From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from bombadil.infradead.org (bombadil.infradead.org [198.137.202.133]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E54E315F3F3; Wed, 29 May 2024 06:24:20 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=198.137.202.133 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1716963862; cv=none; b=hVCzmQc8piphhmG4VHAjczv3DE9J4VNzQEvv9+rBU1nE6JuSA4IJWsBJ4nYzCTbk7FX8Y3Ftf6NKLJVL6IbhKIJ/g1OHHQT4o8cXGO99nyiw48rAJg/DS07KO+unEd9hXxvKT849B0jG03UxapNIfIznReknpaBxGDCUi+31uiM= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1716963862; c=relaxed/simple; bh=pPM9ny+kNaumhJIGu8VXl7ieb63WgdrNQQ2r3r86KrU=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:Message-ID:References:MIME-Version: Content-Type:Content-Disposition:In-Reply-To; b=DdX1Mj5XTaavgOOPFoMOGPw81qR9hNb2GMN+BGc5WsTeJqZ9fDIY2TxvuqYSsPikSLeE/pagbKcrAGyBYRt+TBRUsH75W3ijhUG/vCYfTiTcB3bc+R06kM8Um76QToW0YQmslJpg3kupXC9fDi5gjdhd5bj1/R01p1HFNB95zAA= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=infradead.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=bombadil.srs.infradead.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=infradead.org header.i=@infradead.org header.b=0xSCbsz6; arc=none smtp.client-ip=198.137.202.133 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=infradead.org Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=bombadil.srs.infradead.org Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=infradead.org header.i=@infradead.org header.b="0xSCbsz6" DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=infradead.org; s=bombadil.20210309; h=In-Reply-To:Content-Type:MIME-Version :References:Message-ID:Subject:Cc:To:From:Date:Sender:Reply-To: Content-Transfer-Encoding:Content-ID:Content-Description; bh=pPM9ny+kNaumhJIGu8VXl7ieb63WgdrNQQ2r3r86KrU=; b=0xSCbsz68/CidLV/kgNWdm4vmd DcnHmjJHBjSaNDwa/7FUP0m+3soqGA6wk+873Rz5SWPyQWnEI7EN29rP3kiCiGHApMqCzQX/seZvu CXlg1l52hShvokbOux46Z1WneHxAEN3EIkXY7xwtt7smMWt9uFUz8ce/yF09LPAuQomDg1MqWJPrY Noom52EDsVmhX/jDbfsU2tYaP3iV2+Xs11XVxaEv1MSI83BkG0Tog5UknTKEsvRVq4oiYSSfjPdWO x3/Pc+ifQSc/kuzL5jEBbm+66V2MPFr0NeZumYqgKKijtP3hGo6XGtPZGdZLa4Zh3k9XAetf8yHuF Nnlq5K3Q==; Received: from hch by bombadil.infradead.org with local (Exim 4.97.1 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1sCCjS-00000002zuE-2aAy; Wed, 29 May 2024 06:24:18 +0000 Date: Tue, 28 May 2024 23:24:18 -0700 From: "hch@infradead.org" To: Dave Chinner Cc: "hch@infradead.org" , Jan Kara , Trond Myklebust , "chuck.lever@oracle.com" , "linux-api@vger.kernel.org" , "linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org" , "brauner@kernel.org" , "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" , "alex.aring@gmail.com" , "cyphar@cyphar.com" , "viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk" , "jlayton@kernel.org" , "amir73il@gmail.com" , "linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org" Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v2] fhandle: expose u64 mount id to name_to_handle_at(2) Message-ID: References: <20240523-exportfs-u64-mount-id-v2-1-f9f959f17eb1@cyphar.com> <30137c868039a3ae17f4ae74d07383099bfa4db8.camel@hammerspace.com> <86065f6a4f3d2f3d78f39e7a276a2d6e25bfbc9d.camel@hammerspace.com> <20240528101152.kyvtx623djnxwonm@quack3> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: X-SRS-Rewrite: SMTP reverse-path rewritten from by bombadil.infradead.org. See http://www.infradead.org/rpr.html On Wed, May 29, 2024 at 09:25:49AM +1000, Dave Chinner wrote: > But no-one has bothered to reply or acknowledge my comments so I'll > point them out again and repeat: Filehandles generated by > the kernel for unprivileged use *must* be self describing and self > validating as the kernel must be able to detect and prevent > unprivelged users from generating custom filehandles that can be > used to access files outside the restricted scope of their > container. We must not generate file handle for unprivileged use at all, as they bypass all the path based access controls.