* [PATCH v6 1/5] lib: fix _parse_integer_limit() to handle overflow
2026-02-09 16:47 [PATCH v6 0/5] lib and lib/cmdline enhancements Dmitry Antipov
@ 2026-02-09 16:47 ` Dmitry Antipov
2026-02-10 7:36 ` Andy Shevchenko
2026-02-09 16:47 ` [PATCH v6 2/5] lib: fix memparse() " Dmitry Antipov
` (4 subsequent siblings)
5 siblings, 1 reply; 13+ messages in thread
From: Dmitry Antipov @ 2026-02-09 16:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andy Shevchenko, Andrew Morton
Cc: Kees Cook, Darrick J . Wong, linux-hardening, linux-kernel,
Dmitry Antipov
In '_parse_integer_limit()', adjust native integer arithmetic
with near-to-overflow branch where 'check_mul_overflow()' and
'check_add_overflow()' are used to check whether an intermediate
result goes out of range, and denote such a case with ULLONG_MAX,
thus making the function more similar to standard C library's
'strtoull()'. Adjust comment to kernel-doc style as well.
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Antipov <dmantipov@yandex.ru>
---
v6: more compact for-loop and minor style adjustments again
v5: minor brace style adjustment
v4: restore plain integer arithmetic and use check_xxx_overflow()
on near-to-overflow branch only
v3: adjust commit message and comments as suggested by Andy
v2: initial version to join the series
---
lib/kstrtox.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/kstrtox.c b/lib/kstrtox.c
index bdde40cd69d7..ab7ce72e36e2 100644
--- a/lib/kstrtox.c
+++ b/lib/kstrtox.c
@@ -39,25 +39,29 @@ const char *_parse_integer_fixup_radix(const char *s, unsigned int *base)
return s;
}
-/*
- * Convert non-negative integer string representation in explicitly given radix
- * to an integer. A maximum of max_chars characters will be converted.
+/**
+ * _parse_integer_limit - Convert integer string representation to an integer
+ * @s: Integer string representation
+ * @base: Radix
+ * @p: Where to store result
+ * @max_chars: Maximum amount of characters to convert
*
- * Return number of characters consumed maybe or-ed with overflow bit.
- * If overflow occurs, result integer (incorrect) is still returned.
+ * Convert non-negative integer string representation in explicitly given
+ * radix to an integer. If overflow occurs, value at @p is set to ULLONG_MAX.
*
- * Don't you dare use this function.
+ * This function is the workhorse of other string conversion functions and it
+ * is discouraged to use it explicitly. Consider kstrto*() family instead.
+ *
+ * Return: Number of characters consumed, maybe ORed with overflow bit
*/
noinline
unsigned int _parse_integer_limit(const char *s, unsigned int base, unsigned long long *p,
size_t max_chars)
{
- unsigned long long res;
+ unsigned long long res = 0;
unsigned int rv;
- res = 0;
- rv = 0;
- while (max_chars--) {
+ for (rv = 0; max_chars--; rv++, s++) {
unsigned int c = *s;
unsigned int lc = _tolower(c);
unsigned int val;
@@ -72,16 +76,23 @@ unsigned int _parse_integer_limit(const char *s, unsigned int base, unsigned lon
if (val >= base)
break;
/*
- * Check for overflow only if we are within range of
- * it in the max base we support (16)
+ * Accumulate result if no overflow detected.
+ * Otherwise just consume valid characters.
