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From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
To: Jonathan Calmels <jcalmels@3xx0.net>, Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: brauner@kernel.org, ebiederm@xmission.com,
	 Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	 Joel Granados <j.granados@samsung.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	 David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
	containers@lists.linux.dev,  linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	 linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/3] Introduce user namespace capabilities
Date: Thu, 16 May 2024 12:23:35 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAHC9VhQ=nNPLRHF8RAMxArT1CESei+qYsnGse6--ixPhACAWTA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240516092213.6799-1-jcalmels@3xx0.net>

On Thu, May 16, 2024 at 5:21 AM Jonathan Calmels <jcalmels@3xx0.net> wrote:
>
> It's that time of the year again where we debate security settings for user
> namespaces ;)
>
> I’ve been experimenting with different approaches to address the gripe
> around user namespaces being used as attack vectors.
> After invaluable feedback from Serge and Christian offline, this is what I
> came up with.

As Serge is the capabilities maintainer it would be good to hear his
thoughts on-list about this proposal.

> There are obviously a lot of things we could do differently but I feel this
> is the right balance between functionality, simplicity and security. This
> also serves as a good foundation and could always be extended if the need
> arises in the future.
>
> Notes:
>
> - Adding a new capability set is far from ideal, but trying to reuse the
>   existing capability framework was deemed both impractical and
>   questionable security-wise, so here we are.
>
> - We might want to add new capabilities for some of the checks instead of
>   reusing CAP_SETPCAP every time. Serge mentioned something like
>   CAP_SYS_LIMIT?
>
> - In the last patch, we could decide to have stronger requirements and
>   perform checks inside cap_capable() in case we want to retroactively
>   prevent capabilities in old namespaces, this might be an overreach though
>   so I left it out.
>
>   I'm also not fond of the ulong logic for setting the sysctl parameter, on
>   the other hand, the usermodhelper code always uses two u32s which makes it
>   very confusing to set in userspace.
>
>
> Jonathan Calmels (3):
>   capabilities: user namespace capabilities
>   capabilities: add securebit for strict userns caps
>   capabilities: add cap userns sysctl mask
>
>  fs/proc/array.c                 |  9 ++++
>  include/linux/cred.h            |  3 ++
>  include/linux/securebits.h      |  1 +
>  include/linux/user_namespace.h  |  7 +++
>  include/uapi/linux/prctl.h      |  7 +++
>  include/uapi/linux/securebits.h | 11 ++++-
>  kernel/cred.c                   |  3 ++
>  kernel/sysctl.c                 | 10 ++++
>  kernel/umh.c                    | 16 +++++++
>  kernel/user_namespace.c         | 83 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
>  security/commoncap.c            | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++
>  security/keys/process_keys.c    |  3 ++
>  12 files changed, 204 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

-- 
paul-moore.com

  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-05-16 16:23 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 53+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-05-16  9:22 [PATCH 0/3] Introduce user namespace capabilities Jonathan Calmels
2024-05-16  9:22 ` [PATCH 1/3] capabilities: " Jonathan Calmels
2024-05-16 12:27   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-16 22:07   ` John Johansen
2024-05-17 10:51     ` Jonathan Calmels
2024-05-17 11:59       ` John Johansen
2024-05-18  3:50         ` Jonathan Calmels
2024-05-18 12:27           ` John Johansen
2024-05-19  1:33             ` Jonathan Calmels
2024-05-17 11:32   ` Eric W. Biederman
2024-05-17 11:55     ` Jonathan Calmels
2024-05-17 12:48       ` John Johansen
2024-05-17 14:22       ` Eric W. Biederman
2024-05-17 18:02         ` Jonathan Calmels
2024-05-21 15:52         ` John Johansen
2024-05-20  3:30   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2024-05-20  3:36   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2024-05-16  9:22 ` [PATCH 2/3] capabilities: add securebit for strict userns caps Jonathan Calmels
2024-05-16 12:42   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-20  3:38   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2024-05-16  9:22 ` [PATCH 3/3] capabilities: add cap userns sysctl mask Jonathan Calmels
2024-05-16 12:44   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-20  3:38   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2024-05-20 13:30   ` Tycho Andersen
2024-05-20 19:25     ` Jonathan Calmels
2024-05-20 21:13       ` Tycho Andersen
2024-05-20 22:12         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-21 14:29           ` Tycho Andersen
2024-05-21 14:45             ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-16 13:30 ` [PATCH 0/3] Introduce user namespace capabilities Ben Boeckel
2024-05-16 13:36   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-17 10:00     ` Jonathan Calmels
2024-05-16 16:23 ` Paul Moore [this message]
2024-05-16 17:18   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-16 19:07 ` Casey Schaufler
2024-05-16 19:29   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-16 19:31     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-16 20:00       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-17 11:42         ` Jonathan Calmels
2024-05-17 17:53           ` Casey Schaufler
2024-05-17 19:11             ` Jonathan Calmels
2024-05-18 11:08               ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-18 11:17                 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-18 11:21                   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-21 13:57                     ` John Johansen
2024-05-21 14:12                       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-21 14:45                         ` John Johansen
2024-05-22  0:45                           ` Jonathan Calmels
2024-05-31  7:43                             ` John Johansen
2024-05-18 12:20             ` Serge Hallyn
2024-05-19 17:03               ` Casey Schaufler
2024-05-20  0:54                 ` Jonathan Calmels
2024-05-21 14:29               ` John Johansen

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