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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavoars@kernel.org>,
	Peter Rosin <peda@axentia.se>, Wolfram Sang <wsa@kernel.org>,
	"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@embeddedor.com>,
	linux-i2c@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel-janitors@vger.kernel.org, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] i2c: mux: harden i2c_mux_alloc() against integer overflows
Date: Fri, 16 Sep 2022 01:07:25 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <202209160101.2A240E9@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <YyMyKQnWgu0SL6jj@kadam>

On Thu, Sep 15, 2022 at 05:09:45PM +0300, Dan Carpenter wrote:
> It would probaby be useful to mark passed data as explicitly unsafe for
> integer overflows.  Smatch already tracks user data.  And if the user
> data has been capped to an unknown value.  But this would be a
> completely separate flag which says that "this value came from
> size_add/mul()".

I really want a __must_check_type(size_t) attribute or something for
functions, so we can get a subset of -Wconversion warnings, etc.

> drivers/char/tpm/eventlog/tpm2.c:57 tpm2_bios_measurements_start() warn: using integer overflow function 'size_add()' for math
> [...]
> drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_flex_pipe.c:2070 ice_pkg_buf_reserve_section() warn: using integer overflow function 'size_mul()' for math

I see size_add() and size_mul() here. I would have expected some
size_sub() opportunities too? Did nothing pop out?

-- 
Kees Cook

       reply	other threads:[~2022-09-16  8:07 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <YyMM8iVSHJ4ammsg@kili>
     [not found] ` <YyMt2cWtHC2SeG62@work>
     [not found]   ` <YyMyKQnWgu0SL6jj@kadam>
2022-09-16  8:07     ` Kees Cook [this message]
2022-09-16  8:23       ` [PATCH] i2c: mux: harden i2c_mux_alloc() against integer overflows Dan Carpenter
2022-09-16 13:31         ` Kees Cook
2022-09-16 14:55           ` Dan Carpenter
2022-09-16 21:31             ` Kees Cook

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