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[92.21.50.228]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id ffacd0b85a97d-472de944719sm158151f8f.2.2026.06.27.14.49.16 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Sat, 27 Jun 2026 14:49:16 -0700 (PDT) Date: Sat, 27 Jun 2026 22:49:14 +0100 From: David Laight To: Ian Bridges Cc: Paul Moore , Stephen Smalley , Ondrej Mosnacek , selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] selinux: replace strlcat() with seq_buf in selinux_ima_collect_state() Message-ID: <20260627224914.68b506b0@pumpkin> In-Reply-To: References: X-Mailer: Claws Mail 4.1.1 (GTK 3.24.38; arm-unknown-linux-gnueabihf) Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit On Fri, 26 Jun 2026 10:57:10 -0500 Ian Bridges wrote: > In preparation for removing the deprecated strlcat() API[1], replace the > strscpy()/strlcat() chain in selinux_ima_collect_state() with a struct > seq_buf, which tracks the write position and remaining space internally. > > Each field is written with seq_buf_printf() using a "=%d;" format, which > removes the open-coded "=1;"/"=0;" constants. The seven per-append > WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len) truncation checks are replaced by a single > seq_buf_has_overflowed() check after the string is built. > > Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/370 [1] > Signed-off-by: Ian Bridges > --- > Changed in v2: replace the v1 seq_buf_puts() pairs with seq_buf_printf() > using a "=%d;" format, which drops the open-coded "=1;"/"=0;" constants. Did you verify that all the values are 0/1 otherwise a !! prefix might be needed. > > v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ajlN94VO7BYNUTAy@dev/ > > I didn't change the precomputation of the string size. An alternative, > which is used by other seq_buf callers (e.g. kernel/rcu/refscale.c, > mm/memcontrol.c), is to drop the precomputation and allocate an oversized > fixed buffer, relying on the seq_buf overflow check as a backstop. I'm > happy to rework the patch to adopt that alternative. That would be reasonable, the output is always exactly the same length and the buffer is freed just after being allocated. A comment that there are 3 + 15 strings and all are under 32 bytes so 1k is plenty would suffice. David > > security/selinux/ima.c | 40 +++++++++++++--------------------------- > 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/security/selinux/ima.c b/security/selinux/ima.c > index aa34da9b0aeb..cb0efa2fc1ad 100644 > --- a/security/selinux/ima.c > +++ b/security/selinux/ima.c > @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ > */ > #include > #include > +#include > #include "security.h" > #include "ima.h" > > @@ -20,46 +21,31 @@ > */ > static char *selinux_ima_collect_state(void) > { > - const char *on = "=1;", *off = "=0;"; > + struct seq_buf s; > char *buf; > - int buf_len, len, i, rc; > + int buf_len, suffix_len, i; > > buf_len = strlen("initialized=0;enforcing=0;checkreqprot=0;") + 1; > + suffix_len = strlen("=0;"); > > - len = strlen(on); > for (i = 0; i < __POLICYDB_CAP_MAX; i++) > - buf_len += strlen(selinux_policycap_names[i]) + len; > + buf_len += strlen(selinux_policycap_names[i]) + suffix_len; > > buf = kzalloc(buf_len, GFP_KERNEL); > if (!buf) > return NULL; > > - rc = strscpy(buf, "initialized", buf_len); > - WARN_ON(rc < 0); > + seq_buf_init(&s, buf, buf_len); > > - rc = strlcat(buf, selinux_initialized() ? on : off, buf_len); > - WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len); > + seq_buf_printf(&s, "initialized=%d;enforcing=%d;checkreqprot=%d;", > + selinux_initialized(), enforcing_enabled(), > + checkreqprot_get()); > > - rc = strlcat(buf, "enforcing", buf_len); > - WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len); > - > - rc = strlcat(buf, enforcing_enabled() ? on : off, buf_len); > - WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len); > - > - rc = strlcat(buf, "checkreqprot", buf_len); > - WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len); > - > - rc = strlcat(buf, checkreqprot_get() ? on : off, buf_len); > - WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len); > - > - for (i = 0; i < __POLICYDB_CAP_MAX; i++) { > - rc = strlcat(buf, selinux_policycap_names[i], buf_len); > - WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len); > + for (i = 0; i < __POLICYDB_CAP_MAX; i++) > + seq_buf_printf(&s, "%s=%d;", selinux_policycap_names[i], > + selinux_state.policycap[i]); > > - rc = strlcat(buf, selinux_state.policycap[i] ? on : off, > - buf_len); > - WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len); > - } > + WARN_ON(seq_buf_has_overflowed(&s)); > > return buf; > }