From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Andy Lutomirski Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 4/4] Allow unprivileged chroot when safe Date: Mon, 30 Jan 2012 14:28:05 -0800 Message-ID: References: <0e2f0f54e19bff53a3739ecfddb4ffa9a6dbde4d.1327858005.git.luto@amacapital.net> <1327960736.5355.5.camel@lenny> <1327961884.5882.11.camel@gandalf.stny.rr.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: QUOTED-PRINTABLE Cc: Colin Walters , Will Drewry , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Casey Schaufler , Linus Torvalds , Jamie Lokier , keescook@chromium.org, john.johansen@canonical.com, serge.hallyn@canonical.com, coreyb@linux.vnet.ibm.com, pmoore@redhat.com, eparis@redhat.com, djm@mindrot.org, segoon@openwall.com, jmorris@namei.org, scarybeasts@gmail.com, avi@redhat.com, penberg@cs.helsinki.fi, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, mingo@elte.hu, akpm@linux-foundation.org, khilman@ti.com, borislav.petkov@amd.com, amwang@redhat.com, oleg@redhat.com, ak@linux.intel.com, eric.dumazet@gmail.com, gregkh@suse.de, dhowells@redhat.com, daniel.lezcano@free.fr, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, olofj@chromium.org, mhalcrow@google.com, dlaor@redhat.com, corbet@lwn.net To: Steven Rostedt Return-path: In-Reply-To: <1327961884.5882.11.camel@gandalf.stny.rr.com> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-Id: linux-fsdevel.vger.kernel.org On Mon, Jan 30, 2012 at 2:18 PM, Steven Rostedt w= rote: > On Mon, 2012-01-30 at 16:58 -0500, Colin Walters wrote: >> On Mon, 2012-01-30 at 08:17 -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote: >> > Chroot can easily be used to subvert setuid programs. =A0If no_new= _privs, >> > then setuid programs don't gain any privilege, so allow chroot. >> >> Is this needed/desired by anyone now, or are you just using it to "d= emo" >> NO_NEW_PRIVS? =A0I don't see it as very useful on its own, since in = any >> "container"-type chroot you really want /proc and /dev, and your pat= ch >> doesn't help with that. >> >> System daemons that do chroot for a modicum of security already star= t >> privileged, so this doesn't help them either. > > I thought this was all for sandboxing? If a browers (or user) wants t= o > run some untrusted code, perhaps a chroot is the best way to do so. I= t > just will break if it needs to access /proc or /dev. And perhaps we > don't want untrusted code accessing /proc and /dev. True. A BPF seccomp filter that disables open, bind, connect, rename, unlink, etc may be better, though. (I like this patch, although I don't think it's at all essential. It could certainly be made more flexible and more useful, but it would get considerably more complicated in the process.) --Andy