linux-fsdevel.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
	Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>, Shivank Garg <shivankg@amd.com>,
	 david@redhat.com, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
	paul@paul-moore.com,  viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk,
	willy@infradead.org, pbonzini@redhat.com,  tabba@google.com,
	afranji@google.com, ackerleytng@google.com, jack@suse.cz,
	 hch@infradead.org, cgzones@googlemail.com, ira.weiny@intel.com,
	 roypat@amazon.co.uk, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org,  linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] fs: export anon_inode_make_secure_inode() and fix secretmem LSM bypass
Date: Fri, 20 Jun 2025 08:02:18 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <aFV3-sYCxyVIkdy6@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <aFQATWEX2h4LaQZb@kernel.org>

On Thu, Jun 19, 2025, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 19, 2025 at 02:06:17PM +0200, Christian Brauner wrote:
> > On Thu, Jun 19, 2025 at 02:01:22PM +0300, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> > > On Thu, Jun 19, 2025 at 12:38:25PM +0200, Christian Brauner wrote:
> > > > On Thu, Jun 19, 2025 at 11:13:49AM +0200, Vlastimil Babka wrote:
> > > > > On 6/19/25 09:31, Shivank Garg wrote:
> > > > > > Export anon_inode_make_secure_inode() to allow KVM guest_memfd to create
> > > > > > anonymous inodes with proper security context. This replaces the current
> > > > > > pattern of calling alloc_anon_inode() followed by
> > > > > > inode_init_security_anon() for creating security context manually.
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > This change also fixes a security regression in secretmem where the
> > > > > > S_PRIVATE flag was not cleared after alloc_anon_inode(), causing
> > > > > > LSM/SELinux checks to be bypassed for secretmem file descriptors.
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > As guest_memfd currently resides in the KVM module, we need to export this
> > > > > 
> > > > > Could we use the new EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL_FOR_MODULES() thingy to make this
> > > > > explicit for KVM?
> > > > 
> > > > Oh? Enlighten me about that, if you have a second, please. 
> > > 
> > > From Documentation/core-api/symbol-namespaces.rst:
> > > 
> > > The macro takes a comma separated list of module names, allowing only those
> > > modules to access this symbol. Simple tail-globs are supported.
> > > 
> > > For example::
> > > 
> > >   EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL_FOR_MODULES(preempt_notifier_inc, "kvm,kvm-*")
> > > 
> > > will limit usage of this symbol to modules whoes name matches the given
> > > patterns.
> > 
> > Is that still mostly advisory and can still be easily circumenvented?

Yes and no.  For out-of-tree modules, it's mostly advisory.  Though I can imagine
if someone tries to report a bug because their module is masquerading as e.g. kvm,
then they will be told to go away (in far less polite words :-D).

For in-tree modules, the restriction is much more enforceable.  Renaming a module
to circumvent a restricted export will raise major red flags, and getting "proper"
access to a symbol would require an ack from the relevant maintainers.  E.g. for
many KVM-induced exports, it's not that other module writers are trying to misbehave,
there simply aren't any guardrails to deter them from using a "dangerous" export.
 
The other big benefit I see is documentation, e.g. both for readers/developers to
understand the intent, and for auditing purposes (I would be shocked if there
aren't exports that were KVM-induced, but that are no longer necessary).

And we can utilize the framework to do additional hardening.  E.g. for exports
that exist solely for KVM, I plan on adding wrappers so that the symbols are
exproted if and only if KVM is enabled in the kernel .config[*].  Again, that's
far from perfect, e.g. AFAIK every distro enables KVM, but it should help keep
everyone honest.

[*] https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZzJOoFFPjrzYzKir@google.com 

> The commit message says
> 
>    will limit the use of said function to kvm.ko, any other module trying
>    to use this symbol will refure to load (and get modpost build
>    failures).

To Christian's point, the restrictions are trivial to circumvent by out-of-tree
modules.  E.g. to get access to the above, simply name your module kvm-lol.ko or
whatever.

  reply	other threads:[~2025-06-20 15:02 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-06-19  7:31 [PATCH] fs: export anon_inode_make_secure_inode() and fix secretmem LSM bypass Shivank Garg
2025-06-19  8:45 ` Christian Brauner
2025-06-19  9:13 ` Vlastimil Babka
2025-06-19  9:53   ` Shivank Garg
2025-06-19 10:38   ` Christian Brauner
2025-06-19 11:01     ` Mike Rapoport
2025-06-19 12:06       ` Christian Brauner
2025-06-19 12:19         ` Mike Rapoport
2025-06-20 15:02           ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2025-06-23  5:32             ` Shivank Garg
2025-06-23 10:16             ` Christian Brauner
2025-06-23 14:00               ` Christoph Hellwig
2025-06-23 14:01                 ` Christoph Hellwig
2025-06-23 14:21                   ` Vlastimil Babka
2025-06-23 14:22                     ` Christoph Hellwig
2025-06-23 14:28                     ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-06-24  9:02                       ` Christian Brauner
2025-06-25  9:05                         ` Christian Brauner
2025-06-25  9:18                           ` Vlastimil Babka
2025-06-25  8:02                       ` Vlastimil Babka
2025-06-25  8:09                         ` David Hildenbrand

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=aFV3-sYCxyVIkdy6@google.com \
    --to=seanjc@google.com \
    --cc=ackerleytng@google.com \
    --cc=afranji@google.com \
    --cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=brauner@kernel.org \
    --cc=cgzones@googlemail.com \
    --cc=david@redhat.com \
    --cc=hch@infradead.org \
    --cc=ira.weiny@intel.com \
    --cc=jack@suse.cz \
    --cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
    --cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
    --cc=roypat@amazon.co.uk \
    --cc=rppt@kernel.org \
    --cc=shivankg@amd.com \
    --cc=tabba@google.com \
    --cc=vbabka@suse.cz \
    --cc=viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk \
    --cc=willy@infradead.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).