*/
- if (unlikely(res & (~0ull << 60))) {
- if (res > div_u64(ULLONG_MAX - val, base))
- rv |= KSTRTOX_OVERFLOW;
+ if (likely(res != ULLONG_MAX)) {
+ if (unlikely(res & (~0ull << 60))) {
+ /* We're close to possible overflow. */
+ unsigned long long tmp;
+
+ if (check_mul_overflow(res, base, &tmp) ||
+ check_add_overflow(tmp, val, &res)) {
+ res = ULLONG_MAX;
+ rv |= KSTRTOX_OVERFLOW;
+ }
+ } else {
+ res = res * base + val;
+ }
}
- res = res * base + val;
- rv++;
- s++;
}
*p = res;
return rv;
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 13+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v6 1/5] lib: fix _parse_integer_limit() to handle overflow
2026-02-09 16:47 ` [PATCH v6 1/5] lib: fix _parse_integer_limit() to handle overflow Dmitry Antipov
@ 2026-02-10 7:36 ` Andy Shevchenko
2026-02-12 11:13 ` Dmitry Antipov
0 siblings, 1 reply; 13+ messages in thread
From: Andy Shevchenko @ 2026-02-10 7:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Dmitry Antipov
Cc: Andrew Morton, Kees Cook, Darrick J . Wong, linux-hardening,
linux-kernel
On Mon, Feb 09, 2026 at 07:47:53PM +0300, Dmitry Antipov wrote:
> In '_parse_integer_limit()', adjust native integer arithmetic
> with near-to-overflow branch where 'check_mul_overflow()' and
> 'check_add_overflow()' are used to check whether an intermediate
> result goes out of range, and denote such a case with ULLONG_MAX,
> thus making the function more similar to standard C library's
> 'strtoull()'. Adjust comment to kernel-doc style as well.
...
> - unsigned long long res;
> + unsigned long long res = 0;
>
> - res = 0;
We can leave this untouched.
...
> - while (max_chars--) {
> + for (rv = 0; max_chars--; rv++, s++) {
I don't see how max_chars is used. With that said, I would rather see the usual
way of expressing the condition in the for-loop:
for (rv = 0; rv < max_chars; rv++, s++) {
...
> + if (likely(res != ULLONG_MAX)) {
Have you seen David's question about these checks?
Maybe I missed your answer...
> + if (unlikely(res & (~0ull << 60))) {
> + /* We're close to possible overflow. */
> + unsigned long long tmp;
> +
> + if (check_mul_overflow(res, base, &tmp) ||
> + check_add_overflow(tmp, val, &res)) {
> + res = ULLONG_MAX;
> + rv |= KSTRTOX_OVERFLOW;
> + }
> + } else {
> + res = res * base + val;
> + }
> }
--
With Best Regards,
Andy Shevchenko
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 13+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v6 1/5] lib: fix _parse_integer_limit() to handle overflow
2026-02-10 7:36 ` Andy Shevchenko
@ 2026-02-12 11:13 ` Dmitry Antipov
[not found] ` <20260212120030.2f15caaa@pumpkin>
0 siblings, 1 reply; 13+ messages in thread
From: Dmitry Antipov @ 2026-02-12 11:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andy Shevchenko
Cc: Andrew Morton, David Laight, Kees Cook, Darrick J . Wong,
linux-hardening, linux-kernel
On Tue, 2026-02-10 at 09:36 +0200, Andy Shevchenko wrote:
> I don't see how max_chars is used. With that said, I would rather see the usual
> way of expressing the condition in the for-loop:
>
> for (rv = 0; rv < max_chars; rv++, s++) {
This will break the loop (and so stop consuming characters) if KSTRTOX_OVERFLOW
bit is set.
> > + if (likely(res != ULLONG_MAX)) {
>
> Have you seen David's question about these checks?
> Maybe I missed your answer...
>
> > + if (unlikely(res & (~0ull << 60))) {
The first check may be dropped indeed (assuming check_mul_overflow(ULLONG_MAX, a, b)
and check_add_overflow(ULLONG_MAX, a, b) always signals an overflow).
