From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: James Morris Subject: Re: [AppArmor 39/45] AppArmor: Profile loading and manipulation, pathname matching Date: Fri, 15 Jun 2007 23:39:05 -0400 (EDT) Message-ID: References: <979511.88139.qm@web36601.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Cc: Greg KH , Pavel Machek , Crispin Cowan , Andreas Gruenbacher , Stephen Smalley , jjohansen@suse.de, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org To: Casey Schaufler Return-path: In-Reply-To: <979511.88139.qm@web36601.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Sender: linux-security-module-owner@vger.kernel.org List-Id: linux-fsdevel.vger.kernel.org On Fri, 15 Jun 2007, Casey Schaufler wrote: > > --- James Morris wrote: > > > On my system, it takes about 1.2 seconds to label a fully checked out > > kernel source tree with ~23,000 files in this manner > > That's an eternity for that many files to be improperly labeled. > If, and the "if" didn't originate with me, your policy is > demonstrably correct (how do you do that?) for all domains > you could claim that the action is safe, if not ideal. > I can't say if an evaluation team would buy the "safe" > argument. They've been known to balk before. To clarify: We are discussing a scheme where the underlying SELinux labeling policy always ensures a safe label on a file, and then relabeling newly created files according to their pathnames. There is no expectation that this scheme would be submitted for certification. Its purpose is to merely to provide pathname-based labeling outside of the kernel. - James -- James Morris