From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
To: Jonathan Calmels <jcalmels@3xx0.net>, Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: brauner@kernel.org, ebiederm@xmission.com,
Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Joel Granados <j.granados@samsung.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
containers@lists.linux.dev, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/3] Introduce user namespace capabilities
Date: Thu, 16 May 2024 12:23:35 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAHC9VhQ=nNPLRHF8RAMxArT1CESei+qYsnGse6--ixPhACAWTA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240516092213.6799-1-jcalmels@3xx0.net>
On Thu, May 16, 2024 at 5:21 AM Jonathan Calmels <jcalmels@3xx0.net> wrote:
>
> It's that time of the year again where we debate security settings for user
> namespaces ;)
>
> I’ve been experimenting with different approaches to address the gripe
> around user namespaces being used as attack vectors.
> After invaluable feedback from Serge and Christian offline, this is what I
> came up with.
As Serge is the capabilities maintainer it would be good to hear his
thoughts on-list about this proposal.
> There are obviously a lot of things we could do differently but I feel this
> is the right balance between functionality, simplicity and security. This
> also serves as a good foundation and could always be extended if the need
> arises in the future.
>
> Notes:
>
> - Adding a new capability set is far from ideal, but trying to reuse the
> existing capability framework was deemed both impractical and
> questionable security-wise, so here we are.
>
> - We might want to add new capabilities for some of the checks instead of
> reusing CAP_SETPCAP every time. Serge mentioned something like
> CAP_SYS_LIMIT?
>
> - In the last patch, we could decide to have stronger requirements and
> perform checks inside cap_capable() in case we want to retroactively
> prevent capabilities in old namespaces, this might be an overreach though
> so I left it out.
>
> I'm also not fond of the ulong logic for setting the sysctl parameter, on
> the other hand, the usermodhelper code always uses two u32s which makes it
> very confusing to set in userspace.
>
>
> Jonathan Calmels (3):
> capabilities: user namespace capabilities
> capabilities: add securebit for strict userns caps
> capabilities: add cap userns sysctl mask
>
> fs/proc/array.c | 9 ++++
> include/linux/cred.h | 3 ++
> include/linux/securebits.h | 1 +
> include/linux/user_namespace.h | 7 +++
> include/uapi/linux/prctl.h | 7 +++
> include/uapi/linux/securebits.h | 11 ++++-
> kernel/cred.c | 3 ++
> kernel/sysctl.c | 10 ++++
> kernel/umh.c | 16 +++++++
> kernel/user_namespace.c | 83 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
> security/commoncap.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++
> security/keys/process_keys.c | 3 ++
> 12 files changed, 204 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
--
paul-moore.com
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-05-16 16:23 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 53+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-05-16 9:22 [PATCH 0/3] Introduce user namespace capabilities Jonathan Calmels
2024-05-16 9:22 ` [PATCH 1/3] capabilities: " Jonathan Calmels
2024-05-16 12:27 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-16 22:07 ` John Johansen
2024-05-17 10:51 ` Jonathan Calmels
2024-05-17 11:59 ` John Johansen
2024-05-18 3:50 ` Jonathan Calmels
2024-05-18 12:27 ` John Johansen
2024-05-19 1:33 ` Jonathan Calmels
2024-05-17 11:32 ` Eric W. Biederman
2024-05-17 11:55 ` Jonathan Calmels
2024-05-17 12:48 ` John Johansen
2024-05-17 14:22 ` Eric W. Biederman
2024-05-17 18:02 ` Jonathan Calmels
2024-05-21 15:52 ` John Johansen
2024-05-20 3:30 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2024-05-20 3:36 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2024-05-16 9:22 ` [PATCH 2/3] capabilities: add securebit for strict userns caps Jonathan Calmels
2024-05-16 12:42 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-20 3:38 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2024-05-16 9:22 ` [PATCH 3/3] capabilities: add cap userns sysctl mask Jonathan Calmels
2024-05-16 12:44 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-20 3:38 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2024-05-20 13:30 ` Tycho Andersen
2024-05-20 19:25 ` Jonathan Calmels
2024-05-20 21:13 ` Tycho Andersen
2024-05-20 22:12 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-21 14:29 ` Tycho Andersen
2024-05-21 14:45 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-16 13:30 ` [PATCH 0/3] Introduce user namespace capabilities Ben Boeckel
2024-05-16 13:36 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-17 10:00 ` Jonathan Calmels
2024-05-16 16:23 ` Paul Moore [this message]
2024-05-16 17:18 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-16 19:07 ` Casey Schaufler
2024-05-16 19:29 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-16 19:31 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-16 20:00 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-17 11:42 ` Jonathan Calmels
2024-05-17 17:53 ` Casey Schaufler
2024-05-17 19:11 ` Jonathan Calmels
2024-05-18 11:08 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-18 11:17 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-18 11:21 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-21 13:57 ` John Johansen
2024-05-21 14:12 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-21 14:45 ` John Johansen
2024-05-22 0:45 ` Jonathan Calmels
2024-05-31 7:43 ` John Johansen
2024-05-18 12:20 ` Serge Hallyn
2024-05-19 17:03 ` Casey Schaufler
2024-05-20 0:54 ` Jonathan Calmels
2024-05-21 14:29 ` John Johansen
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