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From: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
To: Uros Bizjak <ubizjak@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrea Pinski <andrew.pinski@oss.qualcomm.com>,
	Jeffrey Law <jefflaw@qti.qualcomm.com>,
	Joseph Myers <josmyers@redhat.com>,
	Richard Biener <rguenther@suse.de>,
	Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com>,
	Martin Uecker <uecker@tugraz.at>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>, Jan Hubicka <hubicka@ucw.cz>,
	Richard Earnshaw <richard.earnshaw@arm.com>,
	Richard Sandiford <richard.sandiford@arm.com>,
	Marcus Shawcroft <marcus.shawcroft@arm.com>,
	Kyrylo Tkachov <kyrylo.tkachov@arm.com>,
	Kito Cheng <kito.cheng@gmail.com>,
	Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
	Andrew Waterman <andrew@sifive.com>,
	Jim Wilson <jim.wilson.gcc@gmail.com>,
	Dan Li <ashimida.1990@gmail.com>,
	Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>,
	Ramon de C Valle <rcvalle@google.com>,
	Joao Moreira <joao@overdrivepizza.com>,
	Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>,
	Bill Wendling <morbo@google.com>,
	Osterlund Sebastian <sebastian.osterlund@intel.com>,
	Constable Scott D <scott.d.constable@intel.com>,
	gcc-patches@gcc.gnu.org, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v15 4/7] x86: Add x86_64 Kernel Control Flow Integrity implementation
Date: Wed, 26 Aug 2026 22:03:45 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <202608262159.ED2BB32C4B@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAFULd4ZKxXdw0gk5RHfihOBHJmcs15Y-uLFHcQUp_JMg58RyrA@mail.gmail.com>

On Wed, Aug 26, 2026 at 10:57:44AM +0200, Uros Bizjak wrote:
> On Wed, Aug 26, 2026 at 1:59 AM Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org> wrote:
[...]
> > +/* Apply x86-64 specific masking to KCFI type ID.  TYPE_ID is the 32-bit
> > +   KCFI type identifier to potentially mask.  Returns the type ID with
> > +   x86-64 specific adjustments to avoid embedding ENDBR instruction
> > +   sequences in the type identifier values.  */
> > +
> > +static uint32_t
> > +ix86_kcfi_mask_type_id (uint32_t type_id)
> > +{
> > +  /* Avoid embedding ENDBR instructions in KCFI type IDs.
> > +     ENDBR64: 0xfa1e0ff3, ENDBR32: 0xfb1e0ff3
> > +     If the type ID matches either instruction encoding, increment by 1.  */
> > +  if (type_id == 0xfa1e0ff3U || type_id == 0xfb1e0ff3U)
> 
> This should use the ix86_endbr_immediate_operand predicate. Exactly
> one target dependent immediate (0xfa1... for TARGET_64BIT and 0xfb1
> for TARGET_32BIT) should be avoided only with flag_cf_protection &
> CF_BRANCH. All this is handled in the predicate.

Ah yeah. Hmm, I double checked, and Clang doesn't gate this on
-fcf-protection nor arch, which means we have a potential ABI mismatch if
I change that logic in GCC's version of this.

If this is really important, I could look at making Clang check for the
flag/arch too, though honestly, I haven't even been able to generate a
collision with these values either, so the whole thing is theoretical...

I could improve the comment to note the ABI perhaps?

-- 
Kees Cook

  reply	other threads:[~2026-08-27  5:03 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-08-25 23:57 [PATCH v15 0/7] Introduce Kernel Control Flow Integrity ABI [PR107048] Kees Cook
2026-08-25 23:57 ` [PATCH v15 1/7] kcfi: Introduce KCFI typeinfo mangling API Kees Cook
2026-08-25 23:57 ` [PATCH v15 2/7] kcfi: Add core Kernel Control Flow Integrity infrastructure Kees Cook
2026-08-25 23:57 ` [PATCH v15 3/7] kcfi: Add regression test suite Kees Cook
2026-08-25 23:57 ` [PATCH v15 4/7] x86: Add x86_64 Kernel Control Flow Integrity implementation Kees Cook
2026-08-26  8:57   ` Uros Bizjak
2026-08-27  5:03     ` Kees Cook [this message]
2026-08-27  8:03       ` Uros Bizjak
2026-08-25 23:57 ` [PATCH v15 5/7] aarch64: Add AArch64 " Kees Cook
2026-08-25 23:57 ` [PATCH v15 6/7] arm: Add ARM 32-bit " Kees Cook
2026-08-25 23:57 ` [PATCH v15 7/7] riscv: Add RISC-V " Kees Cook

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