From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from casper.infradead.org (casper.infradead.org [90.155.50.34]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 97AFC40DFBD for ; Sat, 18 Apr 2026 21:32:54 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=90.155.50.34 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1776547980; cv=none; b=SA0yRl9ELm9ERKCIKVsS3JWY4aEO/ieZJ4HcTmyD7zgOKW0gN+8iCbOZ8gBYF75+bYWLqL65WHMpT/Er4BtZhVUd69/0FqerUuhswcwosE+0arVxNTsHwj+OoqSwJ4OL26aU2QR/Ab1yc2lTR2ndHGHl28lwayfzyhUlF2FU9yk= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1776547980; c=relaxed/simple; bh=bRWAr1sHm3FI6Lj331+ZxY01lFHEhqUNpzdkBK6spCc=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:Message-ID:References:MIME-Version: Content-Type:Content-Disposition:In-Reply-To; b=fYYoJXhwLQqalOoDByncfcNWA4kdUZjWBOYpkEfMlCtOe4g4f7SJVBWZomkLB9XXBZhTDuvHcFKWFco9qvE15Uvqgk404XpLtE6boWYIaCbvkYzyQHV7pqX8jvaCWAKSOQOtclmAsrWFnOnCoYYJzu7ev4COgZ04RUfFR2LSZUg= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=infradead.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=infradead.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=infradead.org header.i=@infradead.org header.b=AvpOkjgR; arc=none smtp.client-ip=90.155.50.34 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=infradead.org Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=infradead.org Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=infradead.org header.i=@infradead.org header.b="AvpOkjgR" DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=infradead.org; s=casper.20170209; h=In-Reply-To:Content-Type:MIME-Version: References:Message-ID:Subject:Cc:To:From:Date:Sender:Reply-To: Content-Transfer-Encoding:Content-ID:Content-Description; bh=SklTkomoz6BngvqaTC/W/jtZITRWybZJVeL0/xrM3d4=; b=AvpOkjgRmIrblvbjDY/bU0Ugnl lpWKGs0xt+RTICUyysNAxrrRejsNvE2RIQO++xE0rHQ3Wo/AJDXiy1OFlSDQOJQ/Qf6R0JvawTw+w zzUXNwGcdVOTK4+O4X6p6XGbZLG4qeVqWejGjhwo9vr+twJd3DVj8roDgRA+8ZWltDvQ3FyYxW0i+ Lxtz+yv/aCTUdLASxJAFIhsiszr+E2knVa6LJMtgjvNsIDZJZQFWFkpzW4ZG2NOV4wH7vH5Bv2+Rq gKB1BjmQnaA1WPxtrrbG3Wr95B0qUz0bZG43JTM7tB+HTlmJNHZJW5ZL/xBRTRjSRIMsqYaekZMX/ ZhAQFl3Q==; Received: from willy by casper.infradead.org with local (Exim 4.98.2 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1wEDHV-000000061vY-1rVS; Sat, 18 Apr 2026 21:32:49 +0000 Date: Sat, 18 Apr 2026 22:32:49 +0100 From: Matthew Wilcox To: Amir Goldstein Cc: Christian Brauner , Jan Kara , Al Viro , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Theodore Tso , Christoph Hellwig , "Darrick J. Wong" Subject: Re: [PATCH] docs: add guidelines for submitting new filesystems Message-ID: References: <20260417142503.1436446-1-amir73il@gmail.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20260417142503.1436446-1-amir73il@gmail.com> On Fri, Apr 17, 2026 at 04:25:03PM +0200, Amir Goldstein wrote: > +Be testable > + The filesystem must be testable in a meaningful way. The > + `fstests `_ > + framework (also known as xfstests) is the standard testing infrastructure > + for Linux filesystems and its use is highly recommended. At a minimum, > + there must be a credible and documented way to test the filesystem and > + detect regressions. When submitting, include a summary of test results > + indicating which tests pass, fail, or are not applicable. Perhaps we need a section on fuzzing? Maybe something like this: Fuzzing Filesystems in the Linux kernel are subjected to various fuzzing activities, by academic researchers, syzbot and malicious actors. Your filesystem will need to be robust against not just random syscalls but also fuzzed (corrupted) filesystem images (for block based filesystems) and crafted hostile network messages (for network filesystems). It should react appropriately to such attacks, by repairing or reporting a corrupted filesystem, but not hanging executing BUG() or WARN() statements or otherwise corrupting the kernel. Happy for you to reword that.