From: Alexander Lobakin <aleksander.lobakin@intel.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org,
"Andy Shevchenko" <andy@kernel.org>,
"Cezary Rojewski" <cezary.rojewski@intel.com>,
"Puyou Lu" <puyou.lu@gmail.com>,
"Mark Brown" <broonie@kernel.org>,
"Josh Poimboeuf" <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
"Peter Zijlstra" <peterz@infradead.org>,
"Brendan Higgins" <brendan.higgins@linux.dev>,
"David Gow" <davidgow@google.com>,
"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"Nathan Chancellor" <nathan@kernel.org>,
"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
"Zhaoyang Huang" <zhaoyang.huang@unisoc.com>,
"Randy Dunlap" <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
"Geert Uytterhoeven" <geert+renesas@glider.be>,
"Miguel Ojeda" <ojeda@kernel.org>,
"Nick Desaulniers" <ndesaulniers@google.com>,
"Liam Howlett" <liam.howlett@oracle.com>,
"Vlastimil Babka" <vbabka@suse.cz>,
"Dan Williams" <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
"Rasmus Villemoes" <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>,
"Yury Norov" <yury.norov@gmail.com>,
"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>,
"Sander Vanheule" <sander@svanheule.net>,
"Eric Biggers" <ebiggers@google.com>,
"Masami Hiramatsu (Google)" <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
"Andrey Konovalov" <andreyknvl@gmail.com>,
"Linus Walleij" <linus.walleij@linaro.org>,
"Daniel Latypov" <dlatypov@google.com>,
"José Expósito" <jose.exposito89@gmail.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kunit-dev@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 6/9] fortify: Split reporting and avoid passing string pointer
Date: Thu, 6 Apr 2023 17:23:54 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <0ff0548e-7348-d6cb-75a5-838a110b7d82@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230406000212.3442647-6-keescook@chromium.org>
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Date: Wed, 5 Apr 2023 17:02:05 -0700
> In preparation for KUnit testing and further improvements in fortify
> failure reporting, split out the report and encode the function and
> access failure (read or write overflow) into a single int argument. This
> mainly ends up saving some space in the data segment. For a defconfig
> with FORTIFY_SOURCE enabled:
>
> $ size gcc/vmlinux.before gcc/vmlinux.after
> text data bss dec hex filename
> 26132309 9760658 2195460 38088427 2452eeb gcc/vmlinux.before
> 26132386 9748382 2195460 38076228 244ff44 gcc/vmlinux.after
>
> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andy@kernel.org>
> Cc: Cezary Rojewski <cezary.rojewski@intel.com>
> Cc: Puyou Lu <puyou.lu@gmail.com>
> Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
> Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> ---
> include/linux/fortify-string.h | 72 +++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
> lib/string_helpers.c | 70 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
> tools/objtool/check.c | 2 +-
> 3 files changed, 118 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/fortify-string.h b/include/linux/fortify-string.h
> index 41dbd641f55c..6db4052db459 100644
> --- a/include/linux/fortify-string.h
> +++ b/include/linux/fortify-string.h
> @@ -9,7 +9,34 @@
> #define __FORTIFY_INLINE extern __always_inline __gnu_inline __overloadable
> #define __RENAME(x) __asm__(#x)
>
> -void fortify_panic(const char *name) __noreturn __cold;
> +#define fortify_reason(func, write) (((func) << 1) | !!(write))
> +
> +#define fortify_panic(func, write) \
> + __fortify_panic(fortify_reason(func, write))
> +
> +#define FORTIFY_READ 0
> +#define FORTIFY_WRITE 1
> +
> +#define FORTIFY_FUNC_strncpy 0
> +#define FORTIFY_FUNC_strnlen 1
> +#define FORTIFY_FUNC_strlen 2
> +#define FORTIFY_FUNC_strlcpy 3
> +#define FORTIFY_FUNC_strscpy 4
> +#define FORTIFY_FUNC_strlcat 5
> +#define FORTIFY_FUNC_strcat 6
> +#define FORTIFY_FUNC_strncat 7
> +#define FORTIFY_FUNC_memset 8
> +#define FORTIFY_FUNC_memcpy 9
> +#define FORTIFY_FUNC_memmove 10
> +#define FORTIFY_FUNC_memscan 11
> +#define FORTIFY_FUNC_memcmp 12
> +#define FORTIFY_FUNC_memchr 13
> +#define FORTIFY_FUNC_memchr_inv 14
> +#define FORTIFY_FUNC_kmemdup 15
> +#define FORTIFY_FUNC_strcpy 16
enum?
