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From: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
To: "Christian Göttsche" <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 1/2] fs/xattr: add *at family syscalls
Date: Wed, 31 Aug 2022 23:17:54 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <Yw/eEufm/QpKg5Pq@ZenIV> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220830152858.14866-2-cgzones@googlemail.com>

[linux-arch Cc'd for ABI-related stuff]

On Tue, Aug 30, 2022 at 05:28:39PM +0200, Christian Göttsche wrote:
> Add the four syscalls setxattrat(), getxattrat(), listxattrat() and
> removexattrat() to enable extended attribute operations via file
> descriptors.  This can be used from userspace to avoid race conditions,
> especially on security related extended attributes, like SELinux labels
> ("security.selinux") via setfiles(8).
> 
> Use the do_{name}at() pattern from fs/open.c.
> Use a single flag parameter for extended attribute flags (currently
> XATTR_CREATE and XATTR_REPLACE) and *at() flags to not exceed six
> syscall arguments in setxattrat().

	I've no problems with the patchset aside of the flags part;
however, note that XATTR_CREATE and XATTR_REPLACE are actually exposed
to the network - the values are passed to nfsd by clients.
See nfsd4_decode_setxattr() and
        BUILD_BUG_ON(XATTR_CREATE != SETXATTR4_CREATE);
	BUILD_BUG_ON(XATTR_REPLACE != SETXATTR4_REPLACE);
in encode_setxattr() on the client side.

	Makes me really nervous about constraints like that.  Sure,
AT_... flags you are using are in the second octet and these are in
the lowest one, but...

  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-08-31 22:18 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-08-30 15:28 [RFC PATCH 2/2] fs/xattr: wire up syscalls Christian Göttsche
2022-08-30 15:28 ` [RFC PATCH 1/2] fs/xattr: add *at family syscalls Christian Göttsche
2022-08-30 17:09   ` Christian Brauner
2022-08-31 22:17   ` Al Viro [this message]
2022-09-01  8:20     ` Amir Goldstein
2022-09-01 16:45     ` Casey Schaufler
2022-08-30 15:56 ` [RFC PATCH 2/2] fs/xattr: wire up syscalls Christian Brauner
2022-08-31 19:54 ` Richard Guy Briggs

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