From: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
To: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Joe Malicki <jmalicki@metacarta.com>,
Michael Itz <mitz@metacarta.com>,
Kenneth Baker <bakerk@metacarta.com>,
Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 3/4] fix setuid sometimes wouldn't
Date: Sat, 28 Mar 2009 23:21:27 +0000 (GMT) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.4.64.0903282320271.15432@blonde.anvils> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.4.64.0903282307050.14892@blonde.anvils>
check_unsafe_exec() also notes whether the fs_struct is being
shared by more threads than will get killed by the exec, and if so
sets LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE to make bprm_set_creds() careful about euid.
But /proc/<pid>/cwd and /proc/<pid>/root lookups make transient
use of get_fs_struct(), which also raises that sharing count.
This might occasionally cause a setuid program not to change euid,
in the same way as happened with files->count (check_unsafe_exec
also looks at sighand->count, but /proc doesn't raise that one).
We'd prefer exec not to unshare fs_struct: so fix this in procfs,
replacing get_fs_struct() by get_fs_path(), which does path_get
while still holding task_lock, instead of raising fs->count.
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
___
fs/proc/base.c | 50 +++++++++++++++--------------------------------
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
--- 2.6.29/fs/proc/base.c 2009-03-23 23:12:14.000000000 +0000
+++ linux/fs/proc/base.c 2009-03-28 18:06:02.000000000 +0000
@@ -146,15 +146,22 @@ static unsigned int pid_entry_count_dirs
return count;
}
-static struct fs_struct *get_fs_struct(struct task_struct *task)
+static int get_fs_path(struct task_struct *task, struct path *path, bool root)
{
struct fs_struct *fs;
+ int result = -ENOENT;
+
task_lock(task);
fs = task->fs;
- if(fs)
- atomic_inc(&fs->count);
+ if (fs) {
+ read_lock(&fs->lock);
+ *path = root ? fs->root : fs->pwd;
+ path_get(path);
+ read_unlock(&fs->lock);
+ result = 0;
+ }
task_unlock(task);
- return fs;
+ return result;
}
static int get_nr_threads(struct task_struct *tsk)
@@ -172,42 +179,24 @@ static int get_nr_threads(struct task_st
static int proc_cwd_link(struct inode *inode, struct path *path)
{
struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(inode);
- struct fs_struct *fs = NULL;
int result = -ENOENT;
if (task) {
- fs = get_fs_struct(task);
+ result = get_fs_path(task, path, 0);
put_task_struct(task);
}
- if (fs) {
- read_lock(&fs->lock);
- *path = fs->pwd;
- path_get(&fs->pwd);
- read_unlock(&fs->lock);
- result = 0;
- put_fs_struct(fs);
- }
return result;
}
static int proc_root_link(struct inode *inode, struct path *path)
{
struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(inode);
- struct fs_struct *fs = NULL;
int result = -ENOENT;
if (task) {
- fs = get_fs_struct(task);
+ result = get_fs_path(task, path, 1);
put_task_struct(task);
}
- if (fs) {
- read_lock(&fs->lock);
- *path = fs->root;
- path_get(&fs->root);
- read_unlock(&fs->lock);
- result = 0;
- put_fs_struct(fs);
- }
return result;
}
@@ -596,7 +585,6 @@ static int mounts_open_common(struct ino
struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(inode);
struct nsproxy *nsp;
struct mnt_namespace *ns = NULL;
- struct fs_struct *fs = NULL;
struct path root;
struct proc_mounts *p;
int ret = -EINVAL;
@@ -610,22 +598,16 @@ static int mounts_open_common(struct ino
get_mnt_ns(ns);
}
rcu_read_unlock();
- if (ns)
- fs = get_fs_struct(task);
+ if (ns && get_fs_path(task, &root, 1) == 0)
+ ret = 0;
put_task_struct(task);
}
if (!ns)
goto err;
- if (!fs)
+ if (ret)
goto err_put_ns;
- read_lock(&fs->lock);
- root = fs->root;
- path_get(&root);
- read_unlock(&fs->lock);
- put_fs_struct(fs);
-
ret = -ENOMEM;
p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct proc_mounts), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!p)
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2009-03-28 23:23 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 50+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2009-03-28 23:16 [PATCH 1/4] compat_do_execve should unshare_files Hugh Dickins
2009-03-28 23:20 ` [PATCH 2/4] fix setuid sometimes doesn't Hugh Dickins
2009-03-29 0:53 ` Q: check_unsafe_exec() races (Was: [PATCH 2/4] fix setuid sometimes doesn't) Oleg Nesterov
2009-03-29 4:10 ` Al Viro
2009-03-29 4:14 ` Al Viro
2009-03-29 4:52 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-03-29 5:55 ` Al Viro
2009-03-29 6:01 ` Al Viro
2009-03-29 21:36 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-03-29 22:20 ` Al Viro
2009-03-29 23:56 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-03-30 0:03 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-03-30 1:08 ` Al Viro
2009-03-30 1:13 ` Al Viro
2009-03-30 1:36 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-03-30 1:40 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-03-30 12:31 ` Al Viro
2009-03-30 14:32 ` Hugh Dickins
2009-03-31 6:16 ` Al Viro
2009-04-01 0:28 ` Hugh Dickins
2009-04-01 2:38 ` Al Viro
2009-04-01 3:03 ` Al Viro
2009-04-01 11:25 ` Hugh Dickins
2009-04-06 15:31 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-04-19 16:30 ` Hugh Dickins
2009-04-21 16:10 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-04-21 16:31 ` Linus Torvalds
2009-04-21 17:15 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-04-21 17:35 ` Linus Torvalds
2009-04-21 19:39 ` Hugh Dickins
2009-04-23 23:01 ` [PATCH 1/2] do_execve() must not clear fs->in_exec if it was set by another thread Oleg Nesterov
2009-04-23 23:18 ` Roland McGrath
2009-04-23 23:31 ` Al Viro
2009-04-24 11:57 ` [PATCH 3/2] check_unsafe_exec: rcu_read_unlock Hugh Dickins
2009-04-24 14:34 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-04-24 4:20 ` [PATCH 1/2] do_execve() must not clear fs->in_exec if it was set by another thread Hugh Dickins
2009-04-23 23:02 ` [PATCH 2/2] check_unsafe_exec: s/lock_task_sighand/rcu_read_lock/ Oleg Nesterov
2009-04-23 23:18 ` Roland McGrath
2009-04-24 4:29 ` Hugh Dickins
2009-04-01 11:18 ` Q: check_unsafe_exec() races (Was: [PATCH 2/4] fix setuid sometimes doesn't) Hugh Dickins
2009-04-06 15:51 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-04-19 16:44 ` Hugh Dickins
2009-04-21 16:39 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-03-30 23:45 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2009-03-31 6:19 ` Al Viro
2009-03-28 23:21 ` Hugh Dickins [this message]
2009-03-29 11:19 ` [PATCH 3/4] fix setuid sometimes wouldn't Alexey Dobriyan
2009-03-29 21:48 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-03-29 22:37 ` Al Viro
2009-03-28 23:23 ` [PATCH 4/4] Annotate struct fs_struct's usage count restriction Hugh Dickins
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