Dmitry
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 13+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v6 2/5] lib: fix memparse() to handle overflow
2026-02-09 16:47 [PATCH v6 0/5] lib and lib/cmdline enhancements Dmitry Antipov
2026-02-09 16:47 ` [PATCH v6 1/5] lib: fix _parse_integer_limit() to handle overflow Dmitry Antipov
@ 2026-02-09 16:47 ` Dmitry Antipov
2026-02-10 7:51 ` Andy Shevchenko
2026-02-09 16:47 ` [PATCH v6 3/5] lib: add more string to 64-bit integer conversion overflow tests Dmitry Antipov
` (3 subsequent siblings)
5 siblings, 1 reply; 13+ messages in thread
From: Dmitry Antipov @ 2026-02-09 16:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andy Shevchenko, Andrew Morton
Cc: Kees Cook, Darrick J . Wong, linux-hardening, linux-kernel,
Dmitry Antipov
Since '_parse_integer_limit()' (and so 'simple_strtoull()') is now
capable to handle overflow, adjust 'memparse()' to handle overflow
(denoted by ULLONG_MAX) returned from 'simple_strtoull()'. Also
use 'check_shl_overflow()' to catch an overflow possibly caused
by processing size suffix and denote it with ULLONG_MAX as well.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Antipov <dmantipov@yandex.ru>
---
v6: handle valid-suffix-only string like "k"
as unrecognized, minor style adjustments
v5: initial version to join the series
---
lib/cmdline.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/cmdline.c b/lib/cmdline.c
index 90ed997d9570..0d8770a0fb67 100644
--- a/lib/cmdline.c
+++ b/lib/cmdline.c
@@ -150,39 +150,57 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_options);
unsigned long long memparse(const char *ptr, char **retptr)
{
char *endptr; /* local pointer to end of parsed string */
-
unsigned long long ret = simple_strtoull(ptr, &endptr, 0);
+ unsigned int shl = 0;
+ /* Consume valid suffix even in case of overflow. */
switch (*endptr) {
case 'E':
case 'e':
- ret <<= 10;
+ shl += 10;
fallthrough;
case 'P':
case 'p':
- ret <<= 10;
+ shl += 10;
fallthrough;
case 'T':
case 't':
- ret <<= 10;
+ shl += 10;
fallthrough;
case 'G':
case 'g':
- ret <<= 10;
+ shl += 10;
fallthrough;
case 'M':
case 'm':
- ret <<= 10;
+ shl += 10;
fallthrough;
case 'K':
case 'k':
- ret <<= 10;
+ shl += 10;
endptr++;
fallthrough;
default:
break;
}
+ if (shl) {
+ /* Valid suffix without preceding number. */
+ if (unlikely(ptr == endptr - 1)) {
+ endptr--;
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+ /* Apply suffix if no overflow. */
+ else if (likely(ret != ULLONG_MAX)) {
+ unsigned long long val;
+
+ if (unlikely(check_shl_overflow(ret, shl, &val)))
+ ret = ULLONG_MAX;
+ else
+ ret = val;
+ }
+ }
+
if (retptr)
*retptr = endptr;
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 13+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v6 2/5] lib: fix memparse() to handle overflow
2026-02-09 16:47 ` [PATCH v6 2/5] lib: fix memparse() " Dmitry Antipov
@ 2026-02-10 7:51 ` Andy Shevchenko
2026-02-12 11:21 ` Dmitry Antipov
0 siblings, 1 reply; 13+ messages in thread
From: Andy Shevchenko @ 2026-02-10 7:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Dmitry Antipov
Cc: Andrew Morton, Kees Cook, Darrick J . Wong, linux-hardening,
linux-kernel
On Mon, Feb 09, 2026 at 07:47:54PM +0300, Dmitry Antipov wrote:
> Since '_parse_integer_limit()' (and so 'simple_strtoull()') is now
> capable to handle overflow, adjust 'memparse()' to handle overflow
> (denoted by ULLONG_MAX) returned from 'simple_strtoull()'. Also
> use 'check_shl_overflow()' to catch an overflow possibly caused
> by processing size suffix and denote it with ULLONG_MAX as well.
...
> unsigned long long memparse(const char *ptr, char **retptr)
> {
> char *endptr; /* local pointer to end of parsed string */
> -
> unsigned long long ret = simple_strtoull(ptr, &endptr, 0);
> + unsigned int shl = 0;
>
> + /* Consume valid suffix even in case of overflow. */
> switch (*endptr) {
> case 'E':
> case 'e':
> - ret <<= 10;
> + shl += 10;
> fallthrough;
> case 'P':
> case 'p':
> - ret <<= 10;
> + shl += 10;
> fallthrough;
> case 'T':
> case 't':
> - ret <<= 10;
> + shl += 10;
> fallthrough;
> case 'G':
> case 'g':
> - ret <<= 10;
> + shl += 10;
> fallthrough;
> case 'M':
> case 'm':
> - ret <<= 10;
> + shl += 10;
> fallthrough;
> case 'K':
> case 'k':
> - ret <<= 10;
> + shl += 10;
> endptr++;
> fallthrough;
> default:
> break;
> }
> + if (shl) {
> + /* Valid suffix without preceding number. */
> + if (unlikely(ptr == endptr - 1)) {
I believe this can be optimised with the endptr++ moved somewhere here.
