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Juni 2025 um 22:54 Uhr schrieb Christian Brauner : > > Persist exit and coredump information independent of whether anyone > currently holds a pidfd for the struct pid. > > The current scheme allocated pidfs dentries on-demand repeatedly. > This scheme is reaching it's limits as it makes it impossible to pin > information that needs to be available after the task has exited or > coredumped and that should not be lost simply because the pidfd got > closed temporarily. The next opener should still see the stashed > information. > > This is also a prerequisite for supporting extended attributes on > pidfds to allow attaching meta information to them. > > If someone opens a pidfd for a struct pid a pidfs dentry is allocated > and stashed in pid->stashed. Once the last pidfd for the struct pid is > closed the pidfs dentry is released and removed from pid->stashed. > > So if 10 callers create a pidfs dentry for the same struct pid > sequentially, i.e., each closing the pidfd before the other creates a > new one then a new pidfs dentry is allocated every time. > > Because multiple tasks acquiring and releasing a pidfd for the same > struct pid can race with each another a task may still find a valid > pidfs entry from the previous task in pid->stashed and reuse it. Or it > might find a dead dentry in there and fail to reuse it and so stashes a > new pidfs dentry. Multiple tasks may race to stash a new pidfs dentry > but only one will succeed, the other ones will put their dentry. > > The current scheme aims to ensure that a pidfs dentry for a struct pid > can only be created if the task is still alive or if a pidfs dentry > already existed before the task was reaped and so exit information has > been was stashed in the pidfs inode. > > That's great except that it's buggy. If a pidfs dentry is stashed in > pid->stashed after pidfs_exit() but before __unhash_process() is called > we will return a pidfd for a reaped task without exit information being > available. > > The pidfds_pid_valid() check does not guard against this race as it > doens't sync at all with pidfs_exit(). The pid_has_task() check might be > successful simply because we're before __unhash_process() but after > pidfs_exit(). > > Introduce a new scheme where the lifetime of information associated with > a pidfs entry (coredump and exit information) isn't bound to the > lifetime of the pidfs inode but the struct pid itself. > > The first time a pidfs dentry is allocated for a struct pid a struct > pidfs_attr will be allocated which will be used to store exit and > coredump information. > > If all pidfs for the pidfs dentry are closed the dentry and inode can be > cleaned up but the struct pidfs_attr will stick until the struct pid > itself is freed. This will ensure minimal memory usage while persisting > relevant information. > > The new scheme has various advantages. First, it allows to close the > race where we end up handing out a pidfd for a reaped task for which no > exit information is available. Second, it minimizes memory usage. > Third, it allows to remove complex lifetime tracking via dentries when > registering a struct pid with pidfs. There's no need to get or put a > reference. Instead, the lifetime of exit and coredump information > associated with a struct pid is bound to the lifetime of struct pid > itself. > > Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner Reviewed-by: Alexander Mikhalitsyn > --- > fs/pidfs.c | 212 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- > include/linux/pid.h | 3 + > include/linux/pidfs.h | 1 + > kernel/pid.c | 2 +- > 4 files changed, 151 insertions(+), 67 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/fs/pidfs.c b/fs/pidfs.c > index ff2560b34ed1..6a907457b1fe 100644 > --- a/fs/pidfs.c > +++ b/fs/pidfs.c > @@ -25,7 +25,10 @@ > #include "internal.h" > #include "mount.h" > > +#define PIDFS_PID_DEAD ERR_PTR(-ESRCH) > + > static struct