From: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
To: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Daniel Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>, Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
"Schaufler, Casey" <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
"linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
"virtio-fs@redhat.com" <virtio-fs@redhat.com>,
"berrange@redhat.com" <berrange@redhat.com>,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
"selinux@vger.kernel.org" <selinux@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 0/1] xattr: Allow user.* xattr on symlink/special files if caller has CAP_SYS_RESOURCE
Date: Wed, 30 Jun 2021 16:01:42 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <YNyHVhGPe1bFAt+C@work-vm> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <YNyECw/1FzDCW3G8@mit.edu>
* Theodore Ts'o (tytso@mit.edu) wrote:
> On Wed, Jun 30, 2021 at 09:07:56AM +0100, Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote:
> > * Theodore Ts'o (tytso@mit.edu) wrote:
> > > On Tue, Jun 29, 2021 at 04:28:24PM -0400, Daniel Walsh wrote:
> > > > All this conversation is great, and I look forward to a better solution, but
> > > > if we go back to the patch, it was to fix an issue where the kernel is
> > > > requiring CAP_SYS_ADMIN for writing user Xattrs on link files and other
> > > > special files.
> > > >
> > > > The documented reason for this is to prevent the users from using XATTRS to
> > > > avoid quota.
> > >
> > > Huh? Where is it so documented?
> >
> > man xattr(7):
> > The file permission bits of regular files and directories are
> > interpreted differently from the file permission bits of special
> > files and symbolic links. For regular files and directories the
> > file permission bits define access to the file's contents,
> > while for device special files they define access to the device
> > described by the special file. The file permissions of symbolic
> > links are not used in access checks.
>
> All of this is true...
>
> > *** These differences would
> > allow users to consume filesystem resources in a way not
> > controllable by disk quotas for group or world writable special
> > files and directories.****
>
> Anyone with group write access to a regular file can append to the
> file, and the blocks written will be charged the owner of the file.
> So it's perfectly "controllable" by the quota system; if you have
> group write access to a file, you can charge against the user's quota.
> This is Working As Intended.
>
> And the creation of device special files take the umask into account,
> just like regular files, so if you have a umask that allows newly
> created files to be group writeable, the same issue would occur for
> regular files as device files. Given that most users have a umask of
> 0077 or 0022, this is generally Not A Problem.
>
> I think I see the issue which drove the above text, though, which is
> that Linux's syscall(2) is creating symlinks which do not take umask
> into account; that is, the permissions are always mode ST_IFLNK|0777.
>
> Hence, it might be that the right answer is to remove this fairly
> arbitrary restriction entirely, and change symlink(2) so that it
> creates files which respects the umask. Posix and SUS doesn't specify
> what the permissions are that are used, and historically (before the
> advent of xattrs) I suspect since it didn't matter, no one cared about
> whether or not umask was applied.
>
> Some people might object to such a change arguing that with
> pre-existing file systems where there are symlinks which
> world-writeable, this might cause people to be able to charge up to
> 32k (or whatever the maximum size of the xattr supported by the file
> system) for each symlink. However, (a) very few people actually use
> quotas, and this would only be an issue for those users, and (b) the
> amount of quota "abuse" that could be carried out this way is small
> enough that I'm not sure it matters.
Even if you fix symlinks, I don't think it fixes device nodes or
anything else where the permissions bitmap isn't purely used as the
permissions on the inode.
Dave
> - Ted
>
--
Dr. David Alan Gilbert / dgilbert@redhat.com / Manchester, UK
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-06-30 15:01 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-06-25 19:12 [RFC PATCH 0/1] xattr: Allow user.* xattr on symlink/special files if caller has CAP_SYS_RESOURCE Vivek Goyal
2021-06-25 19:12 ` [PATCH 1/1] xattr: Allow user.* xattr on symlink/special files with CAP_SYS_RESOURCE Vivek Goyal
2021-06-28 12:33 ` Christian Brauner
2021-06-28 15:00 ` Vivek Goyal
2021-06-29 3:13 ` [xattr] 8d8cd767b6: ltp.setxattr02.fail kernel test robot
2021-06-29 12:59 ` Vivek Goyal
2021-06-25 21:49 ` [RFC PATCH 0/1] xattr: Allow user.* xattr on symlink/special files if caller has CAP_SYS_RESOURCE Schaufler, Casey
2021-06-28 11:58 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-06-28 13:17 ` Vivek Goyal
2021-06-28 13:36 ` Daniel Walsh
2021-06-28 16:04 ` Casey Schaufler
2021-06-28 16:28 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-06-28 17:41 ` Casey Schaufler
2021-06-29 9:00 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-06-29 14:38 ` Casey Schaufler
2021-06-29 15:20 ` Vivek Goyal
2021-06-29 16:13 ` Casey Schaufler
2021-06-29 16:35 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-06-29 16:51 ` Casey Schaufler
2021-06-29 17:35 ` Vivek Goyal
2021-06-29 20:28 ` Daniel Walsh
2021-06-30 4:12 ` Theodore Ts'o
2021-06-30 8:07 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-06-30 14:47 ` Theodore Ts'o
2021-06-30 15:01 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert [this message]
2021-06-30 19:59 ` Theodore Ts'o
2021-06-30 20:32 ` Vivek Goyal
2021-07-01 8:48 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-07-01 12:21 ` Vivek Goyal
2021-07-01 13:10 ` Vivek Goyal
2021-07-01 16:58 ` Casey Schaufler
2021-06-30 16:09 ` Vivek Goyal
2021-06-30 14:27 ` Vivek Goyal
2021-06-29 16:25 ` Theodore Ts'o
2021-06-28 17:22 ` Vivek Goyal
2021-06-28 18:55 ` Daniel Walsh
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