From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; t=1795110191; b=EClClKyb7yKspNyQ/fZaLiz+sP3wb11GOg4RP1+C6fvDXj3cNe4d+sYL4uqcx59Puc3X EgiC4w25Nz8mWjOsc/C707AexEwVnioeKkBaogsZtHxaAM06VvHM7CJxR/Zbo6at+r1hm t0g+3K/+0IiAqSwu3xVTJ8fYYv1880U2X6ex5zC4VCJ/txjmFCdREuH2elovQDCWWE+Ex Nqq24/Md7IfA1EFbcafGDFAvJmHt+8BNVZ1VYz2hWnlwfojDAIv9nu2tcogdvqGJdO3x+ vp8MRCZvnWzBtUKxJuxwu0hEw09U0+jmXIyG4eR8yNzFGDLDBeVViy2FKMAO3QTxfOg== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1795110191; h=Received:DKIM-Signature:Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:Message-ID: References:MIME-Version:Content-Type:Content-Disposition:In-Reply-To; bh=rKTl60KWr0mLCOQNUgZPIfoXZLaIl31V2GUy6m5DwRU=; b=odrc+f6HWhL0zjGKBRES837A5RtnueUyhgmWMe1MGS69HNSNE2wxx4mdXSM1RbGHYzKa lfp6DBF6J2DjyCBdZo9QMNU/KBm9pdl+yAv6ws6eyZ3/+5sI8dX4kxK0RwmivuHgCAagW IdY0OlakKMt8IdJw2X0LVElP0ZapqMZXI9GOD6cR+hvupzn3toXHUtZsBLZ0oFslsdXr/ tfrakUVWd216ksEh1qIKbHDCWLDGNAWFICc3UMP//HSRsTWvth4kGhJvAcONELjx81eFU W7EGzPq5kHA0rpU2bKygjWfTRxHXHohlCFsXZWDF7IQ7Wf/JlSJP5lcDoaHWwtbBS7A== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=mfCBeh22; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (quasi.space.kernel.org [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with UTF8SMTPS id D580F606A325; Thu, 19 Nov 2026 17:43:11 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=mfCBeh22 Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with UTF8SMTPSA id EB54C1F000C5; Thu, 19 Nov 2026 17:43:10 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1795110191; bh=rKTl60KWr0mLCOQNUgZPIfoXZLaIl31V2GUy6m5DwRU=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To; b=mfCBeh22AyZN2cDQZ0Z3bJFKmJBo+enYokZCrjW0LvIdaiFzf5Bi3bgp0L0pLjFWF KWOEF+P2hF61/peFpR73vG8J+9uVqnaeOC2VVpvhjr0eAKH/uWuel7whOJ5owj8sU2 glpuvnfjRorUr2e2vDGVnSh9dXG+PdrIyBOOy6SKqZ2WHBOdCOz/GGQbHDMRH6sWbG oswAu3w/7e/zP2JPnJ7b8OVVV4E8dzRljglTvQj3hIKUP3MfzhRaDJSaCVZEBklcD+ RAPIN/Xj87FF4H2rjUER26wi7sgLK+edQ71PUfcQ63F0iIdJ6eg9f0wtVKbk8BaM+R GVSZhVPnmJLKg== Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2026 19:43:07 +0200 From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: Josef Bacik Cc: Andy Lutomirski , Christian Brauner , Alexander Viro , David Howells , Jan Kara , Serge Hallyn , Kees Cook , Paul Moore , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 00/13] Namespace for namespace roots Message-ID: References: <20261117231352.3816603-1-jarkko@kernel.org> <9463a969d35a7d5ec5a56aeb67644b94.josef@toxicpanda.com> X-Mailing-List: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <9463a969d35a7d5ec5a56aeb67644b94.josef@toxicpanda.com> On Thu, Nov 19, 2026 at 05:30:55PM +0000, Josef Bacik wrote: > On Wed, Nov 18, 2026 at 9:46 AM Andy Lutomirski wrote: > > cells: The dance where I create an anonymous mountns, mount stuff into > > it, and then attach it to the cell is cute. But I think the userns > > interaction is wrong: you are making me assemble all the mounts in > > *my* userns and then clone the entire tree into a fresh, non-anonymous > > mountns bound to the current userns. And that clone operation is not > > free and serves no actual practical purpose. > > The copy buys us nothing, agreed. That's just what the mount API gives > me to work with today, it's not something cells wants. If I could make > an empty mount namespace and fill it by fd I'd use that, the "root" slot > takes a mount namespace fd already. Extending the API for that makes > sense to me on its own. > > The mount namespace staying with the builder's userns is on purpose > though, that's what keeps the cell from mounting anything no matter what > capabilities it was given. The builder sets the tree up and hands it > over, so the cell only ever has what it was given, and the mount code > isn't something it can attack from the inside. > > > cells: I find it *incredibly annoying* that one generally cannot put > > new mounts into an existing container using most existing container > > managers. I hit this on a surprisingly regular basis. You seem to be > > baking this into the whole cells design. Why? > > By design. Allowing changes to a running container is what causes the > problems. If you need another mount, tear it down and build it again. > > > both of you: Can we please make it possible to do the parts of this > > that oughtn't require privilege without privilege? > > Agreed, we need to come up with a design for this. To clear things up I'm not pushing "my stuff" over "your stuff", and I get if that is the impression I might have given :-) Apologies for that. I think it is better to look where things balance. It can even lead to something else than anyone considered (something better). I'm all for right solution :-) Distruption is painful but useful E.g., MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTS is completely independent patch regardless of patch set for what it is worth [1]. > > Thanks, > > Josef [1] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd.git/commit/?h=rootns&id=cb058646b3dd76b13f5044846c119fe1d28db4bf Br, Jarkko