I have not yet a clear picture in my mind, just gut feelings, so please
try to think about it. With that we won't need endptr--.
> + endptr--;
> + ret = 0;
Wouldn't ret be already 0 here?
> + }
> + /* Apply suffix if no overflow. */
> + else if (likely(ret != ULLONG_MAX)) {
Should be (style)
/* Apply suffix if no overflow. */
} else if (likely(ret != ULLONG_MAX)) {
> + unsigned long long val;
> +
> + if (unlikely(check_shl_overflow(ret, shl, &val)))
> + ret = ULLONG_MAX;
> + else
> + ret = val;
> + }
> + }
Strictly speaking this is an ABI breakage. I dunno how many (broken) strings
will stop working after this check.
--
With Best Regards,
Andy Shevchenko
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 13+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v6 2/5] lib: fix memparse() to handle overflow
2026-02-10 7:51 ` Andy Shevchenko
@ 2026-02-12 11:21 ` Dmitry Antipov
0 siblings, 0 replies; 13+ messages in thread
From: Dmitry Antipov @ 2026-02-12 11:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andy Shevchenko
Cc: Andrew Morton, Kees Cook, Darrick J . Wong, linux-hardening,
linux-kernel
On Tue, 2026-02-10 at 09:51 +0200, Andy Shevchenko wrote:
> Strictly speaking this is an ABI breakage. I dunno how many (broken) strings
> will stop working after this check.
Yes, but this is for the corner case only (where ULLONG_MAX is used instead of
ignoring an overflow). And finding more bugs is better than silently hiding them.
Dmitry
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 13+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v6 3/5] lib: add more string to 64-bit integer conversion overflow tests
2026-02-09 16:47 [PATCH v6 0/5] lib and lib/cmdline enhancements Dmitry Antipov
2026-02-09 16:47 ` [PATCH v6 1/5] lib: fix _parse_integer_limit() to handle overflow Dmitry Antipov
2026-02-09 16:47 ` [PATCH v6 2/5] lib: fix memparse() " Dmitry Antipov
@ 2026-02-09 16:47 ` Dmitry Antipov
2026-02-09 16:47 ` [PATCH v6 4/5] lib/cmdline_kunit: add test case for memparse() Dmitry Antipov
` (2 subsequent siblings)
5 siblings, 0 replies; 13+ messages in thread
From: Dmitry Antipov @ 2026-02-09 16:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andy Shevchenko, Andrew Morton
Cc: Kees Cook, Darrick J . Wong, linux-hardening, linux-kernel,
Dmitry Antipov
Add a few more string to 64-bit integer conversion tests to
check whether 'kstrtoull()', 'kstrtoll()', 'kstrtou64()' and
'kstrtos64()' can handle overflows reported by
'_parse_integer_limit()'.
Suggested-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Antipov <dmantipov@yandex.ru>
---
v6: likewise
v5: bump version to match the series
v4: initial version to join the series
---
lib/test-kstrtox.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/lib/test-kstrtox.c b/lib/test-kstrtox.c
index ee87fef66cb5..811128d0df16 100644
--- a/lib/test-kstrtox.c
+++ b/lib/test-kstrtox.c
@@ -198,6 +198,7 @@ static void __init test_kstrtoull_fail(void)
{"10000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000", 2},
{"2000000000000000000000", 8},
{"18446744073709551616", 10},
+ {"569202370375329612767", 10},
{"10000000000000000", 16},
/* negative */
{"-0", 0},
@@ -275,9 +276,11 @@ static void __init test_kstrtoll_fail(void)
{"9223372036854775809", 10},
{"18446744073709551614", 10},
{"18446744073709551615", 10},
+ {"569202370375329612767", 10},
{"-9223372036854775809", 10},
{"-18446744073709551614", 10},
{"-18446744073709551615", 10},
+ {"-569202370375329612767", 10},
/* sign is first character if any */
{"-+1", 0},
{"-+1", 8},
@@ -334,6 +337,7 @@ static void __init test_kstrtou64_fail(void)
{"-1", 10},
{"18446744073709551616", 10},
{"18446744073709551617", 10},
+ {"569202370375329612767", 10},
};
TEST_FAIL(kstrtou64, u64, "%llu", test_u64_fail);
}