kmem_cache *pidfs_cachep __ro_after_init; > +static struct kmem_cache *pidfs_attr_cachep __ro_after_init; > > /* > * Stashes information that userspace needs to access even after the > @@ -37,6 +40,11 @@ struct pidfs_exit_info { > __u32 coredump_mask; > }; > > +struct pidfs_attr { > + struct pidfs_exit_info __pei; > + struct pidfs_exit_info *exit_info; > +}; > + > struct pidfs_inode { > struct pidfs_exit_info __pei; > struct pidfs_exit_info *exit_info; > @@ -125,6 +133,7 @@ void pidfs_add_pid(struct pid *pid) > > pid->ino = pidfs_ino_nr; > pid->stashed = NULL; > + pid->attr = NULL; > pidfs_ino_nr++; > > write_seqcount_begin(&pidmap_lock_seq); > @@ -139,6 +148,18 @@ void pidfs_remove_pid(struct pid *pid) > write_seqcount_end(&pidmap_lock_seq); > } > > +void pidfs_free_pid(struct pid *pid) > +{ > + /* > + * Any dentry must've been wiped from the pid by now. > + * Otherwise there's a reference count bug. > + */ > + VFS_WARN_ON_ONCE(pid->stashed); > + > + if (!IS_ERR(pid->attr)) > + kfree(pid->attr); > +} > + > #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS > /** > * pidfd_show_fdinfo - print information about a pidfd > @@ -261,13 +282,13 @@ static __u32 pidfs_coredump_mask(unsigned long mm_flags) > static long pidfd_info(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) > { > struct pidfd_info __user *uinfo = (struct pidfd_info __user *)arg; > - struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); > struct pid *pid = pidfd_pid(file); > size_t usize = _IOC_SIZE(cmd); > struct pidfd_info kinfo = {}; > struct pidfs_exit_info *exit_info; > struct user_namespace *user_ns; > struct task_struct *task; > + struct pidfs_attr *attr; > const struct cred *c; > __u64 mask; > > @@ -286,8 +307,9 @@ static long pidfd_info(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) > if (!pid_in_current_pidns(pid)) > return -ESRCH; > > + attr = READ_ONCE(pid->attr); > if (mask & PIDFD_INFO_EXIT) { > - exit_info = READ_ONCE(pidfs_i(inode)->exit_info); > + exit_info = READ_ONCE(attr->exit_info); > if (exit_info) { > kinfo.mask |= PIDFD_INFO_EXIT; > #ifdef CONFIG_CGROUPS > @@ -300,7 +322,7 @@ static long pidfd_info(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) > > if (mask & PIDFD_INFO_COREDUMP) { > kinfo.mask |= PIDFD_INFO_COREDUMP; > - kinfo.coredump_mask = READ_ONCE(pidfs_i(inode)->__pei.coredump_mask); > + kinfo.coredump_mask = READ_ONCE(attr->__pei.coredump_mask); > } > > task = get_pid_task(pid, PIDTYPE_PID); > @@ -552,41 +574,61 @@ struct pid *pidfd_pid(const struct file *file) > * task has been reaped which cannot happen until we're out of > * release_task(). > * > - * If this struct pid is referred to by a pidfd then > - * stashed_dentry_get() will return the dentry and inode for that struct > - * pid. Since we've taken a reference on it there's now an additional > - * reference from the exit path on it. Which is fine. We're going to put > - * it again in a second and we know that the pid is kept alive anyway. > + * If this struct pid has at least once been referred to by a pidfd then > + * pid->attr will be allocated. If not we mark the struct pid as dead so > + * anyone who is trying to register it with pidfs will fail to do so. > + * Otherwise we would hand out pidfs for reaped tasks without having > + * exit information available. > * > - * Worst case is that we've filled in the info and immediately free the > - * dentry and inode afterwards since the pidfd has been closed. Since > + * Worst case is that we've filled in the info and the pid gets freed > + * right away in free_pid() when no one holds a pidfd anymore. Since > * pidfs_exit() currently is placed after exit_task_work() we know that > - * it cannot be us aka the exiting task holding a pidfd to ourselves. > + * it cannot be us aka the exiting task holding a pidfd to itself. > */ > void pidfs_exit(struct task_struct *tsk) > { > - struct dentry *dentry; > + struct pid *pid = task_pid(tsk); > + struct pidfs_attr *attr; > + struct