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From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
To: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas@google.com>,
	Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>,
	Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>,
	"Christian Brauner (Amutable)" <brauner@kernel.org>,
	Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: kernel-team@android.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	Carlos Llamas <cmllamas@google.com>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org,
	"open list:SELINUX SECURITY MODULE" <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
	"open list:BPF [MISC]:Keyword:(?:b|_)bpf(?:b|_)"
	<bpf@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] selinux: bpf: check SBLABEL_MNT before isec init
Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2026 17:10:00 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <db6fe5d2d4081f20f85abc6020b831fd@paul-moore.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260730181008.3654413-1-cmllamas@google.com>

On Jul 30, 2026 Carlos Llamas <cmllamas@google.com> wrote:
> 
> selinux_inode_init_security() marks the isec as initialized before
> checking if mount labeling is supported (SBLABEL_MNT). This was fine
> until commit 9722955b5430 ("bpf: Add simple xattr support to bpffs"),
> where genfscon bpffs mounts fail the SBLABEL_MNT check as expected (no
> xattrs) and yet leave the isec->initialized. This breaks subsequent
> calls to inode_doinit_with_dentry().
> 
> Do the SBLABEL_MNT check before the inode security is initialized.
> 
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/akWdcp6P0FkNDzBk@google.com/
> Fixes: 9722955b5430 ("bpf: Add simple xattr support to bpffs")
> Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas@google.com>
> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
> ---
>  security/selinux/hooks.c | 8 ++++----
>  1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index 8d6945edae7a..09a12eb8652c 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -2980,6 +2980,10 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
>  	if (rc)
>  		return rc;
>  
> +	if (!selinux_initialized() ||
> +	    !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
> +		return -EOPNOTSUPP;

If we're moving this check, we should probably just move it to right
after we assign 'sbsec' at the top of the function.  The calls to
inode_mode_to_security() and selinux_determine_inode_label() aren't
doing anything useful in either the !selinux_initialized() or !SBLABEL_MNT
cases so let's avoid the unnecessary work.

>  	/* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
>  	if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
>  		struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
> @@ -2988,10 +2992,6 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
>  		isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
>  	}
>  
> -	if (!selinux_initialized() ||
> -	    !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
> -		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> -
>  	xattr = lsm_get_xattr_slot(xattrs, xattr_count);
>  	if (xattr) {
>  		rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid,
> -- 
> 2.55.0.508.g3f0d502094-goog

--
paul-moore.com

  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-07-30 21:10 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-06-02  7:40 [PATCH vfs/vfs-7.2.xattr v3] bpf: Add simple xattr support to bpffs Daniel Borkmann
2026-06-02 18:07 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-06-02 18:25   ` Daniel Borkmann
2026-06-03  7:07 ` Christian Brauner
2026-07-01 23:06   ` Carlos Llamas
2026-07-10 12:17     ` Daniel Borkmann
2026-07-30 18:10       ` [PATCH] selinux: bpf: check SBLABEL_MNT before isec init Carlos Llamas
2026-07-30 18:50         ` Stephen Smalley
2026-07-30 21:10         ` Paul Moore [this message]
2026-07-30 22:07           ` Carlos Llamas
2026-07-30 22:15           ` [PATCH v2] " Carlos Llamas

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