Re: [RFC PATCH v1 0/3] Userspace MFR Policy via memfd

Jiaqi Yan
2025-10-30T21:29:03Z

On Thu, Oct 30, 2025 at 10:28 AM Jiaqi Yan <jiaqiyan@google.com> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Oct 30, 2025 at 4:51 AM Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> wrote:
> >
> > On 2025/10/28 15:00, Harry Yoo wrote:
> > > On Mon, Oct 27, 2025 at 09:17:31PM -0700, Jiaqi Yan wrote:
> > >> On Wed, Oct 22, 2025 at 6:09 AM Harry Yoo <harry.yoo@oracle.com> wrote:
> > >>>
> > >>> On Mon, Oct 13, 2025 at 03:14:32PM -0700, Jiaqi Yan wrote:
> > >>>> On Fri, Sep 19, 2025 at 8:58 AM “William Roche <william.roche@oracle.com> wrote:
> > >>>>>
> > >>>>> From: William Roche <william.roche@oracle.com>
> > >>>>>
> > >>>>> Hello,
> > >>>>>
> > >>>>> The possibility to keep a VM using large hugetlbfs pages running after a memory
> > >>>>> error is very important, and the possibility described here could be a good
> > >>>>> candidate to address this issue.
> > >>>>
> > >>>> Thanks for expressing interest, William, and sorry for getting back to
> > >>>> you so late.
> > >>>>
> > >>>>>
> > >>>>> So I would like to provide my feedback after testing this code with the
> > >>>>> introduction of persistent errors in the address space: My tests used a VM
> > >>>>> running a kernel able to provide MFD_MF_KEEP_UE_MAPPED memfd segments to the
> > >>>>> test program provided with this project. But instead of injecting the errors
> > >>>>> with madvise calls from this program, I get the guest physical address of a
> > >>>>> location and inject the error from the hypervisor into the VM, so that any
> > >>>>> subsequent access to the location is prevented directly from the hypervisor
> > >>>>> level.
> > >>>>
> > >>>> This is exactly what VMM should do: when it owns or manages the VM
> > >>>> memory with MFD_MF_KEEP_UE_MAPPED, it is then VMM's responsibility to
> > >>>> isolate guest/VCPUs from poisoned memory pages, e.g. by intercepting
> > >>>> such memory accesses.
> > >>>>
> > >>>>>
> > >>>>> Using this framework, I realized that the code provided here has a problem:
> > >>>>> When the error impacts a large folio, the release of this folio doesn't isolate
> > >>>>> the sub-page(s) actually impacted by the poison. __rmqueue_pcplist() can return
> > >>>>> a known poisoned page to get_page_from_freelist().
> > >>>>
> > >>>> Just curious, how exactly you can repro this leaking of a known poison
> > >>>> page? It may help me debug my patch.
> > >>>>
> > >>>>>
> > >>>>> This revealed some mm limitations, as I would have expected that the
> > >>>>> check_new_pages() mechanism used by the __rmqueue functions would filter these
> > >>>>> pages out, but I noticed that this has been disabled by default in 2023 with:
> > >>>>> [PATCH] mm, page_alloc: reduce page alloc/free sanity checks
> > >>>>> https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230216095131.17336-1-vbabka@suse.cz
> > >>>>
> > >>>> Thanks for the reference. I did turned on CONFIG_DEBUG_VM=y during dev
> > >>>> and testing but didn't notice any WARNING on "bad page"; It is very
> > >>>> likely I was just lucky.
> > >>>>
> > >>>>>
> > >>>>>
> > >>>>> This problem seems to be avoided if we call take_page_off_buddy(page) in the
> > >>>>> filemap_offline_hwpoison_folio_hugetlb() function without testing if
> > >>>>> PageBuddy(page) is true first.
> > >>>>
> > >>>> Oh, I think you are right, filemap_offline_hwpoison_folio_hugetlb
> > >>>> shouldn't call take_page_off_buddy(page) depend on PageBuddy(page) or
> > >>>> not. take_page_off_buddy will check PageBuddy or not, on the page_head
> > >>>> of different page orders. So maybe somehow a known poisoned page is
> > >>>> not taken off from buddy allocator due to this?
> > >>>
> > >>> Maybe it's the case where the poisoned page is merged to a larger page,
> > >>> and the PGTY_buddy flag is set on its buddy of the poisoned page, so
> > >>> PageBuddy() returns false?:
> > >>>
> > >>> [ free page A ][ free page B (poisoned) ]
> > >>>
> > >>> When these two are merged, then we set PGTY_buddy on page A but not on B.
> > >>
> > >> Thanks Harry!
> > >>
> > >> It is indeed this case. I validate by adding some debug prints in
> > >> take_page_off_buddy:
> > >>
> > >> [ 193.029423] Memory failure: 0x2800200: [yjq] PageBuddy=0 after drain_all_pages
> > >> [ 193.029426] 0x2800200: [yjq] order=0, page_order=0, PageBuddy(page_head)=0
> > >> [ 193.029428] 0x2800200: [yjq] order=1, page_order=0, PageBuddy(page_head)=0
> > >> [ 193.029429] 0x2800200: [yjq] order=2, page_order=0, PageBuddy(page_head)=0
> > >> [ 193.029430] 0x2800200: [yjq] order=3, page_order=0, PageBuddy(page_head)=0
> > >> [ 193.029431] 0x2800200: [yjq] order=4, page_order=0, PageBuddy(page_head)=0
> > >> [ 193.029432] 0x2800200: [yjq] order=5, page_order=0, PageBuddy(page_head)=0
> > >> [ 193.029434] 0x2800200: [yjq] order=6, page_order=0, PageBuddy(page_head)=0
> > >> [ 193.029435] 0x2800200: [yjq] order=7, page_order=0, PageBuddy(page_head)=0
> > >> [ 193.029436] 0x2800200: [yjq] order=8, page_order=0, PageBuddy(page_head)=0
> > >> [ 193.029437] 0x2800200: [yjq] order=9, page_order=0, PageBuddy(page_head)=0
> > >> [ 193.029438] 0x2800200: [yjq] order=10, page_order=10, PageBuddy(page_head)=1
> > >>
> > >> In this case, page for 0x2800200 is hwpoisoned, and its buddy page is
> > >> 0x2800000 with order 10.
> > >
> > > Woohoo, I got it right!
> > >
> > >>> But even after fixing that we need to fix the race condition.
> > >>
> > >> What exactly is the race condition you are referring to?
> > >
> > > When you free a high-order page, the buddy allocator doesn't not check
> > > PageHWPoison() on the page and its subpages. It checks PageHWPoison()
> > > only when you free a base (order-0) page, see free_pages_prepare().
> >
> > I think we might could check PageHWPoison() for subpages as what free_page_is_bad()
> > does. If any subpage has HWPoisoned flag set, simply drop the folio. Even we could
>
> Agree, I think as a starter I could try to, for example, let
> free_pages_prepare scan HWPoison-ed subpages if the base page is high
> order. In the optimal case, HugeTLB does move PageHWPoison flag from
> head page to the raw error pages.