> --- a/lib/string_helpers.c
> +++ b/lib/string_helpers.c
> @@ -1021,10 +1021,74 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__read_overflow2_field);
> void __write_overflow_field(size_t avail, size_t wanted) { }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(__write_overflow_field);
>
> -void fortify_panic(const char *name)
> +void __fortify_report(u8 reason)
> {
> - pr_emerg("detected buffer overflow in %s\n", name);
> + const char *name;
> + const bool write = !!(reason & 0x1);
> +
> + switch (reason >> 1) {
As already mentioned, I'd use bitfield helpers + couple definitions to
not miss something when changing the way it's encoded
#define FORTIFY_REASON_DIR(r) FIELD_GET(BIT(0), r)
#define FORTIFY_REASON_FUNC(r) FIELD_GET(GENMASK(7, 1), r)
(+ set pair)
> + case FORTIFY_FUNC_strncpy:
> + name = "strncpy";
> + break;
> + case FORTIFY_FUNC_strnlen:
> + name = "strnlen";
> + break;
> + case FORTIFY_FUNC_strlen:
> + name = "strlen";
> + break;
> + case FORTIFY_FUNC_strlcpy:
> + name = "strlcpy";
> + break;
> + case FORTIFY_FUNC_strscpy:
> + name = "strscpy";
> + break;
> + case FORTIFY_FUNC_strlcat:
> + name = "strlcat";
> + break;
> + case FORTIFY_FUNC_strcat:
> + name = "strcat";
> + break;
> + case FORTIFY_FUNC_strncat:
> + name = "strncat";
> + break;
> + case FORTIFY_FUNC_memset:
> + name = "memset";
> + break;
> + case FORTIFY_FUNC_memcpy:
> + name = "memcpy";
> + break;
> + case FORTIFY_FUNC_memmove:
> + name = "memmove";
> + break;
> + case FORTIFY_FUNC_memscan:
> + name = "memscan";
> + break;
> + case FORTIFY_FUNC_memcmp:
> + name = "memcmp";
> + break;
> + case FORTIFY_FUNC_memchr:
> + name = "memchr";
> + break;
> + case FORTIFY_FUNC_memchr_inv:
> + name = "memchr_inv";
> + break;
> + case FORTIFY_FUNC_kmemdup:
> + name = "kmemdup";
> + break;
> + case FORTIFY_FUNC_strcpy:
> + name = "strcpy";
> + break;
> + default:
> + name = "unknown";
> + }
I know this is far from hotpath, but could we save some object code and
do that via O(1) array lookup? Plus some macro to compress things:
#define FORTIFY_ENTRY(name) \
[FORTIFY_FUNC_##name] = #name
static const char * const fortify_funcs[] = {
FORTIFY_ENTRY(strncpy),
...
}
// array bounds check here if you wish, I wouldn't bother as
// we're panicking anyway
name = fortify_funcs[reason >> 1];
> + WARN(1, "%s: detected buffer %s overflow\n", name, write ? "write" : "read");
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__fortify_report);
> +
> +void __fortify_panic(const u8 reason)
> +{
> + __fortify_report(reason);
> BUG();
> }
> -EXPORT_SYMBOL(fortify_panic);
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__fortify_panic);
> #endif /* CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE */
Thanks,
Olek
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-04-06 15:24 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-04-06 0:01 [PATCH 0/9] fortify: Add KUnit tests for runtime overflows Kees Cook
2023-04-06 0:02 ` [PATCH 1/9] kunit: tool: Enable CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE under UML Kees Cook
2023-04-06 3:10 ` Kees Cook
2023-04-06 0:02 ` [PATCH 2/9] fortify: Allow KUnit test to build without FORTIFY Kees Cook
2023-04-06 1:22 ` Daniel Latypov
2023-04-06 23:09 ` Kees Cook
2023-04-06 0:02 ` [PATCH 3/9] string: Add Kunit tests for strcat() family Kees Cook
2023-04-06 4:19 ` kernel test robot
2023-04-06 9:11 ` Alexander Potapenko
2023-04-06 23:07 ` Kees Cook
2023-04-12 12:34 ` Alexander Potapenko
2023-04-06 0:02 ` [PATCH 4/9] fortify: Add protection for strlcat() Kees Cook
2023-04-06 13:32 ` Miguel Ojeda
2023-04-06 22:58 ` Kees Cook
2023-04-06 0:02 ` [PATCH 5/9] fortify: strcat: Move definition to use fortified strlcat() Kees Cook
2023-04-06 0:02 ` [PATCH 6/9] fortify: Split reporting and avoid passing string pointer Kees Cook
2023-04-06 10:20 ` Andy Shevchenko
2023-04-06 22:57 ` Kees Cook
2023-04-07 8:34 ` Andy Shevchenko
2023-04-07 19:49 ` Kees Cook
2023-04-06 11:19 ` kernel test robot
2024-02-22 13:00 ` Arnd Bergmann
2024-02-22 16:30 ` Kees Cook
2024-02-22 17:11 ` Andy Shevchenko
2023-04-06 13:44 ` Miguel Ojeda
2023-04-06 22:54 ` Kees Cook
2023-04-06 15:23 ` Alexander Lobakin [this message]
2023-04-06 22:54 ` Kees Cook
2023-04-07 10:26 ` kernel test robot
2023-04-06 0:02 ` [PATCH 7/9] fortify: Provide KUnit counters for failure testing Kees Cook
2023-04-06 0:02 ` [PATCH 8/9] fortify: Add KUnit tests for runtime overflows Kees Cook
2023-04-06 0:02 ` [PATCH 9/9] fortify: Improve buffer overflow reporting Kees Cook
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