pidfs_exit_info *exit_info; > +#ifdef CONFIG_CGROUPS > + struct cgroup *cgrp; > +#endif > > might_sleep(); > > - dentry = stashed_dentry_get(&task_pid(tsk)->stashed); > - if (dentry) { > - struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry); > - struct pidfs_exit_info *exit_info = &pidfs_i(inode)->__pei; > -#ifdef CONFIG_CGROUPS > - struct cgroup *cgrp; > + guard(spinlock_irq)(&pid->wait_pidfd.lock); > + attr = pid->attr; > + if (!attr) { > + /* > + * No one ever held a pidfd for this struct pid. > + * Mark it as dead so no one can add a pidfs > + * entry anymore. We're about to be reaped and > + * so no exit information would be available. > + */ > + pid->attr = PIDFS_PID_DEAD; > + return; > + } > > - rcu_read_lock(); > - cgrp = task_dfl_cgroup(tsk); > - exit_info->cgroupid = cgroup_id(cgrp); > - rcu_read_unlock(); > + /* > + * If @pid->attr is set someone might still legitimately hold a > + * pidfd to @pid or someone might concurrently still be getting > + * a reference to an already stashed dentry from @pid->stashed. > + * So defer cleaning @pid->attr until the last reference to @pid > + * is put > + */ > + > + exit_info = &attr->__pei; > + > +#ifdef CONFIG_CGROUPS > + rcu_read_lock(); > + cgrp = task_dfl_cgroup(tsk); > + exit_info->cgroupid = cgroup_id(cgrp); > + rcu_read_unlock(); > #endif > - exit_info->exit_code = tsk->exit_code; > + exit_info->exit_code = tsk->exit_code; > > - /* Ensure that PIDFD_GET_INFO sees either all or nothing. */ > - smp_store_release(&pidfs_i(inode)->exit_info, &pidfs_i(inode)->__pei); > - dput(dentry); > - } > + /* Ensure that PIDFD_GET_INFO sees either all or nothing. */ > + smp_store_release(&attr->exit_info, &attr->__pei); > } > > #ifdef CONFIG_COREDUMP > @@ -594,16 +636,15 @@ void pidfs_coredump(const struct coredump_params *cprm) > { > struct pid *pid = cprm->pid; > struct pidfs_exit_info *exit_info; > - struct dentry *dentry; > - struct inode *inode; > + struct pidfs_attr *attr; > __u32 coredump_mask = 0; > > - dentry = pid->stashed; > - if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!dentry)) > - return; > + attr = READ_ONCE(pid->attr); > > - inode = d_inode(dentry); > - exit_info = &pidfs_i(inode)->__pei; > + VFS_WARN_ON_ONCE(!attr); > + VFS_WARN_ON_ONCE(attr == PIDFS_PID_DEAD); > + > + exit_info = &attr->__pei; > /* Note how we were coredumped. */ > coredump_mask = pidfs_coredump_mask(cprm->mm_flags); > /* Note that we actually did coredump. */ > @@ -663,7 +704,7 @@ static struct inode *pidfs_alloc_inode(struct super_block *sb) > > static void pidfs_free_inode(struct inode *inode) > { > - kmem_cache_free(pidfs_cachep, pidfs_i(inode)); > + kfree(pidfs_i(inode)); > } > > static const struct super_operations pidfs_sops = { > @@ -831,8 +872,13 @@ static inline bool pidfs_pid_valid(struct pid *pid, const struct path *path, > * recorded and published can be handled correctly. > */ > if (unlikely(!pid_has_task(pid, type))) { > - struct inode *inode = d_inode(path->dentry); > - return !!READ_ONCE(pidfs_i(inode)->exit_info); > + struct pidfs_attr *attr; > + > + attr = READ_ONCE(pid->attr); > + if (!attr) > + return false; > + if (!READ_ONCE(attr->exit_info)) > + return false; > } > > return true; > @@ -878,9 +924,67 @@ static void pidfs_put_data(void *data) > put_pid(pid); > } > > +/** > + * pidfs_register_pid - register a struct pid in pidfs > + * @pid: pid to pin > + * > + * Register a struct pid in pidfs. Needs to be paired with > + * pidfs_put_pid() to not risk leaking the pidfs dentry and inode. > + * > + * Return: On success zero, on error a negative error code is returned. > + */ > +int pidfs_register_pid(struct pid *pid) > +{ > + struct pidfs_attr *new_attr __free(kfree) = NULL; > + struct pidfs_attr *attr; > + > + might_sleep(); > + > + if (!pid) > + return 0; > + > + attr = READ_ONCE(pid->attr); > + if (unlikely(attr == PIDFS_PID_DEAD)) > + return PTR_ERR(PIDFS_PID_DEAD); > + if (attr) > + return 0; > + > + new_attr = kmem_cache_zalloc(pidfs_attr_cachep, GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!new_attr) > + return -ENOMEM; > + > + /* Synchronize with pidfs_exit(). */ > + guard(spinlock_irq)(&pid->wait_pidfd.lock); > + > + attr = pid->attr; > + if (unlikely(attr == PIDFS_PID_DEAD)) > + return PTR_ERR(PIDFS_PID_DEAD); > + if (unlikely(attr)) > + return 0; > + > + pid->attr = no_free_ptr(new_attr); > + return 0; > +} > + > +static struct dentry *pidfs_stash_dentry(struct dentry **stashed, > + struct dentry *dentry) > +{ > + int ret; > + struct pid *pid = d_inode(dentry)->i_private; > + > + VFS_WARN_ON_ONCE(stashed != &pid->stashed); > + > + ret = pidfs_register_pid(pid); > + if (ret) > + return ERR_PTR(ret); > + > + return stash_dentry(stashed, dentry); > +} > + > static const struct stashed_operations pidfs_stashed_ops = { > - .init_inode = pidfs_init_inode, > - .put_data = pidfs_put_data, > + .stash_dentry = pidfs_stash_dentry, > + .init_inode = pidfs_init_inode, > + .put_data = pidfs_put_data, > }; > > static int pidfs_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc) > @@ -936,33 +1040,6 @@ struct file *pidfs_alloc_file(struct pid *pid, unsigned int flags) > return pidfd_file; > } > > -/** > - * pidfs_register_pid - register a struct pid in pidfs > - * @pid: pid to pin > - * > - * Register a struct pid in pidfs. Needs to be paired with > - * pidfs_put_pid() to not risk leaking the pidfs dentry and inode. > - * > - * Return: On success zero, on error a negative error code is returned. > - */ > -int pidfs_register_pid(struct pid *pid) > -{ > - struct path path __free(path_put) = {}; > - int ret; > - > - might_sleep(); > - > - if (!pid) > - return 0; > - > - ret = path_from_stashed(&pid->stashed, pidfs_mnt, get_pid(pid), &path); > - if (unlikely(ret)) > - return ret; > - /* Keep the dentry and only put the reference to the mount. */ > - path.dentry = NULL; > - return 0; > -} > - > /** > * pidfs_get_pid - pin a struct pid through pidfs > * @pid: pid to pin > @@ -1008,6 +1085,9 @@ void __init pidfs_init(void) > (SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN | SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT | > SLAB_ACCOUNT | SLAB_PANIC), > pidfs_inode_init_once); > + pidfs_attr_cachep = kmem_cache_create("pidfs_attr_cache", sizeof(struct pidfs_attr), 0, > + (SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN | SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT | > + SLAB_ACCOUNT | SLAB_PANIC), NULL); > pidfs_mnt = kern_mount(&pidfs_type); > if (IS_ERR(pidfs_mnt)) > panic("Failed to mount pidfs pseudo filesystem"); > diff --git a/include/linux/pid.h b/include/linux/pid.h > index 00646a692dd4..003a1027d219 100644 > --- a/include/linux/pid.h > +++ b/include/linux/pid.h > @@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ > > #define RESERVED_PIDS 300 > > +struct pidfs_attr; > + > struct upid { > int nr; > struct pid_namespace *ns; > @@ -60,6 +62,7 @@ struct pid { > u64 ino; > struct rb_node pidfs_node; > struct dentry *stashed; > + struct pidfs_attr *attr; > }; > /* lists of tasks that use this pid */ > struct hlist_head tasks[PIDTYPE_MAX]; > diff --git a/include/linux/pidfs.h b/include/linux/pidfs.h > index 77e7db194914..8f6ed59bb3fb 100644 > --- a/include/linux/pidfs.h > +++ b/include/linux/pidfs.h > @@ -16,5 +16,6 @@ extern const struct dentry_operations pidfs_dentry_operations; > int pidfs_register_pid(struct pid *pid); > void pidfs_get_pid(struct pid *pid); > void pidfs_put_pid(struct pid *pid); > +void pidfs_free_pid(struct pid *pid); > > #endif /* _LINUX_PID_FS_H */ > diff --git a/kernel/pid.c b/kernel/pid.c > index 8317bcbc7cf7..07db7d8d066c 100644 > --- a/kernel/pid.c > +++ b/kernel/pid.c > @@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ void put_pid(struct pid *pid) > > ns = pid->numbers[pid->level].ns; > if (refcount_dec_and_test(&pid->count)) { > - WARN_ON_ONCE(pid->stashed); > + pidfs_free_pid(pid); > kmem_cache_free(ns->pid_cachep, pid); > put_pid_ns(ns); > } > > -- > 2.47.2 >