From: Francis Laniel <laniel_francis@privacyrequired.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, dja@axtens.net
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v4 0/5] Fortify strscpy()
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2020 11:41:13 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <4657036.ZfE1bQA0bl@machine> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <202011171404.2CFCB24344@keescook>
Le mardi 17 novembre 2020, 23:06:07 CET Kees Cook a écrit :
> On Mon, Nov 16, 2020 at 03:50:07PM +0100, laniel_francis@privacyrequired.com
wrote:
> > This patch set answers to this issue:
> > https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/46
> >
> > I based my modifications on top of two patches from Daniel Axtens which
> > modify calls to __builtin_object_size to ensure the true size of char *
> > are returned and not the surrounding structure size.
> >
> > To sum up, in my first patch I implemented a fortified version of strscpy.
> > This new version ensures the following before calling vanilla strscpy:
> > 1. There is no read overflow because we either size is smaller than src
> > length or we shrink size to src length by calling fortified strnlen.
> > 2. There is no write overflow because we either failed during compilation
> > or at runtime by checking that size is smaller than dest size.
> > The second patch brings a new file in LKDTM driver to test this new
> > version. The test ensures the fortified version still returns the same
> > value as the vanilla one while panic'ing when there is a write overflow.
> > The third just corrects some typos in LKDTM related file.
> >
> > If you see any problem or way to improve the code, feel free to share it.
>
> Thanks! This looks really good. You can drop the "RFC" parts, and for
> v5, please use
>
> To: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
>
> and add to Cc:
>
> linux-mm@kvack.org
> linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
>
> I think going via -mm is the most sensible, since that's where the other
> fortify pieces landed.
You are welcome and thank you for the reviews!
I rebase it on Linus Torvalds' tree and I send the V5.
prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-11-18 10:41 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-11-16 14:50 [RFC PATCH v4 0/5] Fortify strscpy() laniel_francis
2020-11-16 14:50 ` [PATCH v4 1/5] string.h: detect intra-object overflow in fortified string functions laniel_francis
2020-11-16 14:50 ` [PATCH v4 2/5] lkdtm: tests for FORTIFY_SOURCE laniel_francis
2020-11-16 14:50 ` [RFC PATCH v4 3/5] string.h: Add FORTIFY coverage for strscpy() laniel_francis
2020-11-17 22:02 ` Kees Cook
2020-11-16 14:50 ` [RFC PATCH v4 4/5] Add new file in LKDTM to test fortified strscpy laniel_francis
2020-11-17 22:04 ` Kees Cook
2020-11-16 14:50 ` [RFC PATCH v4 5/5] Correct wrong filenames in comment laniel_francis
2020-11-17 22:06 ` [RFC PATCH v4 0/5] Fortify strscpy() Kees Cook
2020-11-18 10:41 ` Francis Laniel [this message]
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