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From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
To: Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Linux Filesystem Mailing List <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>, Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Subject: [PATCH 5/8] Make 'check_acl()' a first-class filesystem op
Date: Mon, 7 Sep 2009 14:04:05 -0700 (PDT)	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <alpine.LFD.2.01.0909071403390.3419@localhost.localdomain> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <alpine.LFD.2.01.0909071403110.3419@localhost.localdomain>


From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Date: Fri, 28 Aug 2009 11:51:25 -0700

This is stage one in flattening out the callchains for the common
permission testing.  Rather than have most filesystem implemnt their
inode->i_op->permission own function that just calls back down to the
VFS layers 'generic_permission()' with the per-filesystem ACL checking
function, the filesystem can just expose its 'check_acl' function
directly, and let the VFS layer do everything for it.

This is all just preparatory - no filesystem actually enables this yet.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
---
 fs/namei.c         |   62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
 include/linux/fs.h |    1 +
 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index 7959e70..5953913 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -169,19 +169,10 @@ void putname(const char *name)
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(putname);
 #endif
 
-
-/**
- * generic_permission  -  check for access rights on a Posix-like filesystem
- * @inode:	inode to check access rights for
- * @mask:	right to check for (%MAY_READ, %MAY_WRITE, %MAY_EXEC)
- * @check_acl:	optional callback to check for Posix ACLs
- *
- * Used to check for read/write/execute permissions on a file.
- * We use "fsuid" for this, letting us set arbitrary permissions
- * for filesystem access without changing the "normal" uids which
- * are used for other things..
+/*
+ * This does basic POSIX ACL permission checking
  */
-int generic_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
+static int acl_permission_check(struct inode *inode, int mask,
 		int (*check_acl)(struct inode *inode, int mask))
 {
 	umode_t			mode = inode->i_mode;
@@ -193,9 +184,7 @@ int generic_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
 	else {
 		if (IS_POSIXACL(inode) && (mode & S_IRWXG) && check_acl) {
 			int error = check_acl(inode, mask);
-			if (error == -EACCES)
-				goto check_capabilities;
-			else if (error != -EAGAIN)
+			if (error != -EAGAIN)
 				return error;
 		}
 
@@ -208,8 +197,32 @@ int generic_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
 	 */
 	if ((mask & ~mode) == 0)
 		return 0;
+	return -EACCES;
+}
+
+/**
+ * generic_permission  -  check for access rights on a Posix-like filesystem
+ * @inode:	inode to check access rights for
+ * @mask:	right to check for (%MAY_READ, %MAY_WRITE, %MAY_EXEC)
+ * @check_acl:	optional callback to check for Posix ACLs
+ *
+ * Used to check for read/write/execute permissions on a file.
+ * We use "fsuid" for this, letting us set arbitrary permissions
+ * for filesystem access without changing the "normal" uids which
+ * are used for other things..
+ */
+int generic_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
+		int (*check_acl)(struct inode *inode, int mask))
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	/*
+	 * Do the basic POSIX ACL permission checks.
+	 */
+	ret = acl_permission_check(inode, mask, check_acl);
+	if (ret != -EACCES)
+		return ret;
 
- check_capabilities:
 	/*
 	 * Read/write DACs are always overridable.
 	 * Executable DACs are overridable if at least one exec bit is set.
@@ -262,7 +275,7 @@ int inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 	if (inode->i_op->permission)
 		retval = inode->i_op->permission(inode, mask);
 	else
-		retval = generic_permission(inode, mask, NULL);
+		retval = generic_permission(inode, mask, inode->i_op->check_acl);
 
 	if (retval)
 		return retval;
@@ -432,27 +445,22 @@ static struct dentry * cached_lookup(struct dentry * parent, struct qstr * name,
  */
 static int exec_permission_lite(struct inode *inode)
 {
-	umode_t	mode = inode->i_mode;
+	int ret;
 
 	if (inode->i_op->permission) {
-		int ret = inode->i_op->permission(inode, MAY_EXEC);
+		ret = inode->i_op->permission(inode, MAY_EXEC);
 		if (!ret)
 			goto ok;
 		return ret;
 	}
-
-	if (current_fsuid() == inode->i_uid)
-		mode >>= 6;
-	else if (in_group_p(inode->i_gid))
-		mode >>= 3;
-
-	if (mode & MAY_EXEC)
+	ret = acl_permission_check(inode, MAY_EXEC, inode->i_op->check_acl);
+	if (!ret)
 		goto ok;
 
 	if (capable(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE) || capable(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
 		goto ok;
 
-	return -EACCES;
+	return ret;
 ok:
 	return security_inode_permission(inode, MAY_EXEC);
 }
diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index 73e9b64..c1f9935 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -1528,6 +1528,7 @@ struct inode_operations {
 	void (*put_link) (struct dentry *, struct nameidata *, void *);
 	void (*truncate) (struct inode *);
 	int (*permission) (struct inode *, int);
+	int (*check_acl)(struct inode *, int);
 	int (*setattr) (struct dentry *, struct iattr *);
 	int (*getattr) (struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *, struct kstat *);
 	int (*setxattr) (struct dentry *, const char *,const void *,size_t,int);
-- 
1.6.4.1.209.g74b8

  reply	other threads:[~2009-09-07 21:04 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2009-09-07 21:01 [PATCH 0/8] VFS name lookup permission checking cleanup Linus Torvalds
2009-09-07 21:02 ` [PATCH 1/8] Do not call 'ima_path_check()' for each path component Linus Torvalds
2009-09-07 21:02   ` [PATCH 2/8] Simplify exec_permission_lite() logic Linus Torvalds
2009-09-07 21:03     ` [PATCH 3/8] Simplify exec_permission_lite() further Linus Torvalds
2009-09-07 21:03       ` [PATCH 4/8] Simplify exec_permission_lite(), part 3 Linus Torvalds
2009-09-07 21:04         ` Linus Torvalds [this message]
2009-09-07 21:04           ` [PATCH 6/8] shmfs: use 'check_acl' instead of 'permission' Linus Torvalds
2009-09-07 21:05             ` [PATCH 7/8] ext[234]: move over to 'check_acl' permission model Linus Torvalds
2009-09-07 21:05               ` [PATCH 8/8] jffs2/jfs/xfs: switch over to 'check_acl' rather than 'permission()' Linus Torvalds
2009-09-08 18:34                 ` Christoph Hellwig
2009-09-09 17:09                   ` Linus Torvalds
2009-09-07 22:23             ` [PATCH 6/8] shmfs: use 'check_acl' instead of 'permission' James Morris
2009-09-08  0:03               ` James Morris
2009-09-08 18:05             ` Hugh Dickins
2009-09-07 22:20           ` [PATCH 5/8] Make 'check_acl()' a first-class filesystem op James Morris
2009-09-07 22:18         ` [PATCH 4/8] Simplify exec_permission_lite(), part 3 James Morris
2009-09-07 22:15       ` [PATCH 3/8] Simplify exec_permission_lite() further James Morris
2009-09-08 14:40       ` Jamie Lokier
2009-09-08 14:58         ` Matthew Wilcox
2009-09-08 15:02         ` Linus Torvalds
2009-09-07 22:12     ` [PATCH 2/8] Simplify exec_permission_lite() logic James Morris
2009-09-08  1:50   ` [PATCH 1/8] Do not call 'ima_path_check()' for each path component Christoph Hellwig
2009-09-08 14:01 ` [PATCH 0/8] VFS name lookup permission checking cleanup Serge E. Hallyn
2009-09-08 17:52 ` Mimi Zohar

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