From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: James Morris Subject: Re: [AppArmor 01/41] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_create LSM hook Date: Wed, 23 May 2007 21:28:52 -0400 (EDT) Message-ID: References: <20070412090809.917795000@suse.de> <20070412090836.207973000@suse.de> <20070412101236.GD4095@ftp.linux.org.uk> <200705232106.28260.agruen@suse.de> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Cc: Al Viro , jjohansen@suse.de, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, chrisw@sous-sol.org, Tony Jones To: Andreas Gruenbacher Return-path: Received: from mail1.sea5.speakeasy.net ([69.17.117.3]:55145 "EHLO mail1.sea5.speakeasy.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1757606AbXEXB24 (ORCPT ); Wed, 23 May 2007 21:28:56 -0400 In-Reply-To: <200705232106.28260.agruen@suse.de> Sender: linux-fsdevel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-Id: linux-fsdevel.vger.kernel.org On Wed, 23 May 2007, Andreas Gruenbacher wrote: > This is backwards from what AppArmor does. The policy defines which paths may > be accessed; all paths not explicitly listed are denied. If files are mounted > at multiple locations, then the policy may allow access to some locations but > not to others. That's not a hole. I don't know what else you'd call it. Would you mind providing some concrete examples of how such a model would be useful? - James -- James Morris