From: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
To: tytso@mit.edu, David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>,
linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Karol Lewandowski <k.lewandowsk@samsung.com>,
Kay Sievers <kay@vrfy.org>, Daniel Mack <zonque@gmail.com>,
Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>,
John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com>, Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>,
Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>,
"dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org"
<dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org>,
linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-mm <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Ryan Lortie <desrt@desrt.ca>,
"Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/6] File Sealing & memfd_create()
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 2014 16:48:30 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CANq1E4SUXrzAV8FS8HVYxnRVb1oOR6HSTyucJzyFs5PuS5Y88A@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20140320153250.GC20618@thunk.org>
Hi
On Thu, Mar 20, 2014 at 4:32 PM, <tytso@mit.edu> wrote:
> Why not make sealing an attribute of the "struct file", and enforce it
> at the VFS layer? That way all file system objects would have access
> to sealing interface, and for memfd_shmem, you can't get another
> struct file pointing at the object, the security properties would be
> identical.
Sealing as introduced here is an inode-attribute, not "struct file".
This is intentional. For instance, a gfx-client can get a read-only FD
via /proc/self/fd/ and pass it to the compositor so it can never
overwrite the contents (unless the compositor has write-access to the
inode itself, in which case it can just re-open it read-write).
Furthermore, I don't see any use-case besides memfd for sealing, so I
purposely avoided changing core VFS interfaces. Protecting
page-allocation/access for SEAL_WRITE like I do in shmem.c is not that
easy to do generically. So if we moved this interface to "struct
inode", all that would change is moving "u32 seals;" from one struct
to the other. Ok, some protections might get easily implemented
generically, but I without proper insight in the underlying
implemenation, I couldn't verify all paths and possible races. Isn't
keeping the API generic enough so far? Changing the underlying
implementation can be done once we know what we want.
Thanks
David
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-03-20 15:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 49+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-03-19 19:06 [PATCH 0/6] File Sealing & memfd_create() David Herrmann
2014-03-19 19:06 ` [PATCH 1/6] fs: fix i_writecount on shmem and friends David Herrmann
2014-03-19 19:06 ` [PATCH 2/6] shm: add sealing API David Herrmann
2014-03-19 19:06 ` [PATCH 3/6] shm: add memfd_create() syscall David Herrmann
2014-03-20 8:47 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2014-03-20 9:01 ` Pavel Emelyanov
2014-03-20 11:29 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-20 11:50 ` Pavel Emelyanov
2014-03-20 19:22 ` John Stultz
2014-04-02 13:38 ` Konstantin Khlebnikov
2014-04-02 14:18 ` David Herrmann
2014-04-02 14:52 ` Konstantin Khlebnikov
2014-04-10 19:07 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-03-19 19:06 ` [PATCH 4/6] selftests: add memfd_create() + sealing tests David Herrmann
2014-03-19 19:06 ` [PATCH man-pages 5/6] fcntl.2: document SHMEM_SET/GET_SEALS commands David Herrmann
2014-03-19 19:06 ` [PATCH man-pages 6/6] memfd_create.2: add memfd_create() man-page David Herrmann
2014-03-20 2:55 ` [PATCH 0/6] File Sealing & memfd_create() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-03-20 3:49 ` Linus Torvalds
2014-03-20 8:07 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-20 14:41 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-20 15:12 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-20 15:26 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-20 15:32 ` tytso
2014-03-20 15:39 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-20 15:48 ` David Herrmann [this message]
2014-03-20 16:38 ` tytso
2014-04-10 19:14 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-10 20:32 ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-04-10 20:37 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-10 20:49 ` David Herrmann
2014-04-10 21:16 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-10 22:57 ` David Herrmann
2014-04-10 23:05 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-10 23:16 ` David Herrmann
2014-04-10 23:32 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-20 15:03 ` Pavel Machek
2014-06-17 9:48 ` Florian Weimer
2014-06-17 16:21 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-10 14:45 ` Colin Walters
2014-04-10 19:15 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-10 19:45 ` Colin Walters
2014-04-11 6:09 ` Alex Elsayed
2014-04-08 13:00 ` Florian Weimer
2014-04-09 21:31 ` David Herrmann
2014-04-22 9:10 ` Florian Weimer
2014-04-22 11:55 ` David Herrmann
2014-04-22 12:44 ` Florian Weimer
2014-04-22 12:55 ` David Herrmann
2014-04-10 19:17 ` Andy Lutomirski
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