@@ -386,6 +390,8 @@ static void __init test_kstrtos64_fail(void)
{"18446744073709551615", 10},
{"18446744073709551616", 10},
{"18446744073709551617", 10},
+ {"569202370375329612767", 10},
+ {"-569202370375329612767", 10},
};
TEST_FAIL(kstrtos64, s64, "%lld", test_s64_fail);
}
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 13+ messages in thread* [PATCH v6 4/5] lib/cmdline_kunit: add test case for memparse()
2026-02-09 16:47 [PATCH v6 0/5] lib and lib/cmdline enhancements Dmitry Antipov
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2026-02-09 16:47 ` [PATCH v6 3/5] lib: add more string to 64-bit integer conversion overflow tests Dmitry Antipov
@ 2026-02-09 16:47 ` Dmitry Antipov
2026-02-09 16:47 ` [PATCH v6 5/5] lib/cmdline: adjust a few comments to fix kernel-doc -Wreturn warnings Dmitry Antipov
2026-02-10 7:53 ` [PATCH v6 0/5] lib and lib/cmdline enhancements Andy Shevchenko
5 siblings, 0 replies; 13+ messages in thread
From: Dmitry Antipov @ 2026-02-09 16:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andy Shevchenko, Andrew Morton
Cc: Kees Cook, Darrick J . Wong, linux-hardening, linux-kernel,
Dmitry Antipov
Better late than never, now there is a long-awaited basic
test for 'memparse()' which is provided by cmdline.c.
Suggested-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Antipov <dmantipov@yandex.ru>
---
v6: tests to check whether valid-suffix-only string is handled as unrecognized
v5: even more tests to trigger overflow with size suffix
v4: move actual overflow tests to test-kstrtox.c
v3: adjust style as suggested by Andy
v2: few more test cases to trigger overflows
---
lib/tests/cmdline_kunit.c | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 55 insertions(+)
diff --git a/lib/tests/cmdline_kunit.c b/lib/tests/cmdline_kunit.c
index c1602f797637..4827c4753386 100644
--- a/lib/tests/cmdline_kunit.c
+++ b/lib/tests/cmdline_kunit.c
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
#include <kunit/test.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/sizes.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
static const char *cmdline_test_strings[] = {
@@ -139,11 +140,65 @@ static void cmdline_test_range(struct kunit *test)
} while (++i < ARRAY_SIZE(cmdline_test_range_strings));
}
+struct cmdline_test_memparse_entry {
+ const char *input;
+ const char *unrecognized;
+ unsigned long long result;
+};
+
+static const struct cmdline_test_memparse_entry testdata[] = {
+ { "0", "", 0ULL },
+ { "1", "", 1ULL },
+ { "a", "a", 0ULL },
+ { "k", "k", 0ULL },
+ { "E", "E", 0ULL },
+ { "0xb", "", 11ULL },
+ { "0xz", "x", 0ULL },
+ { "1234", "", 1234ULL },
+ { "04567", "", 2423ULL },
+ { "0x9876", "", 39030LL },
+ { "05678", "8", 375ULL },
+ { "0xabcdefz", "z", 11259375ULL },
+ { "0cdba", "c", 0ULL },
+ { "4K", "", SZ_4K },
+ { "0x10k@0xaaaabbbb", "@", SZ_16K },
+ { "32M", "", SZ_32M },
+ { "067m:foo", ":", 55 * SZ_1M },
+ { "2G;bar=baz", ";", SZ_2G },
+ { "07gz", "z", 7ULL * SZ_1G },
+ { "3T+data", "+", 3 * SZ_1T },
+ { "04t,ro", ",", SZ_4T },
+ { "012p", "", 11258999068426240ULL },
+ { "7P,sync", ",", 7881299347898368ULL },
+ { "0x2e", "", 46ULL },
+ { "2E and more", " ", 2305843009213693952ULL },
+ { "18446744073709551615", "", ULLONG_MAX },
+ { "1111111111111111111T", "", ULLONG_MAX },
+ { "222222222222222222222G", "", ULLONG_MAX },
+ { "3333333333333333333333M", "", ULLONG_MAX },
+};
+
+static void cmdline_test_memparse(struct kunit *test)
+{
+ const struct cmdline_test_memparse_entry *e;
+ unsigned long long ret;
+ char *retptr;
+
+ for (e = testdata; e < testdata + ARRAY_SIZE(testdata); e++) {
+ ret = memparse(e->input, &retptr);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ_MSG(test, ret, e->result,
+ " when parsing '%s'", e->input);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ_MSG(test, *retptr, *e->unrecognized,
