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From: Alejandro Colomar <alx+linux-hardening@kernel.org>
To: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>, Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.cz>,
	 Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
	linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: seq_buf_putc() and strings
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2026 18:30:30 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <auIww9qfX9EF6LXq@devuan> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <auIrUV7A8eF8DCGG@devuan>

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> Date: 2026-10-28 18:13:43+0100
> From: Alejandro Colomar <alx+linux-hardening@kernel.org>
>
> Hi Steven,
> 
> 
> I've been looking at rewriting seq_buf with pointers instead of sizes.
> While doing that, I've found one place which writes to seq_buf without
> forming a proper string (that is, a null-terminated string).
> 
> 	$ git show v7.3:lib/seq_buf.c | grepc seq_buf_putc
> 	(standard input):int seq_buf_putc(struct seq_buf *s, unsigned char c)
> 	{
> 		WARN_ON(s->size == 0);
> 
> 		if (seq_buf_can_fit(s, 1)) {
> 			s->buffer[s->len++] = c;
> 			return 0;
> 		}
> 		seq_buf_set_overflow(s);
> 		return -1;
> 	}
> 
> I think a safe API for handling strings would have to make sure that it
> *always* holds a string.  I think this function should write a NUL byte
> after the byte written, and so, I suggest doing this:
> 
> 	 		s->buffer[s->len++] = c;
> 	+		s->buffer[s->len] = '\0';
> 
> Are there any reasons to not write that NUL byte?

Or to simplify, we could rewrite the function entirely as:

	 int seq_buf_putc(struct seq_buf *s, unsigned char c)
	 {
	-       WARN_ON(s->size == 0);
	-
	-       if (seq_buf_can_fit(s, 1)) {
	-               s->buffer[s->len++] = c;
	-               return 0;
	-       }
	-       seq_buf_set_overflow(s);
	-       return -1;
	+       return seq_buf_puts(s, (char [2]){c, '\0'});
	 }

It involves one more function call, but I suspect that overhead is
going to be negligible.


Cheers,
Alex

-- 
<https://www.alejandro-colomar.es>

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  reply	other threads:[~2026-10-28 17:30 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-10-28 17:13 seq_buf_putc() and strings Alejandro Colomar
2026-10-28 17:30 ` Alejandro Colomar [this message]
2026-10-28 17:47 ` Steven Rostedt
2026-10-28 18:00   ` Alejandro Colomar
2026-10-28 20:59 ` seq_buf_used() return value on overflow Alejandro Colomar
2026-10-28 21:03   ` Alejandro Colomar
2026-10-28 21:30 ` seq_buf_str() silent truncation (data corruption) Alejandro Colomar
2026-10-29  1:04   ` Steven Rostedt
2026-10-29 11:48     ` Alejandro Colomar

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