From: Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
containers@lists.linux.dev, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>,
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
Val Cowan <vcowan@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 0/6] proc: Add allowlist for procfs files
Date: Thu, 26 Jan 2023 13:30:53 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <Y9JyfQwAB/M5QmuH@example.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230125153628.43c12cbe05423fef7d44f0dd@linux-foundation.org>
On Wed, Jan 25, 2023 at 03:36:28PM -0800, Andrew Morton wrote:
> On Wed, 25 Jan 2023 16:28:47 +0100 Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org> wrote:
>
> > The patch expands subset= option. If the proc is mounted with the
> > subset=allowlist option, the /proc/allowlist file will appear. This file
> > contains the filenames and directories that are allowed for this
> > mountpoint. By default, /proc/allowlist contains only its own name.
> > Changing the allowlist is possible as long as it is present in the
> > allowlist itself.
> >
> > This allowlist is applied in lookup/readdir so files that will create
> > modules after mounting will not be visible.
> >
> > Compared to the previous patches [1][2], I switched to a special virtual
> > file from listing filenames in the mount options.
> >
>
> Changlog doesn't explain why you think Linux needs this feature. The
> [2/6] changelog hints that containers might be involved. IOW, please
> fully describe the requirement and use-case(s).
Ok. I will.
Basically, as Christian described, the motivation is to give
containerization programs (docker, podman, etc.) a way to control the
content in procfs.
Now container tools use a list of dangerous files that they hide with
overmount. But procfs is not a static filesystem and using a bad list to
hide dangerous files can't be the solution.
I believe that a container should define a list of files that it considers
useful within the container, and not try to hide what it considers
unwanted.
> Also, please describe why /proc/allowlist is made available via a mount
> option, rather than being permanently present.
Like subset=pid, this file is needed to change the visibility of files in
the procfs mountpoint.
> And why add to subset=, instead of a separate mount option.
>
> Does /proc/allowlist work in subdirectories? Like, permit presence of
> /proc/sys/vm/compact_memory?
Yes. But /proc/allowlist is limited in size to 128K.
> I think the whole thing is misnamed, really. "allowlist" implies
> access permissions. Some of the test here uses "visibility" and other
> places use "presence", which are better. "presentlist" and
> /proc/presentlist might be better. But why not simply /proc/contents?
I don't hold on to the name allowlist at all :) present list is perfect
for me. The /proc/contents is confusing to me.
> Please run these patches through checkpatch and consider the result.
Ok. I will.
--
Rgrds, legion
prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-01-26 12:31 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-01-25 15:28 [RFC PATCH v1 0/6] proc: Add allowlist for procfs files Alexey Gladkov
2023-01-25 15:28 ` [RFC PATCH v1 1/6] proc: Fix separator for subset option Alexey Gladkov
2023-01-25 15:28 ` [RFC PATCH v1 2/6] proc: Add allowlist to control access to procfs files Alexey Gladkov
2023-01-25 23:36 ` Andrew Morton
2023-01-26 11:13 ` Alexey Gladkov
2023-01-25 23:36 ` Andrew Morton
2023-01-25 15:28 ` [RFC PATCH v1 3/6] proc: Check that subset= option has been set Alexey Gladkov
2023-01-25 15:28 ` [RFC PATCH v1 4/6] proc: Allow to use the allowlist filter in userns Alexey Gladkov
2023-01-25 15:28 ` [RFC PATCH v1 5/6] proc: Validate incoming allowlist Alexey Gladkov
2023-01-25 15:28 ` [RFC PATCH v1 6/6] doc: proc: Add description of subset=allowlist Alexey Gladkov
2023-01-25 23:36 ` [RFC PATCH v1 0/6] proc: Add allowlist for procfs files Andrew Morton
2023-01-26 10:16 ` Christian Brauner
2023-01-26 13:39 ` Alexey Gladkov
2023-01-31 13:53 ` Alexey Gladkov
2023-01-26 12:30 ` Alexey Gladkov [this message]
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