Another idea I came up with today and is trying out is:
1. let buddy allocator reject the high order folio first based on the
HWPoison-ed flag
2. memory_failure takes the advantage of break_down_buddy_pages to add
free pages to freelist, but keep target/hwpoison-ed page off the
freelist

>
> > do it better -- Split the folio and let healthy subpages join the buddy while reject
> > the hwpoisoned one.
> >
> > >
> > > AFAICT there is nothing that prevents the poisoned page to be
> > > allocated back to users because the buddy doesn't check PageHWPoison()
> > > on allocation as well (by default).
> > >
> > > So rather than freeing the high-order page as-is in
> > > dissolve_free_hugetlb_folio(), I think we have to split it to base pages
> > > and then free them one by one.
> >
> > It might not be worth to do that as this would significantly increase the overhead
> > of the function while memory failure event is really rare.
>
> IIUC, Harry's idea is to do the split in dissolve_free_hugetlb_folio
> only if folio is HWPoison-ed, similar to what Miaohe suggested
> earlier.
>
> BTW, I believe this race condition already exists today when
> memory_failure handles HWPoison-ed free hugetlb page; it is not
> something introduced via this patchset. I will fix or improve this in
> a separate patchset.
>
> >
> > Thanks both.
>
> Thanks Harry and Miaohe!
>
>
> > .
> >
> > >
> > > That way, free_pages_prepare() will catch that it's poisoned and won't
> > > add it back to the freelist. Otherwise there will always be a window
> > > where the poisoned page can be allocated to users - before it's taken
> > > off from the buddy.
> > >
> >