+ " when parsing '%s'", e->input);
+ }
+}
+
static struct kunit_case cmdline_test_cases[] = {
KUNIT_CASE(cmdline_test_noint),
KUNIT_CASE(cmdline_test_lead_int),
KUNIT_CASE(cmdline_test_tail_int),
KUNIT_CASE(cmdline_test_range),
+ KUNIT_CASE(cmdline_test_memparse),
{}
};
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 13+ messages in thread* [PATCH v6 5/5] lib/cmdline: adjust a few comments to fix kernel-doc -Wreturn warnings
2026-02-09 16:47 [PATCH v6 0/5] lib and lib/cmdline enhancements Dmitry Antipov
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2026-02-09 16:47 ` [PATCH v6 4/5] lib/cmdline_kunit: add test case for memparse() Dmitry Antipov
@ 2026-02-09 16:47 ` Dmitry Antipov
2026-02-10 7:53 ` [PATCH v6 0/5] lib and lib/cmdline enhancements Andy Shevchenko
5 siblings, 0 replies; 13+ messages in thread
From: Dmitry Antipov @ 2026-02-09 16:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andy Shevchenko, Andrew Morton
Cc: Kees Cook, Darrick J . Wong, linux-hardening, linux-kernel,
Dmitry Antipov
Fix 'get_option()', 'memparse()' and 'parse_option_str()' comments
to match the commonly used style as suggested by kernel-doc -Wreturn.
Suggested-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Antipov <dmantipov@yandex.ru>
---
v3 and upwards: likewise
v2: bump version to match the series
---
lib/cmdline.c | 7 +++++--
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/cmdline.c b/lib/cmdline.c
index 0d8770a0fb67..d21075f0c5d7 100644
--- a/lib/cmdline.c
+++ b/lib/cmdline.c
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ static int get_range(char **str, int *pint, int n)
* When @pint is NULL the function can be used as a validator of
* the current option in the string.
*
- * Return values:
+ * Return:
* 0 - no int in string
* 1 - int found, no subsequent comma
* 2 - int found including a subsequent comma
@@ -145,6 +145,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_options);
*
* Parses a string into a number. The number stored at @ptr is
* potentially suffixed with K, M, G, T, P, E.
+ *
+ * Return: The value as recognized by simple_strtoull() multiplied
+ * by the value as specified by suffix, if any.
*/
unsigned long long memparse(const char *ptr, char **retptr)
@@ -216,7 +219,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(memparse);
* This function parses a string containing a comma-separated list of
* strings like a=b,c.
*
- * Return true if there's such option in the string, or return false.
+ * Return: True if there's such option in the string or false otherwise.
*/
bool parse_option_str(const char *str, const char *option)
{
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 13+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v6 0/5] lib and lib/cmdline enhancements
2026-02-09 16:47 [PATCH v6 0/5] lib and lib/cmdline enhancements Dmitry Antipov
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2026-02-09 16:47 ` [PATCH v6 5/5] lib/cmdline: adjust a few comments to fix kernel-doc -Wreturn warnings Dmitry Antipov
@ 2026-02-10 7:53 ` Andy Shevchenko
5 siblings, 0 replies; 13+ messages in thread
From: Andy Shevchenko @ 2026-02-10 7:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Dmitry Antipov
Cc: Andrew Morton, Kees Cook, Darrick J . Wong, linux-hardening,
linux-kernel
On Mon, Feb 09, 2026 at 07:47:52PM +0300, Dmitry Antipov wrote:
> Adjust '_parse_integer_limit()' and 'memparse()' to not ignore
> overflows, extend string to 64-bit integer conversion tests, add
> KUnit-based test for 'memparse()' and fix kernel-doc glitches
> found in lib/cmdline.c.
Thanks for the update!
I have some minor comments per patch 1, and one main Q in patch 2 about ABI.
--
With Best Regards,
Andy Shevchenko
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 13+ messages in thread