __primary_switched+0x64/0x90
Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> 于2018年12月14日周五 下午11:44写道：
>
> On Wed, Dec 05, 2018 at 03:26:04PM +0800, 程洋 wrote:
> > Anyone who can review my patch?
> >
> > 程洋 <chengyang@xiaomi.com> 于2018年11月30日周五 上午10:34写道：
> > >
> > > Here is an article illustrates the details.
> > > https://medium.com/@topjohnwu/from-anime-game-to-android-system-security-vulnerability-9b955a182f20
> > >
> > > And There is a similar fix on kernel-4.4:
> > > https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=99663be772c827b8f5f594fe87eb4807be1994e5
> > >
> > > Q: Other filesystems parse the options from fill_super(). Is proc special in some fashion?
> > > A: According to my research, start_kernel will call proc_mount first, and initialize sb->s_root before any userspace process runs. If others want to mount it, all options will be ignored.
> > > AOSP change here: https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/platform/system/core/+/181345/4/init/init.cpp
> > > At first I though we should mount it with MS_REMOUNT flag. But kernel will crash if we did this.
>
> This is not true: /proc is mounted by userspace (and it is easy to see
> from the fact that proc_mount() is not called from kernel anywhere).
>
> hidepid= in its current form is misdesigned, so might as well not bother
> changing anything. IIRC there were(?) patches to make it per-mount.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-12-17 4:21 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-11-30 2:34 > [PATCH] Security: Handle hidepid option correctly 程洋
2018-11-30 5:58 ` 程洋
2018-11-30 7:34 ` 程洋
2018-12-05 7:26 ` 程洋
2018-12-07 7:03 ` 程洋
2018-12-14 15:44 ` Alexey Dobriyan
2018-12-17 4:21 ` 程洋 [this message]
2018-12-21 18:10 ` Alexey Dobriyan
[not found] <cover.1543472629.git.chengyang@xiaomi.com>
2018-11-29 11:08 ` d17103513
2018-11-29 20:30 ` Andrew Morton
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