From: "Kasatkin, Dmitry" <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: Ext4 data structures integrity
Date: Thu, 10 Nov 2011 13:21:32 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALLzPKZykr3TxmEXPgYQ3twryKSEM6SAfMdqesmbojFfGKcRyQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <loom.20111109T003740-401@post.gmane.org>
On Wed, Nov 9, 2011 at 1:44 AM, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
> Ted Ts'o <tytso <at> mit.edu> writes:
>
>>
>> On Thu, Sep 29, 2011 at 04:33:52PM +0300, Kasatkin, Dmitry wrote:
>> > >>
>> > >> There is work currently being done to add checksums for detecting
> filesystem corruption (see list
>> archive). However, if the attacker can binary edit the underlying disk device
> then they can also edit the
>> checksums (crc32c) at the same time.
>> > >>
>> > >> The only secure way to handle this would be a crypto checksum with a
> secret key.
>> > >
>> >
>> > Can you please give me some links to it????
>>
>> Darrick Wong has been sending patches to the linux-ext4 mailing for
>> review to use crc32c to protect various parts of the file system
>> metadata.
>>
>> There has been no work to the "crypto checksum with a secret key" bit;
>> the hard part is where you would securely store the secret key so that
>> only a trusted kernel has access to it.
>
> Sorry I missed this thread. Any reason that trusted/encrypted keys can't be
> used for storing the secret key?
>
Probably because it is relatively new thing...
> thanks,
>
> Mimi
>
>
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2011-11-10 11:21 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2011-09-28 13:42 Ext4 data structures integrity Kasatkin, Dmitry
2011-09-28 13:56 ` Ted Ts'o
2011-09-28 15:19 ` Kasatkin, Dmitry
2011-09-28 15:45 ` Ted Ts'o
2011-09-29 12:24 ` Kasatkin, Dmitry
2011-09-29 12:56 ` Ted Ts'o
2011-09-29 13:32 ` Kasatkin, Dmitry
2011-09-28 17:16 ` Andreas Dilger
2011-09-29 12:31 ` Kasatkin, Dmitry
2011-09-29 13:33 ` Kasatkin, Dmitry
2011-09-29 13:55 ` Ted Ts'o
2011-10-07 11:40 ` Kasatkin, Dmitry
[not found] ` <64BEDF63-5861-47C9-AC90-F41768D09F17@mit.edu>
2011-10-07 14:20 ` Kasatkin, Dmitry
2011-10-07 15:22 ` Theodore Tso
2011-11-08 23:44 ` Mimi Zohar
2011-11-10 11:21 ` Kasatkin, Dmitry [this message]
2011-09-29 16:35 ` Andreas Dilger
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