From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: security@kernel.org
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>,
"linux-mm@kvack.org" <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
yalin wang <yalin.wang2010@gmail.com>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 0/2] setgid hardening
Date: Wed, 25 Jan 2017 13:06:50 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <cover.1485377903.git.luto@kernel.org> (raw)
The kernel has some dangerous behavior involving the creation and
modification of setgid executables. These issues aren't kernel
security bugs per se, but they have been used to turn various
filesystem permission oddities into reliably privilege escalation
exploits.
See http://www.halfdog.net/Security/2015/SetgidDirectoryPrivilegeEscalation/
for a nice writeup.
Let's fix them for real.
Andy Lutomirski (2):
fs: Check f_cred instead of current's creds in should_remove_suid()
fs: Harden against open(..., O_CREAT, 02777) in a setgid directory
fs/inode.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
fs/internal.h | 2 +-
fs/ocfs2/file.c | 4 ++--
fs/open.c | 2 +-
include/linux/fs.h | 2 +-
5 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
--
2.9.3
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next reply other threads:[~2017-01-25 21:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-01-25 21:06 Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2017-01-25 21:06 ` [PATCH 1/2] fs: Check f_cred instead of current's creds in should_remove_suid() Andy Lutomirski
2017-01-25 21:43 ` Ben Hutchings
2017-01-25 21:48 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-01-25 23:15 ` Frank Filz
2017-01-26 0:12 ` Kees Cook
2017-01-25 21:06 ` [PATCH 2/2] fs: Harden against open(..., O_CREAT, 02777) in a setgid directory Andy Lutomirski
2017-01-25 21:31 ` Ben Hutchings
2017-01-25 21:44 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-01-25 23:17 ` Frank Filz
2017-01-25 23:50 ` Willy Tarreau
2017-01-25 23:59 ` [PATCH 0/2] setgid hardening Willy Tarreau
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